



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

Welcome to RIHSAC 96

Dilip Sinha, Secretary, RIHSAC

10 June 2014



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

ORR European update

Oliver Stewart

10 June 2014

European elections

- Changes to parliament
- New President of the Commission, Commissioner for Transport and chair and members of Transport and Tourism Committee
- Likely to be in position by the Autumn

Fourth Railway Package

- Opening passenger railways market to new entrants and services from December 2019
- Making rail more competitive with other transport modes
- Simplifying the processes for running cross border services
- Package consists of technical, market and political pillars
- 'General approach' on the technical pillar agreed on 10 October 2013



Single safety certificate

- Currently a Railway Undertaking requires a Part A and a Part B safety certificate to run services
- The content of a single certificate will be broadly the same as an existing Part A and B
- Intended to remove barriers/ facilitate market opening
- ORR representing the UK government at the EC task force to put in place requirements for SSC
- Working assumption of being ready in 3 years

Fourth Railway Package – Safety Directive

- Applicant declares ‘area of operation’
- ERA delivers safety certificate if area of operation covers more than one member state
- ERA consult all relevant NSAs to assess compliance with national rules
- If operation is in one Member State only, the applicant can choose ERA or the NSA

Fourth Railway Package – Interoperability Directive

- Applicant declares ‘area of use’
- ERA delivers authorisation to place on the market if area of use covers more than one member state
- RU checks compatibility with national rules for area of use
- If operation is in one Member State only, the applicant can choose ERA or the NSA

Fourth Railway Package – next steps

- Trilogue – Commission, MS, Parliament
- ORR working with other NSAs on future cooperation arrangements with ERA
- Discussion now focused on the ‘market’ and ‘political’ pillars

Revision of CSM for Conformity Assessment and CSM for Supervision

- EC mandate to revise CSMs
- Lack of harmonisation between NSAs
- Safety culture/ SMS not sufficiently embedded in Europe
- More detail about what is expected from CA and supervision
- Avoid anything too detailed or prescriptive
- Shouldn't mean a major change to the criteria themselves, but the evidence a duty holder will need to give
- Evidence ORR expect is in our guidance. This will be reviewed as necessary

Entities in Charge of Maintenance

- Certification of ECMs for freight wagons introduced in 2011
- ORR issued 9 ECM certificates
- Beneficial to RU
- Possible extension to cover passenger all vehicles



Rail Accident Investigation Branch

ORR Railway Industry Health and Safety Advisory Committee
Tuesday 10 June 2014

**Landslips affecting
Network Rail infrastructure
June 2012-Feb 2013**

RAIB Report 08/2014
published April 2014

Chris Ford
Principal Inspector

The RAIB report


six accidents

two themes

- effects on railway from neighbouring land
- responses to unusual weather conditions




The accidents



- Loch Treig (near Tulloch/Fort William) 28 June 2012
- Falls of Cruachan (on the line to Oban) 18 July 2012
- Rosyth (near Edinburgh) 18 July 2012
- St Bees (Cumbria) 30 August 2012;
- Bargoed (South Wales) on 30 January 2013; and
- Hatfield Colliery (South Yorkshire) on 11 February 2013.

Difficulty of predicting landslips (1)

- water adversely affects slope stability but rainfall/water accumulation cannot be predicted with accuracy




- existing drainage arrangements below modern design standards
.....and not always reliable

Difficulty of predicting landslips (2)

- natural weathering processes
 - weaken ground, increasing likelihood of instability
- land use changes in surrounding area affect timing/amount of water reaching the railway
- vegetation changes with time influencing
 - water accumulation in ground
 - soil strength (roots can strengthen ground)
- many railway cuttings and embankments steeper slopes than modern slopes

...accurate prediction not possible, hence risk based management
...sometimes little/no indication of possible instability
...sometimes impractical for railway to recognise risk

Managing Network Rail earthworks



Previous RAIB investigations



Previous recommendations, targeted primarily at **within** the railway boundary, cover:

- effective examination process
 - Moy, Hooley cutting, Management of existing earthworks, Gillingham, Falls of Cruachan (June 2010 accident), Dryclough Junction.
- effective management of earthworks
 - Moy, Oubeck North, Hooley cutting, recommendations, Management of existing earthworks, Gillingham, Falls of Cruachan (2010)
- effective drainage
 - Moy, Oubeck North, Gillingham
- adverse weather response
 - Management of existing earthworks

Landslips investigation

Key issues (illustrated with examples)

- Management of risk from neighbouring land:
 - factors which examiners cannot see from within the boundary
 - neighbours land management strategy (incl. incompatibility between practice and NR's standard for reviewing this)
 - changes between examinations
 - opportunities to use new technology

- Operational controls:


- where should mitigation be applied
 - likelihood of instability
 - consequence
- what mitigation should be taken
- when to mitigate (heavy rainfall will/may/is occurring)

Taking account of improvements introduced by Network Rail since December 2012 (ORR improvement notice)

Legal position (simplified)


- Neighbours have duties relating to
 - landslips depositing debris on (or undermining) railway land
 - ineffective drainage or inappropriate water discharge causing landslips on neighbouring
- H&SAW covers only work activities
- Civil law complex, neighbours duties can depend on:
 - what is reasonable (can consider financial circumstances of parties)
 - whether resulting from a neighbours action or a natural process
 - whether English or Scottish law
- NR must take reasonable steps to manage risk from neighbouring land ...but this does not mean a requirement to recognise all risks
- RAIB experience is that NR sometimes take a pragmatic approach to achieving desired outcomes

Loch Treig June 2012



Loch Treig (cont'd)


- landslip area not visible from railway
- land management & general landslip risk visible from railway
- high consequence location
- trigger probably localised heavy rainfall
- no operational mitigation (heavy rainfall forecast, site not on at-risk list)



Bargoed January 2013




- high consequence location
- adjacent to July 2012 landslip



Barged (cont'd)

- land management & general landslip (water flow) risk visible from railway
- ground saturated (five day rainfall 1 in 7 year return period)
- no operational mitigation (forecast one day rainfall not sufficient to trigger this)
- site not on at-risk list despite adjacent slip in July 2012 (marginal, Nov 2011 exam)
- first train of day



St Bees August 2012



- four earthwork failures within ~ 3 km
- high consequence location

St Bees (cont'd)

- land management & general landslip risk visible from railway
- high consequence location
- site not on at-risk (serviceable, 2005 exam)
- 1 in 57 year return period storm previous night ground
- no operational mitigation (heavy rain not forecast)
- severe local non-railway disruption
- first train of day



Hatfield colliery

February 2013




Rail Accident Investigation Branch

- tip mainly constructed since last examination in 2009 (four years before movement)
- slow ground movement, trains stopped 'safely'
- NR geotechnical staff unaware, no consideration of risk
- if risk considered, NR could have concluded **reasonable to rely on colliery management process** (Aberfan & subsequent legislation)




Falls of Cruachan July 2012




Falls of Cruachan (cont'd)

- culvert not visible from railway
- landowner unaware of culvert (so not maintaining it), in SSSI
- trigger for blocking culvert uncertain (rainfall not unusual)
- high consequence location
- **was mitigation practical (ALARP) for July 2012 event?**




Rosyth July 2012



Rosyth (cont'd)

- little evidence of potential slope instability (serviceable, 2004/05 exam)
- no operational mitigation (heavy rain forecast & occurred, site not on at-risk list)
- trigger was exceptional runoff from gently sloping adjacent waste land
- **was mitigation practical (ALARP) for July 2012 event?**



Key recommendations

- Improvements to managing neighbouring land
 - obtain info not visible from railway (not seen by examiners)
 - using modern technology
(incl use of aerial images, IT, real time rain sensors)
 - identify neighbours actions between examinations
- Obtain information about unusual rain/flooding from emergency services, other transport operators, all rail staff, rain sensors
- Prompt updating of list of areas where operational mitigation should be applied during heavy rainfall
- Don't automatically apply only new landslip risk mitigation procedure in very extreme conditions (new NR operational mitigation process negated need for major recs in this area)
- Correct anomaly which means NR do not always consider some safety critical information provided by examiners

Lessons from Gatwick

Robert Gifford

Passenger Focus/London TravelWatch

It's not completely the same!

- Significantly higher numbers of people
- External forces – planes from overseas
- Far more luggage to deal with
- Two terminals

But it could be the same

- Impact of weather
- Airport operator and different airlines
- Gold, silver and bronze command structures
- Public and media interest

What happened?

- Overnight high winds and heavy rain
- Flooding took out key equipment
- Flights cancelled
- Luggage and passengers separated

Two subsequent inquiries

- Transport Select Committee
- Macmillan report commissioned by Gatwick Airport
- Government response awaited

Transport Committee Report

- Poor and inconsistent provision of information
- Lack of clarity over who was in charge
- Lack of basic facilities
- Confusion over expenses to claim for

McMillan Report

- Identified flood risk – fluvial and pluvial!
- Need for effective communication between operational stakeholders
- A “can-do” mentality
- Crisis Management Manual: Detect, Assess, Plan, Act, Review

What Lessons?

- Passenger Champions/Captains
- The role of the police
- Contingency planning essential
- Public address systems/information flows

And for the railways?

- Network Rail responsibility for the assets
- Downstream effects of disruption
- Key terminals (Euston April 26 – I was there)
- Passenger Advisory Groups
- Getting people home



Association of Train Operating Companies

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

**Operations, Engineering and
Major Projects.**

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

- Any issues causing Customers' Concern is important
- Open to learn from events elsewhere and good practices from any source
- On a journey to think customer - for the 30 years I've been in Rail, and still on that journey
- Can we learn? Yes!

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

- Reviewed
 - Transport Select Committee Report HC956
 - McMillan Report to GAL
 - The problem statement from John
 - Where we are internally
- Our current guidance – over 13 documents

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

- Where could it all go wrong?
 - Train between stations
 - At stations
- Of the two the former more challenging
- The latter probably easier to manage than airport but still need to learn

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Reference	Applies to Trains	Applies to Stations	Comments
TSC: Airport plan not agreed with airlines	Y	Y	Contingency plans for both situations and agreed between TOCS,
TSC: Contingency plan fails to deal with circumstances	Y	Y	Some worst case scenarios are really challenging particularly on train – no plan can deal with everything
TSC: Degree of flooding not foreseen	Y	Y	Industry National Task Force has weather resilience and climate change programme (WRCCP)
TSC: Plans not tested	Y	Y	Always a challenge – how do you test on an operational railway?
TSC: No contingency plan to bring in toilets/refreshments	Y	N	Looking after passengers if stranded, guidance covers many issues including these. On stations facilities exist outside.
TSC: Provision of alternative PA	N	Partly	Will review with industry partners as part of this process
TSC: Contingency to move check in not tested	N	N	If station shut or no train service we redirect customers as we Are `walk on service`
TSC: Information screens down	Y	Y	Still a challenge but easier to manage on train than on station – will review guidance with industry partners

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Reference	Applies to Trains	Applies to Stations	Comments
TSC: Customers couldn't check in	N	N	
TSC: Customers couldn't drop off baggage	N	N	
TSC: Loss of toilets	Y	Y	Problem on trains if power cut – recognised impractical At stations – can use trains or nearby premises
TSC: Emergency planning meetings not minuted	N	Y	Personally surprised how they cannot have been, not about the situation every meeting should be noted in any business
TSC: Bussing between terminals not agreed with airlines	N	Y	Arrangements exist for pre-planned and emergency use of other TOCs trains via alternative stations
TSC: Focus on planes not customers	Y	Y	We are on a journey, discussion as recent as last week. All guidance based on think <u>customer</u> not train.

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Reference	Applies to Trains	Applies to Stations	Comments
TSC: Develop protocols that trigger cancellation or postponement	Y	Y	Each TOC and NR Route have agreed process for making the decision
TSC: Airports to take lead in welfare provision	Y	Partly	Guidance for trains make this explicit specific. On stations – unlikely issue people will have specific needs that can't be met by environment nearby
TSC: Confusion over carriers accepting other's customers	Y	Y	Plans are agreed and used to ensure customers don't get penalised
TSC: Passengers poorly informed of their rights	Y	Y	Websites and printed material provide info. A review completed for National Task Force – buy in from all TOCs to our 40 recommendations for improved customer information
GAL: Review flood prevention	Y	Y	Part of reason for setting up Weather Resilience and Climate Change Steering Group. Will also pick up with industry partners
GAL: Backup power for critical systems	Y	Y	Trains: Loadshedding and staff presence Stations: Less critical but will pick up in review discussions

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Reference	Applies to Trains	Applies to Stations	Comments
GAL: Move sensitive equipment from susceptible location	N	Y	This is a UK wide issue, , e.g. finance centres in the City. In part covered by WRCCP. Also part of Government and ORR dialogue with industry long-term. Pick up in review
GAL: Contingency plans received with airlines	Y	Y	Plans are agreed between TOCS and NR Routes
GAL: Contingency plans to be shared with airlines	Y	Y	They are shared
GAL: Definition of Gold, Silver and Bronze to airline	Y	Y	Railways use UK definitions
GAL: Passenger Champions	Y	Y	Already recommended in guidance is dealing with incidents

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Some reasons why stations are less of a problem than airports

- It is suspension of the train service that causes the problem, not the inability to check in people/bags
- Trains will usually be operating from an alternative point (e.g. if Kings Cross shut, trains start Finsbury Park and/or passengers can be sent to St. Pancras/Euston)
- Large stations are typically in city centres so customers have alternative options (whether for transport or food/drink/accommodation)

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Some reasons why trains are potentially more of a problem than planes

- Low staff to customer ratio
- Train may not be accessible (if stranded on open running line)
- Many trains do not convey refreshments
- One stranded train can lead to another
- Tendency for self-evacuation (a stranded plane is generally self contained)

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

- Can we learn? Yes
 - Look at specifics for stations, with industry partners
 - Loss of power to CIS/PA a challenge

Need to continue to address soft issues so that

- Customers know we understand
- We can demonstrate we are in control – hence reassure
- Customers know that we recognise annoyance, frustration, unease, and stress

Looking After Customers When it All Goes Wrong

Also a role for Government and Regulator to send right signals re longer term climate change

We have to show empathy, assurance and Responsiveness to all customers

We need to plan for expected - unexpected events handled well turn those involved in them into advocates



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

ORR's Occupational Health Programme 2014-19: making it happen

John Gillespie, Occupational Health Programme Chair

RIHSAC June 2014



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

Context

National Context

- ▶ Absenteeism : £320M per annum, if coupled with “presenteeism” £790M per annum,
 - ▶ A 10% cut in overall impaired health costs would realise a saving of £79M (RSSB, 2014)
- ▶ ONS (2012) av Lost time rate 1.8%, rail is 3.9%
- ▶ Last 4 years clearer and better understanding of the problem areas :
 - ▶ HAVS, asbestos management, ballast dust and welding fumes
 - ▶ Musculoskeletal disorders including manual handling,
 - ▶ Lack of data to target where to improve
 - ▶ Lack of structure for delivering health risk management systems
- ▶ Cross government agenda on health and on engagement



CIRAS Risks Catastrophic, Health & Safety

mantra "health like safety"

EDITION 48
September/October 2013

CIRAS

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING FOR SAFETY

CIRAS is a confidential reporting service that supports reporting of safety incidents and near misses with a view to health and safety reporting.

A safety net for industry www.ciras.org.uk

Human Attention Errors

CIRAS has an active interest in Human Factors. In our May/June newsletter, we looked at mobile technology and its use in the workplace. The way that we behave as individuals and the reasons for this can impact all levels of our daily life. Having an understanding of this makes it clearer why some CIRAS reports are made. The following feature looks at 'Human Attention Errors' and explains how some mistakes occur and what the consequences could be in a safety critical environment.



IN THIS ISSUE

- Human Attention Errors pages 1-2
- Train Operation Reports pages 4,5
- Infrastructure Reports page 6
- Platform and Station Reports page 7
- Freight Reports pages 8-9
- London Underground Reports page 10

To give us further insight, we have spoken to John Thompson who is now responsible for Refranchising East Coast Mainline Company Ltd. Colleagues he worked with in the aftermath of the United States Chatsworth accident in 2006 went on to form the Atticus Consultant Group, which specialises in "attention-related errors."

John has introduced this group to CIRAS and

recently Paul Russell, Head of CIRAS, and John Abbott, National Programme Director at RSSB, were given a very interesting presentation and talk on the subject.

How are Human Attention Errors caused and how can they be reduced?

We all make mistakes, sometimes many throughout our day. Fortunately, the vast majority of these are not safety critical and have minor consequences. We might mistakenly pour salt in

our coffee instead of sugar or place our rubbish in the recycling bin.

These sorts of mistakes are often humorous and at worst irritating, but in railway and public transport operations, seemingly trivial mistakes can have catastrophic consequences. Passing a signal at danger or a momentary distraction can lead to major violations and potentially tragic accidents.

Why do people make errors that, in some contexts, can lead to catastrophic accidents?

We're only human and our mental resources are limited so we can't concentrate on everything at once. Psychological research refers to these as our 'attentional resources'. If a sufficient amount of these resources are not allocated to the task at hand, such as monitoring for signals or speed, our performance can be negatively impacted.

Telephone 0800 4 101 101 Freepost CIRAS Text 07507 285887

INFRASTRUCTURE REPORTS

Concerns about manual handling and driving telehandlers

Concerns have been raised about perceived unsafe working practices carried out on sites between Doncaster and Peterborough, which are putting staff at risk.

THE CONCERNS

Manual handling of troughing

According to the employee, staff are having to manually lift troughing, weighing approximately 50kg, into position. It is thought that troughing and lifting equipment should be made available whenever lifting troughing is required. However, it is believed that there are not enough telehandlers available and what telehandlers are occasionally made available, the staff on site do not possess the correct tickets to use them. It is felt that manually lifting troughing of this weight could cause injury to staff.

Telehandlers without Bankmen

There are concerns that telehandlers are operated without Bankmen on the line. Due to the large size of the telehandler, it is believed that a Bankman should assist the Operator by looking out for any dangers, such as staff walking by or proximity to overhead lines, that the Operator may not necessarily see.

Consideration for Skyblues

- Provide troughing or lifting equipment whenever troughing needs lifting
- Ensure there are staff on site who possess the correct tickets to use troughing or lifting equipment
- Clarify whether telehandlers require a Bankman
- Investigate whether it would be possible to provide Bankmen when telehandlers are in operation

RESPONSE FROM SKYBLUE

Skyblue have discussed these issues with our client, Carillon Rail, who is responsible for the control of safety on these sites and they have confirmed the following:

Manual handling: Following the report, Carillon Rail suspended trough installations for approximately three weeks in order to review its activity particularly with regards to manual handling.

Carillon Rail consulted with the tough installation team to get their practical input, investigated the use of various mechanical aids and consulted with the manufacturer regarding lighter units. A review of options available identified aids such as vacuum lifters or hook mounted telehandlers often introduced other safety hazards. The solution chosen was to purchase lighter units, which are now being used to the 5kg weight of the original site.

The installation process now involves placing the new trough sections in advance at pre-planned locations. Mechanical means are now used to reduce the element of manual lifting. A two person, non-stone handled lift and slant positioning is also used. Gangways have been selected to ensure the lifting activity is robust amongst the teams and individual additional health assessments along with specific manual handling training using this equipment to minimise any risk of injury.

Control of vehicles: Carillon Rail confirmed that a Bankman is required to control the movement of telehandlers and all other moving plants. Following the report they identified a shortfall in the availability of competent Bankmen, and an additional 13 people have now been trained at Doncaster and Wokingham through compounds.

ACTIONS TAKEN BY SKYBLUE

- Lighter site are now being used
- Additional Bankmen have been employed

EDITION 49
January/February 2014

CIRAS

CONFIDENTIAL REPORTING FOR SAFETY

CIRAS is a confidential reporting service that supports reporting of safety incidents and near misses with a view to health and safety reporting.

A safety net for industry www.ciras.org.uk

Workforce health and wellbeing

Working in a healthy environment is important for everyone, regardless of what industry you're in. Being well rested, eating the right foods and having a balance between your work and home life can all help contribute towards a healthier lifestyle and thriving workplace. At CIRAS, we wanted to know what you think makes a healthy working environment so we asked for some input to this.

Thomas Ward, a member of Station Staff for First TransPennine Express at Thornaby station, and Colin Thompson, Health and Safety Adviser for Coyle Rail, have given us their outlook on what it is that makes the workplace a healthy place to be.



IN THIS ISSUE

- Health and Wellbeing pages 1-3
- Train Operation Reports pages 4,5
- Signalling Reports page 6
- Train Reports page 7
- Infrastructure Reports pages 8-9
- London Underground Reports page 10

What role do you perform within the rail industry?

I have been a member of Station Staff at Thornaby station for 13 years. The role consists of everything from issuing tickets to providing passenger assistance, making announcements to sweeping the floor. I am also

What do you think makes a healthy work environment?

A healthy working environment covers many aspects. Indoor: comfortable seating, a suitable courier and desk height, not having too much or absent task bar, led room, good lighting and ventilation are all important. An appropriate staff area is also essential for both

What prevents a work environment from being healthy?

Floor cleanliness and housekeeping increase the risks of illness or accidents as well as the potential for fire. Building a lack of co-operation. Firm colleagues should also prove a problem.

Do you think health and

physical and psychological well-being issues are given the appropriate attention at work?

I think that great lengths are gone to in monitoring the physical effects on health and wellbeing but there is always room for improvement. We all try and follow the First Group principles regarding occupational health but psychologically there is always going to be a problem as people tend not

Telephone 0800 4 101 101 Freepost CIRAS Text 07507 285887

Implementation of NR Health & Wellbeing Strategy




➤ Chapter 11 : headcount, absence and absence costs

Key messages in this chapter (continued)

- We are looking for Network Rail to improve its occupational health management and in doing so achieve £20m in cost savings in the final year of CP5, with a total saving of £55m in CP5.
- We expect Network Rail to improve its health and safety performance in CP5 and we will monitor its implementation of the strategies on safety and wellbeing and health and wellness.

RSSB Industry Roadmap



ORR's health programme 2010-14

What are we looking to achieve?

<http://orr.gov.uk/what-and-how-we-regulate/health-and-safety/occupational-health>



Our vision is an industry that **consistently** achieves best practice in occupational health

Our health programme aims to

- ▶ **Change how health is led and managed by organisations in the rail industry**
- ▶ Improve how health is regulated by ORR

Shift the balance – health like safety



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

2nd Programme published 28th April 2014



The ORR Occupational Health Programme 2014-19:

making it happen

Health and wellbeing programme summary 2014-19



Scope : Whole industry

Builds on the first programme

Key focus : securing legal compliance

“Assist and encourage” - Collaborative approach, including TU’s

“Measure the capability of health management systems using RM3-H RC6”



OFFICE OF RAIL REGULATION

ORR Programme : What success looks like

Excellence Engagement Efficiency Enabling

What success looks like.....a more proactive management approach

A health risk management system that includes:

Health policies and clear objectives – documented processes;

Health risk management – risk assessments, surveys, reporting;

Health assurance – data driven, audits, performance reviews;

Health promotion & employee engagement e.g. health fairs, communications, training.

Leadership and public commitment to ill-health reduction

Meets legal compliance and striving for excellence

Rail companies informed on the cost of work-related ill-health

Credible, informed, engaged active service-provider – internal/external

Collaboration and working together across industry including trade unions

Raised awareness at managerial/supervisory level and active role for line managers

Pride and communicating to others what works!



Pages 10 & 11 - priorities

- **Proactively managing** health risks
- Implemented **health policy**
- Sign up as partners to the **Responsibility Deal**
- **Drive innovation** in health risk management
- Pursue the activities of the **RSSB Industry Roadmap**
- Pursue **early intervention** on trauma and musculoskeletal disorders
- Improve the use of **good health data**, develop trend & comparators

Pages 10 & 11 - priorities

- Work openly with **trade unions**
- **Share good practice** on what works...ORR website
- Support employees to be more **physically active**
- **Participate** in events/initiatives on “engagement”
- Be aware of **costs**, “at least as good as comparators”
- Raise awareness and **competence on health risk assessment**
- Raise the standard of **passenger experience** and satisfaction on perceptions of health risks and cleanliness

4 E's : Excellence

We will:

Encourage: development of health policy, sign up to DoH Responsibility Deal

Carry out targeted inspections

Liaise with Route Directors, DU's

Carry out RM3 evaluation of management of key health risks

Pursue our stress strategy

Inclusion of health mandatory investigations : Occ Asthma +

Matters of evident concern in RGD 2010-10

Stakeholders will:

- Demonstrate excellence in health risk management as measured by RM3-health
- Develop policies, action plans, etc.
- Engage with trade unions on health risks and costs
- Support employees to be more physically active



4 E's : Engagement

We will:

Implement H&S Communication Strategy

Promote engagement events

Develop the OH webpages on health

Publish the Industry Brief, quarterly & a regular e-bulletin

Health conferences, including the Safety Reps events

Provide input into BDWG, HAVS groups

Collaborate: HSE; Heritage Community on asbestos management; NEBOSH on health training; ARIOPS

Stakeholders will:

- Consider how to improve employee engagement, how this contributes to better risk management and report on this in their CSR policies and public reporting
- Take ownership of Industry Road-map and make it happen
- Engage with trade unions on health risks and costs
- Work collaboratively: on data; on addressing common health risks



4 E's : Efficiency

We will:

Develop reporting metrics in the NR Licence and published Annual Return

Develop indicators

Monitor progress with PR13 and develop approach for PR18

Bench-mark and compare cost data

Consider/promote the Health and Work Assessment and Advisory Service on its inception

Stakeholders will:

- Demonstrate awareness of the costs on ill-health and develop metrics to inform targeting of health interventions
- Adopt good practice by early intervention e.g. physiotherapy and for trauma
- Participate in RSSB Health Economics PWG

4 E's : Enabling

We will:

- Publish RIDDOR + data on the National Rail Trends data portal
- Publish an updated position paper
- Brief Inspectors on RM3-health and EMM applied to health
- Develop legal & compliance framework
- Support inclusion of passenger health concerns in franchising/QuEST
- Publish headline results of Passenger Focus survey & Develop internal comms on health concerns on passengers

Stakeholders will:

- Provide improved health information and assistance to managers
- Participate fully in the repeat baseline survey in 2014

Currently on-going :: planning and talks

- Repeat of the **Industry Position Paper** and **survey**
- Publication of the **quarterly Industry Brief**
- Publication of the **Accent Report** – feedback last 4 years
- Publication of **updated data** on National Rail Trends Portal
- Follow up of **previous inspection / investigation** issues
- Some planned inspection activity
- Development of **case studies** for website



OFFICE OF **RAIL REGULATION**

Questions

John.gillespie@orr.gsi.gov.uk