



ORR Timetable Inquiry

Phase 1 findings, phase 2 objectives

RIHSAC 16 October 2018

“ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance of railways and roads today and in the future”

Introduction

- Me: Matt Westlake
- Background to inquiry
- Phase one – findings
- Phase two – timeline and workstreams

Background to inquiry

- Timetable change on 20 May was followed by severe disruption – particularly on GTR, Northern and TPE routes. Inquiry announced on 4 June by Secretary of State.
- ORR insisted engagement on a formal statutory basis, under usual governance of the Board, independent of government and industry.
- Broad remit, to consider causes and impact.
- Outputs: findings in September, recommendations by end 2018

Methodology

- Treated as an investigation, analogous to a safety incident. We drew heavily upon RSD knowledge (eg: evidence handling).
- Cross-office team, up to 20 individuals at peak
- Engaged external expertise: investigation methodology, passenger focus-groups
- Funded from existing ORR budget, from within economic cost centres. Planned activities were postponed, re-profiled.

Methodology (cont.)

- Submission of more than 2,000 documents for analysis, from industry stakeholders, unions, national / regional government.
- 33 transcribed interviews with senior executives at DfT, NR, TOCS
- Extensive research on passenger impact:
 - Analysis of regular monitoring data on performance, complaints etc
 - 3 focus groups with commuters
 - Discussion with station and on-board staff
 - Over 2,500 responses to online survey
 - Numerous emails, letters from individuals, user groups


Findings: 4 workstreams

- Passenger impact
- Infrastructure planning and delivery
- Timetable planning
- TOC preparedness

Impact on passengers


- Up to 310 scheduled trains did not run each weekday on Northern
- Up to 470 scheduled trains did not run each weekday on GTR
- For services that were not cancelled, severe delays and confusion about which trains were running
- Significant financial and emotional cost to passengers caught in the disruption

‘On time’ performance of passenger services calling at stations across the network between 20 May and 3 June, relative to preceding weeks.




Infrastructure planning and delivery



- North West Electrification Programme (NWEPP)
 - Excessively optimistic approach to planning the 'Bolton Corridor' (NWEPP4)
 - Infrastructure Programme Boards not remitted to review systemic risk
 - Infrastructure timescales not aligned with Timetabling timescales



Infrastructure

- Thameslink Programme
 - Infrastructure completed on time
 - No link found to the timetable disruption





Timetable Development & the System Operator

- Network Rail's System Operator (SO) was in a unique position to understand infrastructure delivery risks and dependent timetabling risks
 - SO was not proactive enough in highlighting the risks to the timetable
 - At the time, the SO did not have sufficient coordinated processes, cooperation and oversight in place to deliver the changes required

- The Part D timetabling process was stretched to breaking point by compression of allowed timescales
 - Late infrastructure delivery in the North and a late decision to replan train services in the South.
 - The industry timetabling teams made extraordinary efforts to complete timetable rewrites

Northern Preparedness

- The factors that caused Northern to have to replan their timetable were outside of their control.
- The late finalisation of the timetable did not allow Northern to plan optimised train crew rosters
- Late running infrastructure works impacted on Northern's driver training plan
- Northern failed to understand or communicate the risks arising from a lack of drivers to operate the 20 May timetable

GTR Preparedness

- Necessary contractual arrangements slowed down the formalisation of the reduction in timetabled trains per hour, meaning it was not aligned with Part D of the timetable process
- The reduction in trains per hour led to more timetable rework than anyone expected
- GTR could not have accelerated the driver diagramming process
- GTR's initial approach to training drivers was inadequate, and these plans were not adequately stress-tested by the Thameslink Programme Board arrangements
- There was not enough contingency to allow the timetable to run once problems occurred
- GTR did not understand the magnitude of risk around drivers and gave assurances to the industry that were in good faith, but wrong

TOC response during disruption

- Passengers were not warned in advance of May 20 of the likely disruption
- Information provided to passengers during disruption was inadequate
- GTR inadequately communicated messages about the poor performance of the timetable to passengers
- Some evidence of failure to provide a service for passengers requiring assistance
- Station / on-board staff performed well but also lacked information

Systemic Issues

- There is diffuse accountability for different programmes across the rail system, leading to a lack of clarity
 - Infrastructure
 - Franchising
 - Rolling Stock Procurement
 - Timetable Development
- There is a gap in the industry management of systemic risk
 - The Thameslink Industry Readiness Board was a recognition of this, but it could not fully manage systemic risk.

ORR's prior role

- We conducted a separate investigation into our own involvement, as regulator, into the various factors behind the May 2018 change.
- This considered various points at which we were involved
 1. Periodic Review for CP5 concluded in 2013
 2. ORR monitoring of the development of Network Rail's timetabling capability
 3. ORR's authorisation of infrastructure and rolling stock.
 4. The operation and management of the regulatory escalator process (through IDRG)
 5. ORR's role on the Thameslink readiness board,
 6. The formal processes involving granting access rights for the new services, which were part of the major timetable changes;
 7. T-12 Informed Traveller investigations.
- Conclusion:.. “Despite having broad enough powers that we could consider the risks that infrastructure programmes create for timetable changes, ORR failed to identify this risk in the approach to the May 2018 timetable change”.



Phase 2: developing recommendations

Phase 2 of the Inquiry

- As stated in our Terms of Reference, by end 2018 we shall present the Secretary of State with...

“Recommendations looking ahead to planned future major network and timetable changes, to reflect the unprecedented scale of network growth planned in the next few years”

- Phase two of the inquiry will focus on three specific workstreams, which emerge from the phase one findings
 - Timetabling process and system operation.
 - Management of systemic risk.
 - The role of regulation.

Phase 2 of the Inquiry (cont.)

- Context: there is a lot going on elsewhere...
 - DfT Rail review, set-up phase.
 - NR: '100 days' programme, led by new Chief Executive.
 - PR18: Final determination for CP6 by end of October, NR delivery plan and ORR's output-monitoring to be developed by April 2019.
 - Ongoing ORR licence investigation into TOC provision of passenger information – decision by end November.
 - Ongoing industry planning for Dec 2018, May & Dec 2019 timetable changes.
- We will focus on developing feasible proposals that can be implemented quickly. We will engage with stakeholders to ensure that there is cross-industry buy-in.

Workstream 1 – Timetabling & system operation

- Definition of NR System Operator’s role and responsibility
 - How SO performance may be monitored and assessed.
 - Implications in terms of resource and capability.
 - This may include recommendations about the future use of technology.

- Part D of the Network Code: Timetabling process
 - NR plan to lead a review of how the timetabling process works.
 - Recommendations on what that review should consider, and how it should be undertaken.

- What is the role of TOCs in the timetabling process?
 - Specific phase one findings will be followed-up.
 - Role of TOCs in timetabling process. A role for passenger impact assessments?

Workstream 2 – Management of systemic risks

- Our phase one report found that, while risk is managed at a programme / route level, there is a lack of effective management of *systemic* risk.
- We will develop a ‘target operating model’ for the planning and delivery of network change.
 - This will define specific functions, their characteristics and interaction.
 - It will be agnostic about who should perform these specific roles.
- We will consult with government and industry. We will hold several workshops, with senior representatives from across the sector, and develop proposals for consideration by DfT, and industry.

Workstream 3 – The role of regulation

- Our report found that, despite having broad enough powers that we could consider the risks that infrastructure programmes create for timetable changes, ORR “failed to identify this risk in the approach to the May 2018 timetable change”.

- As part of phase two we will consider the appropriate role for ORR in the timetabling process
 - Monitoring and enforcement during CP6 – assurance process, role on industry boards?
 - A role in monitoring TOC capability?

Any questions?

RIHSAC RAILWAY INDUSTRY HEALTH AND SAFETY ADVISORY COMMITTEE (RIHSAC). 110TH MEETING

Competence in Health and Safety Management in the Railway Industry

Purpose: This paper aims to initiate discussion at RIHSAC 110 about the approach/strategy for promoting improvements in railway health and safety in CP6.

Summary

This paper presents a view about the adequacy of health and safety governance and management in the railway industry and that one possible element, (as part of an overall strategy) to improving performance in CP6 is to focus on the capability and competence of senior strategic leaders.

Proposal

That ORR should include a review of the industry approach to securing the competence of senior railway leaders in health and safety governance and management as part of their regulatory strategy for CP6.

Argument

The PR18 draft determination¹, the ORR Annual Health and Safety Report 2017-18² the Network Rail Monitor for quarters 3-4 of CP5 2017-18³, and the latest Rail Safety Statistics⁴ describe a picture of health and safety performance in the railway industry which is familiar and similar to that reported over the last 4 years or so.

Overall there has continued to be improvements in the performance data, (e.g. train accident risk at historically low levels, reductions in the number of Potentially High Risk Train Accidents). However, the figures show a mixed picture of success across all sectors and do not capture the personal tragedy arising from the events, or the impact of ill-health.

Although railways are safer now than in the past the figures show that sustainable improvements in accident performance are difficult to achieve. And the statistics do not convey the significant underlying potential for serious injury from serious train accidents.

In both TOCs and NR there has been overall improvements in health and safety management maturity as expressed by the RM3 scores of companies sampled in 2017-18, though there remains some variability across the range of scores, (see ref 2 page 33). Performance in both NR and TOCs is still some way from the key

¹ http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/27757/pr18-draft-determination-overview-june-2018.pdf, including the Supplementary document on health and safety.

² http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/28348/annual-health-and-safety-report-2017-18.pdf

³ http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0020/28136/network-rail-monitor-2017-18-q3-4.pdf

⁴ http://orr.gov.uk/__data/assets/pdf_file/0017/25622/rail-safety-statistics-2016-17.pdf

milestone for CP5 set in the ORR's health and safety strategy in February 2015⁵ which requires, that 'all major duty holders are able to show that they have sustainably achieved the predictable level (4) for the majority of the 26 elements of our RM3 capability model by the end of CP5 (April 2019). It appears unlikely that this milestone will be achieved.

Some of the weaknesses in the systems of risk control for the high hazards of the industry suggest that they cannot be left to 'mature' over CP6. Is it realistic that sustained improvement will be achieved by the same regulatory approach? It is perhaps cliché, though not necessarily inaccurate, to say that if we continue with the same sort of approaches we are likely to get the same sort of results. To avoid complacency do we not need to try something different/new.

From a health and safety governance and management perspective the RM3 scores and the slow, steady and uneven progress suggest some weakness in the strategic approaches by senior leaders. To be effective a strategic, positive 'tone at the top' needs to deliver a positive result in the middle and at the bottom. The evidence suggests that this is not yet fully achieved.

My experience is that there is potential for leveraging better progress by putting greater emphasis on the practice and competence of directors and senior managers. I believe others share a similar view. An article by Philip Haigh in Rail Review⁶ refers to comments from Neil Robertson at the National Skills Academy (NSAR) that senior managers may not be fully skilled in business skills such as, 'communication, people, governance, risk, marketing, productivity and commercialisation of assets'.

George Bearfield in another article in Rail Review⁷ points out that raising the capability and understanding of risk in the industry is a key challenge. He emphasises that this is not about upskilling safety practitioners but better understanding and application of risk management principles by strategic decision makers, (government and senior industry leaders) who set the context of railway plans from the outset.

ORR have not yet shared their detailed thoughts on their regulatory approach for CP6. However, for me the three challenges for the next three to five years, (ref 2 page 9), do not fully capture some of the complexities. For example:

- The scrutiny of business performance is increasing, (e.g. devolution in NR and the Williams review of railways). This has the potential to divert attention from health and safety. Is there not a challenge to provide a balance to retain appropriate senior leader attention on health and safety? To ensure that there is appropriate attention on the risks to people, as well as the risks to the business.
- The three challenges, (supporting people, pressure on the system and technology) appropriately in my view, recognise the significance of the 'human factors'. However, the approach does not appear to acknowledge that the

⁵ http://orr.gov.uk/_data/assets/pdf_file/0018/17019/health-and-safety-regulatory-strategy.pdf

⁶ Rail Review Q3-2017, 'Proper risk management the key to good decisions'.

⁷ Rail Review Q2-2018, 'Risk-based decisions will advance rail safety'

tendency to fatigue, misjudgement and error is not unique to those at the sharp end of the business. Misdirection and misalignment at the top and the middle can just as easily sow the seeds of failure as can mistakes at the bottom.

Consultation

I received one reply to my initial draft of this paper from PACTS who were supportive of a greater emphasis on health matters in relation to overall safety. In view of the low level of traction on this issue I have redrafted it to refine the nature of the argument.

Discussion

To explore these ideas at the meeting I suggest we consider three questions:

- ***Do inspection programmes appropriately address the boards and senior managers of all major rail companies?*** RM3 covers these issues, e.g. Board Governance in component SP3. Are the judgements for these components based on inspection of director and board practice or inferred from other evidence? What are the benchmarks of good practice used to ensure the adequacy and consistency of the judgements?
- ***Is the approach to competence management adequate and appropriate?*** The current ORR guidance⁸ places emphasis on operational (safety critical work) competences, and not so much on the competences for governing, leading and managing health and safety. The IOSH argument for a more balanced approach was not accepted when the guidance was last revised. (Earlier attempts to address the competence of senior management teams was withdrawn⁹)
- ***Is there appropriate guidance on health and safety governance in the railway industry?*** I know of nothing that specifically addresses directors and senior leaders setting out examples of good practice in health and safety governance; including high level risk decision making, safety leadership and safety assurance. Is there anything to provide a challenge to strategic decision makers and enable self-reflection on the effectiveness of their practice?

David Porter

IOSH

28 September 2018

⁸ 'Developing and Maintaining Staff Competence'

⁹ Railway Safety Good practice Guides 1. Assessing and developing the competence of senior management teams in strategic safety management



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Competence in H&S Management Response to RIHSAC

Jen Ablitt

“ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance railways and roads today and in the future”



Background

Competence paper from David Porter

Proposal


- A fresh approach to stimulate H&S improvement in a reasonable time.
- ORR to review its approach to securing the competence of senior leaders in health & safety governance, Leadership & Management.

Concerns (Network Rail)

- The adequacy and consistency of the systems of risk control, particularly for the high hazards of the business.
- Inconsistent performance across the routes on the management of 'assets'.
- Inconsistent management of risks across routes & disciplines.
- Management understanding of what 'reasonably practicable' actually means.

Success

- Efficient, effective and transparent ORR activity on how it regulates, ...by:
 - Targeting senior manager H&S competency in the areas of: communication, people, governance, risk, marketing, productivity and commercialisation of assets?
 - Creating an inspection programme targeting senior managers and boards of rail companies.



How we plan – ORR’s goal: To continue to drive for a safer railway through compliance with the law and striving for excellence

RSD's Vision, objectives and delivery

Vision

- A Health and Safety Regulator of the Railways that is highly respected by all our stakeholders, whose expertise is sought after across the world because of what we achieve and believe in and delivers continuous improvement.
- Health and Safety
 - 12 Strategic Risk Chapters <http://orr.gov.uk/rail/health-and-safety/health-and-safety-strategy/our-strategic-risk-chapters> and [Regulatory Strategy](#) and [CIAR](#)
 - Railway Safety Directorate Quality Management System (TBD)
 - ORR corporate risk register, board reporting, business plan, business management system, team activity planning

2015 regulatory strategy milestones

- Network Rail delivery of its CP5 goal of zero fatalities and major injuries to its own and contractor workforce by April 2019;
- Ensuring that Network Rail effectively utilises funds made available in CP5 to reduce risk: at level crossings (where Network Rail have committed to reduce risk by at least 25%); improve safety in taking electrical isolations and for workers working within possessions; and reducing risks associated with road rail vehicles.
- A reduction of 50% in the Passenger Train Accident Risk for passengers as measured by the industry safety risk model by April 2019.
- Zero industry caused fatalities to passengers, workforce and the public in each year of of CP5 for both the mainline railway and Transport for London (TfL); and
- All major duty holders are able to show that they have sustainably achieved the predictable level (4) for the majority of the 26 elements of our RM3 management capability model by the end of CP5 (April 2019).

Previous industry challenges by Chief Inspector

Our 2017-18 Annual H&S report provides commentary by the Chief Inspector on our monitoring of the previous years challenges for industry.

- Safe and Sustainable assets – We are continuing to monitor Route performance and Network Rail’s alternative solutions for CSAMS.
- Managing Change – We saw progress by both TfL and Network Rail in large change programmes.
- Culture and OH – Both of these showed signs of improvement within Network Rail.
- H&S by Design – Merseyrail effectively designed out H&S risk through improved PTI measures.

Three future key industry challenges – 1 (next 3 – 5 years)

***Supporting People:** ...we need to focus on ensuring we support them through a strong culture of occupational healthcare, particularly mental health, as well as fatigue and competency management*

***Pressure on the System:** ...Train frequencies have increased recently across large parts of the network and are set to increase further and our structures, earthworks and drainage assets are still primarily Victorian.*

There remain financial constraints and strains across parts of the system which, with an ever moving external environment, and a decline in performance, add to the pressures

***Technology:** ... Has the ability to create the extra barrier in the 'Swiss Cheese' model and so increase defences.*

However, it is vital that we take human interaction into account & manage the changes that support its introduction

Risk ranking and Strategic Priorities

Strategic Risk Chapters

<http://orr.gov.uk/rail/health-and-safety/health-and-safety-strategy/our-strategic-risk-chapters>

- Mixture of direct operational risks and enablers: Management of change, SMS, track, civil engineering assets, staff competence & human failure, leadership and culture

Risk Ranking

- Risk assess sub-topics identified for each strategic chapter
- Determine the adequacy of controls in place
- Determine if the risks are likely to change or remain as they are
- Determine ORR capability to influence improvements (enforcement capability)
- Determine public / external perception of the risks (reputational risk)

Evidence

Horizon scanning (future industry challenges), leading and lagging indicators

- SMIS and SRM
- Network Rail's periodic Safety, Health and Environment Performance (SHEP) report
- London Underground's safety and environment database
- RIDDOR reports
- (RAIB) investigations
- Our intelligence from our permissioning, audit, inspection, investigation and enforcement activities
- RM3

RM3

- It is used by ORR, and increasingly by duty holders,
 - to understand and discuss organisational management maturity in a number of business critical areas.
 - To provide broad conclusions of individual companies and rail sectors
 - To strengthen our understanding of strategic risk priorities (capabilities)
 - To provide (cautious) comparisons and best practice

Business planning and resource allocation

- Strategic Risk Chapters and RARR
- Local and sector priorities
- Resource and expertise constraints
- Statutory (permissioning) and reactive work (investigation and enforcement)

Current RSD internal Projects

- Business planning for 19/20
- RSD's capability and skills, including strengthening training and CPD.
- Committed delivery of a Quality Management System, on a priority basis – collaborating with other H&S regulators on monitoring and KPIs
- Improving our use of data, including strengthening risk ranking, strategic risk prioritisation and exploring the potential of big data analysis.
- Continuously improving key processes e.g. investigation / prosecution.
- Refining our delivery organisation and resource allocation across the operational part of the directorate.



Regulating for Leadership and Culture

Leading by example

- Adopting a strictly risk-based approach – demonstrating our own commitment to safety improvement over bureaucratic compliance
- Ensuring we are competent and authoritative as a regulator

Strategic approach

- Balancing
 - striving for excellence,
 - continuous improvement and
 - our enforcement framework
 - Duty holder responsibility Vs. regulatory oversight
- [Strategic Risk Chapter 13:](#)
 - Clearly articulates our approach
 - Provides a framework for assessing leadership

- ROGS SMS criteria H&S competence of senior leaders
- RM3 : SP1 : OC6 : OP2
- Governance, policy and leadership
 - The organisation’s policies are visionary, based on solid evidence of what the organisation can achieve, and promote a consistent approach to health and safety at all levels of the organisation.
 - Leaders of the organisation set and communicate clear direction that reinforces a consistent approach to health and safety and shapes day-to-day activities.
 - Leaders at all levels of the organisation act in a consistent way that reinforces the values, ethics and culture needed to meet their organisation’s objectives.
 - The leadership style throughout the organisation is transformational as opposed to transactional.
- Results
 - Network Rail’s improvement, particularly STE
 - ORR focus on frontline leadership to support implementation and assurance
 - BUT: changing organisational culture, particularly within large organisations, takes time and long-term determination

OC6 - culture

- “The organisation shows excellent leadership relating to health and safety.”

OP2 - Staff competence

- Can and is used to extend to leaders and senior managers – but enforcement here is complex and heavily resource intensive
- Legal requirement relates to safety critical roles

What is the relationship between senior leadership and H&S competence?
What's the right balance?

Support and guidance

- Why does rail need specific guidance on organisational leadership for safety?
- RSSB's refresh of [Taking Safe Decisions](#)
 - ORR have contributed to revised TSD document
 - Supports duty holders make informed decisions which impact on safety and to assist with meeting their legal requirements.
 - Supported by an abridged principles document which will be aimed at senior rail leaders, so they are competent to make these decisions.
 - ORR are engaging with this principles document at both a working level and senior level through the relevant RSSB risk committees during Q3 of 2018-19.



How we regulate (Network Rail)

Timelines

- 5 year periodic review
- 5 year safety authorisation / certificates
- Multi annual RSD vision and themes
- Annual risk ranking and business planning

Determination

- In our SBP guidance to Network Rail, we set out our expectations regarding health and safety management. We stated that it needed to explain how it would:
 - implement its health and safety strategy – “Transforming Safety and Wellbeing” – finding more effective ways to achieve commitments given around culture, rules and competence, innovation and assurance;
 - focus on ensuring it can achieve its maintenance, renewals and operational output to support a safe infrastructure;
 - ensure compliance with all its relevant legal obligations under health and safety legislation over CP6; and
 - where full legal compliance is difficult due to legacy infrastructure characteristics, describe the trajectory to improved compliance and explain how risk is managed in the interim.



Conclusion

- Our approach to risk ranking is an emerging process and will develop through use
 - This will be supported by a more effective QMS
 - To include better intermediate KPIs and targets
- On leadership and culture, given the legal framework and our other priorities, we believe we have the right tools, approach and priority
- We would welcome a discussion on supporting / requiring leaders to improve
 - Culture
 - Competence
 - Tools and guidance?



Thank you

ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance of railways and roads today and in the future



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Update on the RM3 – 2019 project

Matt Farrell

Permissioning & Capability Manager

RIHSAC – 16/10/2018

Purpose of this presentation

- Refresher on what RM3 is and why we use it
- Explain how and why we are improving the model
- Share the project timeline
- Outline the plans for communicating and promoting the revised model

.....encourage debate, support and further direction.

RM3 refresher

It is the risk management maturity model

- Using 'plan-do-check-act' as the framework, there are 26 criteria which we have determined are essential in an effective health and safety management system (HSMS)
- For each criteria, typical behaviours and processes to be expected in the 5 sub-levels of maturity are provided
- Used by inspection teams to assess the maturity of the duty-holder HSMS arrangements. Used in our annual Health & Safety report.
- Used by duty-holders to assess their own HSMS maturity
- Allows inspectors and dutyholders to discuss findings, around a common framework, and identify improvements which should achieve higher maturity levels; striving for excellence in health and safety.

Governance Board

- **Governance Board:**

- **ORR**

Jen Ablitt (Chair)

Matt Farrell (Sec)

Neil Anderson (Specialist)

- **External** (representing mainline/non-mainline & suppliers)

Cathy Hunsley (TfL) Lee Parlett (NRail) Des Lowe (RTG)

Rob Doyle (Suppliers) Tavid Dobson (RSSB) Iain Ferguson (LNER)

David Porter (IOSH) Mark Ashmore (LRSSB)

- **We are engaging with the trades unions to secure staff representation on the board**

.....and in the process of securing a representative from National Freight Safety group

Improving the model - 1

- **Work is being done by the RM3 Governance Board**
- Model-wide review of all criteria evidence
- Evidence relevant and meaningful, in the right maturity level and builds on lower levels. Considerations:
 - what happens > what processes are in place > the impact of these > how standards are applied > collaboration > culture*
- **Change how organisational health and safety culture is assessed**
 - currently the model is limited in the evidence that is available for assessing culture – and really the whole model tests organisational culture, so.....*

Improving the model - 2

■ OC6 Organisational health and safety culture

- A positive organisational culture is the most important factor in successful health and safety management - *Removing OC6 entirely may send the wrong message that 'organisational culture is not important'*
- Organisational culture evidence will now be included in all criteria other than OC6 allowing us to provide much more detail and guidance
- The maturity levels in OC6 will indicate to the user how culture evidence should be collated to arrive at a view of organisational culture maturity.
- The whole model will provide an organisational culture assessment tool

■ The new model will be much stronger on culture and support our focus on health and safety culture which is part of our first strategic objective

Aligns with ERA's 4th Package SMS Maturity Model approach.....

..... with culture evidence in each criteria

PI3 Workload planning	
Excellence	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The organisation looks beyond its organisational boundaries for factors which may impact on its workload planning. The organisation collaborates with others to achieve continuous improvement in planning systems of all collaborating parties. The workload planning system supports a healthy lifestyle for the individual balanced against delivering the organisation's objectives, efficiently. The organisation actively seeks out best practice in managing workloads and implements ideas that enable continuous improvement in risk management. Active pursuit of best practice which is implemented even in planning workloads of collaborative teams. <div style="border: 1px solid #ccc; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Culture Staff at all levels feel they are able to influence their own workplan, have active involvement in planning additional work and that there is a healthy balance between their needs and those of the organisation.</p> </div>
Predictable	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The planning system includes regular reviews of workload and resources, both within the organisation and the supply chain. When major projects and changes occur, the workload planning system is designed to ensure that nobody is overloaded with work. The fatigue management system is part of a comprehensive occupational health management system and applied to all staff at all levels of the organisation. Even when there is extra work or changes, nobody becomes overloaded with work. Standards reviewed following changes to workloads or tasks. Effective workload planning system includes changes to workloads or task content including collaborative project teams. <div style="border: 1px solid #ccc; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Culture Staff actively support managers over workload planning and resource management and feel that their ideas and concerns are valued and will be acted upon.</p> </div>
Standardised	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> A planning system is in place to make sure that tasks are given to the correct person and can be completed on time. The organisation determines; what will be done; what resources are required; who is responsible and when it will be completed. The resource management system captures work and travel hours to be recorded to identify/monitor excessive hours worked. <div style="border: 1px solid #ccc; padding: 5px; margin-top: 10px;"> <p>Culture Staff feel that resources and workload are aligned and reasonable and are comfortable to challenge managers about additional tasks, particularly when related to safety critical activities. Staff accurately record the hours they work including travelling for work.</p> </div>

Managed	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> The fatigue management system considers activity, workload, environment and travel but is principally focused on operational staff. The organisation determines and provides the resources needed for the establishment, maintenance and continual improvement of the H&S management system. Standards identified and used effectively. Effective use of systematic workload planning leading to effective risk management including collaborative work teams. 	<p>Culture Staff recognise the importance of safety critical tasks and there is some challenge of managers by staff where there is inadequate resource. Managers accept that working excessive hours is just part of the job and will tend to under-report the hours they work.</p>
Ad hoc	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Workloads vary, but some thought has been given to allocating tasks in a way that aims to reduce overloading. There is a process to identify and prioritise safety critical tasks, but workloads are not reviewed to manage areas of overloading. There is a simple process of looking at hours and shift patterns to manage workload related health issues. Safety critical tasks are mostly completed effectively. There is some monitoring of workloads but people still become overloaded, leading to failures in risk control. Standards to reduce fatigue identified but used inconsistently. Inconsistent application of workload planning to collaborative projects dependent on individuals not systems 	<p>Culture There is a culture of accepting tasks that are allocated, without challenging, even if this results in becoming overloaded and non-completion of tasks. Managers think it is acceptable to staff to work excessive hours.</p>

RM3 2019 – Whats happening and when?



COMMS PLAN

- RM3 Update 1
- RSSB/ORR survey
- RM3 Update 2/ 'Dispatches'
- Social media campaign around consultation
- Open consultation through ORR website
- RM3 Update 3
- Website revamp with launch info
- Launch invites
- Social media campaign around launch

Linked work

- Engagement plan with inspectors
 - To get buy in from inspectors and consistency in use of RM3 so they recognise the benefit and encourage take up by industry.
- In partnership with RSSB, identify training needs and develop RM3 courses: *Introduction to RM3, Assessors/Practitioners, Briefing for Organisation Leaders*
- Specific RM3 topic sets to support each of our Strategic Risk Chapters – *the Occupational Health topic set text is now complete.*
- RM3 ‘solutions guide’ – how ORR /duty-holders have introduced the model
- RM3 ‘light’ version (probably a topic set) with criteria targeted at light rail and heritage sectors
- Survey to capture your needs on RM3 training and tools at <https://www.surveymonkey.co.uk/r/J9GRS2Y>



ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance of railways and roads today and in the future



Level Crossings Update 2018

RIHSAC

Anna O'Connor

Head of Projects

Railway Safety Directorate

ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance of railways and roads today and in the future



Level Crossing Safety

Level Crossing Safety

- Level crossing risk has shown a reducing trend during 2017-18 and the long term trend is downward; 31% reduction in CP4 and 24.3% reduction forecast for CP5;
- While historical data and risk modelling indicates that level crossing safety is improving we recognise that increasing train services and speeds present additional challenges for managing level crossing risk.
- Level crossings remain a priority topic for us because we continue to see deaths and injuries at level crossings and they still represent the biggest risk with the potential for a major incident in the event of collision between a train and a road vehicle;
- 6 people were killed on level crossings during 2017-18;

Improvements over recent years

- During CP5 £99m was targeted at reducing level crossing risk above and beyond what was considered reasonably practicable. This funded crossing closures to reduce the total number on the mainline to around 6000 (Network Rail closed 1100 crossings between 2009-17). It also funded the installation of miniature stop lights at User Worked Crossings (UWCs) and footpath crossings; installation of red light safety equipment e.g. cameras; and overlay audible warning systems at footpath crossings.
- Network Rail introduced level crossing managers to provide a focal point for managing risk at level crossings;

Improvements continued

- Some automatic half-barrier crossings have been upgraded to full barrier crossings with obstacle detection. This ensures the crossing is clear before a train approaches and more effectively prevents motorists and other users from attempting to cross once the barriers have activated;
- The installation of LED road traffic lights has increased the visibility of level crossings to road users, particularly when the sun is low on the horizon;
- Active warning systems are now in place at some crossings which previously relied on the user checking for trains e.g. by phoning the signaller or looking for trains - new 'overlay' active warning systems are significantly cheaper than those previously used.
- The night time quiet period, when trains do not sound their horns as a warning to footpath crossing users, has been reduced by two hours to 24:00–06:00;

ORR's activity to drive further improvements

- Continue to challenge Network Rail to improve level crossing risk assessment to identify and deliver opportunities to improve safety;
- Encourage the roll out of active warning systems (lights and audible warnings) at crossings which currently rely on the user to check for an approaching train. UWCs with telephones are a particular priority because telephone use is variable;
- Current proposals for CP6 would see £25m allocated for the prioritised introduction of “overlay” active warning systems at UWCs and funding for research and development for next generation level crossing systems;
- Working with DfT and Network Rail to significantly improve the signs at user worked crossings by developing new signs and amending The Private Crossings (Signs and Barriers) Regulations 1996;

ORR's activity

- Encourage the improvement of footpath and bridleway crossings by the addition of yellow decking underfoot to mark the danger area; RSSB research showed that a significant proportion of users do not stop, look and listen effectively before using such crossings;
- Encourage Network Rail to upgrade automatic half-barrier crossings to full barrier types when they are renewed, where they are located close to schools and stations;
- Automatic half-barrier crossings have no physical barrier on one side and are vulnerable to children's group behaviour and to users who mistakenly think it is safe to cross even if the barriers are down;
- Scrutinise proposals for new level crossings, which we would not support other than in exceptional circumstances.

ORR protects the interests of rail and road users, improving the safety, value and performance of railways and roads today and in the future



Level Crossing Orders

Level Crossing Orders

- The Law Commissions recommended the repeal of the Order system and replacement by Regulations under the HSWA which would have introduced the concept of “plans” in place of Orders;
- The work was not taken forward by DfT and so we reached no clear position on what a new legal framework might look like;
- ORR has been considering how we could change our approach to future Orders to make them more risk-based and therefore a better fit with other health and safety legislation;
- This will take some time to develop and we are currently working with Network Rail to trial the use of a risk-based Order alongside a traditional Order at one level crossing. This will provide feedback to inform the development of a risk-based Order before wider consultation;

How might Orders change?

- Set out the risks to be controlled by protection arrangements at a crossing rather than specifying the detail of protection measures e.g. barrier heights;
- Move away from using off the shelf templates for Orders to drive better risk assessment at the start of the process to upgrade a level crossing;
- This may require more resource at first both from ORR inspectors and Network Rail but we can see longer term benefits and the potential for fewer variation Orders because there will be less detail in an Order;

Next Steps

- Will be consulting more widely with stakeholders once we have a workable model and guidance to explain how the process will work.
- These changes are being developed for new Orders in future and will not be applied retrospectively, so existing Orders will not change;
- Assuming a workable model emerges we will consult during 2019.

Contacts on level crossings:

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Occupational Health – Vision for Post 2019 : What Next ?

From: Claire Dickinson
Principal Inspector
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Since 2009, ORR has been promoting the need for railway companies to improve the health of their workers by striving for:

- Excellence in health risk management;
- Greater engagement with employees and others;
- Better efficiency and reduced costs from people suffering work-related ill-health; and
- Enabling improvements in competency, information, co-ordination and control.

A summary of what we said we would do is shown in Annex 1.

We are keen to gain your viewpoint on:

- **Where have we reached ?**
- **What is left to be done ?**
- **What would be the main headlines be if ORR did a third programme ?**
- **Which organisation should be doing it ?**

- **View on ORR impact/influence during the period of the last programme (2014-2019).**

Annex 1: Making It Happen 2014-19 Occupational Health Programme

What we said in 2014 :

“Over the next five years we want to see railway companies improve the health of their workers by striving for:

- Excellence in health risk management;
- Greater engagement with employees and others;
- Better efficiency and reduced costs from people suffering work-related ill-health; and
- Enabling improvements in competency, information, co-ordination and control.”

What success looks like.....a more proactive management approach

A health risk management system that includes:

Health policies and clear objectives – documented processes;

Health risk management – risk assessments, surveys, reporting;

Health assurance – data driven, audits, performance reviews;

Health promotion & employee engagement e.g. health fairs, communications, training.

Leadership and public commitment to ill-health reduction

Meets legal compliance and striving for excellence

Rail companies informed on the cost of work-related ill-health

Credible, informed, engaged active service-provider – internal/external

Collaboration and working together across industry including trade unions

Raised awareness at managerial/supervisory level and active role for line managers

Pride and communicating to others what works!

We want to see a proportionate effort by all train, freight, tram, and heritage operators as well as infrastructure managers and railway contractors to:

- Proactively manage health risks by identifying, managing and controlling them on a daily basis in line with the law. While the three areas of most widespread concern are hand-arm vibration syndrome, stress management and musculoskeletal disorders, each rail company needs to demonstrate adequate arrangements for complying with a broad range of legal requirements on health, including risk assessment, health surveillance arrangements and RIDDOR reporting.
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- Have clear leadership on health risk management at company level by the implementation of a health policy showing senior level commitment to: identifying health risks; preventing adverse health outcomes from work; providing adequate resources; arrangements for driving continuous improvements in health and well-being; and for reducing the direct/indirect costs of ill-health.
 - Sign up as partners to the Government Public Health Responsibility Deal and commit to playing their part in improving public health. Collective pledges on alcohol, food, health at work and physical activity identify specific actions to take in support of the core commitments. For those involved in infrastructure renewals and construction the construction pledge might be more relevant.
 - Drive innovation in health risk management by better use of specialist resource: ergonomists, hygienists, physiotherapists, etc.; applying emerging findings from the on-going work by the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) on the importance of good people management, preventing cardiovascular disease or promoting physical activity; and formalizing the role of ARIOPS in setting clinical leadership.
 - Take ownership and pursue the activities prioritized in the Occupational Health Industry Roadmap, supported by RSSB's Workforce Health & Well-being Project.
 - Pursue early intervention to reduce the length of absence associated with trauma or musculoskeletal disorders, consistent with good clinical practice.
 - Improve the use of good health data, and develop the use of trend and comparator data on health, working collaboratively, where appropriate. ORR will continue to monitor the extent and nature of public reporting on health.
 - Work openly with the trade unions and safety representatives/employee representatives in developing engagement on health, in securing legal compliance, and reducing costs for risk control.
 - Share good practice on what works. We are keen to further promote good practice case studies via ORR's web site. In addition rail companies might share good practice via the Change4Life initiative⁵
 - Support their employees to be more physically active every day to prevent a wide range of illnesses including heart disease, stroke, depression, type 2 diabetes and some cancers.
 - Participate in events and initiatives beyond the rail sector on health and employee engagement, for example those led by BIS, BITC6 or Engage4Success (E4S). Consideration should be given to the development of an industry-wide strategy for engagement.
 - Be aware of their costs, and be able to demonstrate that the direct and indirect costs associated with ill-health are at least as good as comparators within and outside the industry.
 - Participate in the RSSB Roadmap Economics Project Working Group to develop information on the business benefit of adopting good practices.
 - Raise awareness and competence on health risk management, particularly among employees, managers and supervisors. Participation in the EU-OSHA European Week For Safety & Health at Work, organized in October each year is one way of raising awareness.
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