

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



29 May 2025

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Collision at Stainforth Road level crossing on 11 January 2018.

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 2 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 19 July 2018.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 2 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 2

The intention of this recommendation is to prevent new designs of automatic level crossings which cross public roads, that are remotely monitored by the signaller and which are intended for use on Network Rail managed infrastructure, from being open to road users during the passage of trains.

Network Rail should revise its level crossing design standards so that they do not permit new designs of remotely monitored level crossing to undergo a timed reset unless all strike-in track circuits are clear and the train has been proved to have passed completely over the level crossing by suitable means. This may be undertaken as part of its current review of level crossing design standards and their underlying protection principles.

ORR decision

1. Network Rail reviewed existing level crossing standards and concluded that no changes were needed as the requirement for the recommendation was already addressed by NR/L2/SIG/11201 module X02 (both issue 1, Sep 2011 and issue 2, Dec 12). The design and installation of Stainforth level crossing preceded the standard, so did not meet its requirements.
2. To identify other level crossings with the same train detection configuration as Stainforth, Network Rail issued Special Inspection Notice (SIN) 180. Network Rail has provided a plan for each route and region identifying the relevant level crossings and an indicative timescale for remedial work to meet the requirement of the latest version of standard NR/L2/SIG/11201 module X02.
3. The action taken by Network Rail goes beyond the requirements of the recommendation, as the standard prevents new automatic level crossings being configured with train detection that may clear before a train has fully passed (as happened at Stainforth) and the response to the SIN has identified level crossings with that configuration and a timescale for update to meet the modern standard.
4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - Taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - Has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

5. On 14 June 2019 ORR reported the following:

The panel that reviewed the Network Rail response to the Stainforth recommendations were not content with the rejection of recommendation 2. It was felt Network Rail had not properly addressed the recommendation and undertaken a review of standard NR/L2/SIG/11201 module X__ in order to identify any inconsistencies between the modules.

At a subsequent meeting, it was agreed for ORR and Network Rail would carry out their own separate reviews of the standard and agree a position on any inconsistencies identified.

Update

6. On 4 August 2021 Network Rail provided the following update:

Following our meeting on Monday, below are a couple of lines sent from the team regarding the LC design standard and this rec closure – if you need any more information please let me know.

The requirements for level crossing configuration are part of the signalling design handbook (NR/L2/SIG/11201) and include clauses to control the risk of early opening of LC's as seen at Stainforth. These requirements have been in the NR standards for over 20 years, so no updates were or are proposed in response to the Stainforth incident.

The installations that pre-dated those standards may have configurations similar to Stainforth, and this was subject to Special Inspection Notice to identify those sites and take safe decisions to manage the risk. That process was completed and NR consider that infrastructure risks identified at Stainforth have been assessed for all sites and reasonable measures have been taken.

The submission for closure of the recommendation was made on this basis.

7. On 13 February 2025 Network Rail provided the following update:

For Stainforth Rec 2, the SIN details are attached. It was closed out in 2019.



NR_SIN_180.pdf



SIN National 180
sign off.pdf

8. On 18 March 2025 Network Rail provided the following update:

Attached is the list of crossings, anything green I have updates on, the rest I'm chasing and will send over asap



Stainforth Road
SIN180 survey results

9. On 9 May 2025 Network Rail provided the following update:

Below is the update from Anglia on the level crossing's that were planned for CP6.

Crossing Name	LX Type	ELR	M	CH	Action Plan (04/2025)	Expected Timeframe
Althorne	AOCL+B	WIS	40	27	SIN 180 interventions to be incorporated into Barrier Upgrade Project or packaged as bespoke project, depending on delivering capabilities.	Within CP7 (Proposed for Yr 3-5)
Brinkley Road	AHB	CCH	7	78	C3R Project to alter the level crossing track with Island Detection.	C3R Stage 4 Commissioning No Fixed date at this point in time
Fulbourne	AHB	CCH	4	36	C3R Project to alter the level crossing track with Island Detection.	C3R Stage 4 Commissioning No Fixed date at this point in time
Ingate Street	ABCL	ESK	108	60	Remitted to upgrade to AFBCL in CP7 with SIN 180 interventions as part of the requirements.	Within CP7 (Proposed for Yr 3-5)
Laundry Lane	AOCL+B	CCH	0	29	C3R Project to alter the level crossing track with Island Detection.	C3R Stage 2 Commissioning (Planned End of 2025)
Welney Road	AHB	EMP	79	50	SIN 180 interventions to be incorporated into Barrier Upgrade Project or packaged as bespoke project, depending on delivering capabilities.	Within CP7 (Proposed for Yr 3-5)
Wood Ditton	AHB	CCH	13	11	C3R Project to alter the level crossing track with Island Detection.	C3R Stage 4 Commissioning No Fixed date

Annex A

						at this point in time
Woodham Ferrers	ABCL	WIS	34	8	Remitted to upgrade to AFBCL in CP7 with SIN 180 interventions as part of the requirements.	Within CP7 (Proposed for Yr 3-5)

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 2

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Network Rail should revise its level crossing design standards so that they do not permit new designs of remotely monitored level crossing to undergo a timed reset unless all strike-in track circuits are clear and the train has been proved to have passed completely over the level crossing by suitable means. This may be undertaken as part of its current review of level crossing design standards and their underlying protection principles.

ORR decision

1. The panel that reviewed the Network Rail response to the Stainforth recommendations were not content with the rejection of recommendation 2. It was felt Network Rail had not properly addressed the recommendation and undertaken a review of standard NR/L2/SIG/11201 module X__ in order to identify any inconsistencies between the modules.
2. At a subsequent meeting, it was agreed for ORR and Network Rail would carry out their own separate reviews of the standard and agree a position on any inconsistencies identified.
3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - is taking action to implement it, but has not yet agreed with ORR a plan for full implementation

Status: *Progressing*. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

4. On 1 February 2019, Network Rail provided the following initial response:

Network Rail reject this recommendation

Network Rail has undertaken a review of level crossing standards and has concluded that no amendments to the standards are required.

Specifically, NR/L2/SIG/11201 module X02 (both issue 1, Sep 2011 and issue 2, Dec 12) has requirement that:-

- *The operating sequence shall not be cancelled until trains in either direction have fully cleared the crossing, but if there is a risk of false operation of the island track circuit, (perhaps by a tracked vehicle using the crossing), if no other train is approaching it shall not operate the crossing.*
- *In all cases where the crossing is bi-directional, a short “island” track section shall be provided across the level crossing.*

Application of these requirements mitigate the circumstances of the incident at Stainforth.