Oliver Stewart RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



4 April 2025

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Passenger train collision at Norwich on 21 July 2013

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 5 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 1 May 2014.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 5 is 'Closed'.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 5

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk associated with permissive moves at Norwich station is acceptably low.

Network Rail should assess the risk associated with permissive working at Norwich station. Greater Anglia should support Network Rail by providing an understanding of the current constraints and processes for short-term alterations to platform allocations. Network Rail should take these into account when assessing the risk and determining any necessary risk control measures.

Network Rail and Greater Anglia should implement any required risk control measures and brief their staff accordingly

ORR decision

- 1. Following the incident, Network Rail and Greater Anglia conducted an assessment of the risks associated with permissive moves at Norwich station, particularly those prompted by short-term alterations to platform allocations.
- 2. Greater Anglia briefed station staff and drivers on the changes made. Briefing was also given to Network Rail signallers, focusing on ensuring trains could fit into platforms, particularly around short-term alterations. In addition to the briefing provided to affected staff, the rationalisation of the Greater Anglia fleet to just 3 train types, has also reduced the need for permissive moves.
- 3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

4. On 25 March 2015 ORR reported the following:

The implementation of control measures has still to be carried out.


Update

5. On 11 February 2025 Network Rail provided the following update:

The below statement and evidence has been provided by the Route Operations Manager for the Anglia Outer area.



Permissive working for trains classes 1, 2, 3 ECS, 5, 9 and 0 is authorised at the following platforms for the purposes of attaching or detaching at any time and for platform sharing during times of significant service disruption only: Colchester station platforms 1, 2, 3 and 4 Additional regulations for permissive working on platform lines (TS2 / 3.3.4)**Norwich Station** Before you allow a train to approach an occupied platform you must refer to the daily station arrival and departure sheet issued by the Station Supervisor. However if all the track circuits for the specified platform are occupied you must not allow the train to approach the platform without verbal confirmation from the Station Supervisor that there is enough room for the complete train to be accommodated in the platform. Clacton-on-Sea Station You must only operate the 'Lime Street control' override button if you have made sure that there is enough room for the complete train to be accommodated in the platform. Obstruction of the line (TS2 / 4.1)



The Network Rail Anglia records only go back 10 years which has left a gap from the time of the incident as the evidence is being sought in 2024/25.

After speaking to GA they have the same situation with the driver material as they changed the computer system that they use.

In summary the available evidence is:

As a result of this incident, and the consequential risk assessment the following steps were taken:

- 'Norwich station daily arrival & departure sheet 'was formalised to help the signaller and station supervisor plan the platforming of trains.
- Changes were made to the Signal box Special Instructions and the general instructions of the Sectional Appendix to mandate the signaller at Colchester to confirm with the Person in Charge of the platform that there is enough room for a train conveying passengers to be accommodated in an occupied platform where all track circuits are occupied.
- With the introduction of the 745 trains the instances of platform sharing at Norwich has reduced.

Attached is the instructions on the notice board at Colchester PSB which the signallers all have access to.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 5

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk associated with permissive moves at Norwich station is acceptably low.

Network Rail should assess the risk associated with permissive working at Norwich station. Abellio Greater Anglia should support Network Rail by providing an understanding of the current constraints and processes for short-term alterations to platform allocations. Network Rail should take these into account when assessing the risk and determining any necessary risk control measures.

Network Rail and Abellio Greater Anglia should implement any required risk control measures and brief their staff accordingly.

Steps taken or being taken to address the recommendation

1. On 12 June 2014, Abellio Greater Anglia stated:

Abellio Greater Anglia has contacted Network Rail (via its Route Safety Manager) and has requested a plan / dates for the review of this type of risk assessment to take place. This request also was made to consider other locations on Abellio Greater Anglia where permissive working takes place.

Abellio Greater Anglia awaits dates from Network Rail and will attend when these reviews are arranged.

2. On 17 July 2014, Network Rail stated:

Network Rail and Abellio Greater Anglia met in November 2013 to review this action and carry out a workshop to look at the issues around permissive working at Norwich and the associated risks of short term alterations to platform allocations.

Areas of challenge were discussed and considered within the risk assessment:

- Train plan production and suitability
- Deviation from the plan due to stock shortage
- Deviation from the plan due to service disruption
- Lines of communication currently in use future use
- Training and competency
- Interaction from other key stakeholders East Midlands Trains

Each issue was explored and noted with control measures introduced. Briefing documents were produced and staff were briefed accordingly, including TOC station staff; signalling staff and train crew staff at Norwich station. Following on from the work completed at Norwich station a reduction in deviation of the train plan at the platform has been observed.

23 February 2015: Abellio Greater Anglia has attended a meeting with Network Rail to discuss the Risk Assessment but have yet to agree the content.

24 March 2015: Network Rail has completed a risk assessment and Abellio Greater Anglia / East Midlands Trains assisted in this as required by this recommendation. Abellio Greater Anglia awaits the implementation of control measures following this.

ORR decision

The implementation of control measures has still to be carried out.

Status: In-progress. ORR will update RAIB by 31 July 2015