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Abi Hayes, Director Rail Strategy and Rail
Analysis, Department for Transport
By email
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Paul Marshall, Group Finance Director,
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By email
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29 November 2024

Dear Abi and Paul

ORR's review of Network Rail's RF6 delivery plan update for the financial year ending 31 March 2025

We consider that Network Rail's RF6 plans are consistent with DfT's financial limits as set out in the network grant agreement for 2024-25. We have not identified any material changes in the RF6 plans that could require sign-off from the Secretary of State.

They also remain aligned with the Secretary of State approved Delivery Plan (DP24) earlier this year. This is consistent with our findings at RF3, as set out to Network Rail and DfT in August 2024.

Key findings

1. **The funding gap at RF6 is £577 million, which is similar to the level at RF3 (£570 million).** At RF3, Network Rail included further savings in its plan (e.g. £193 million of savings from the HS2 works at Crewe), but because this has been more than offset by rising inflation (£227 million), the total gap has not changed significantly at RF6.
2. In the absence of alternative actions, **core asset renewals are likely to be cut from Network Rail's original CP7 plan to close the funding gap** which would not be consistent with our final determination and is an outcome that we are pressing Network Rail to address. We have previously written to Network Rail on this matter at the time of DP23 and at RF3. On 22 November we further wrote to Jeremy Westlake to set out our concerns and

expectations. Our view remains that the forecast funding gap should be reduced to zero.

3. Network Rail's RF6 **regional plans show reductions in core asset renewal volumes**. The Technical Authority's (TA) initial assurance found material concerns for North West & Central (NW&C), moderate issues for Eastern, minor issues for Southern and Wales & Western (W&W) and no issues for Scotland. The TA's view is being developed ahead of RF9. However, based on previous assessments, we consider that without suitable mitigation, the long-term **risk to asset sustainability of the network appears to be increasing**.
4. [Redacted]. **Eastern is currently forecasting to significantly miss its Passenger On Time Year 1 target of 70.4%**. We wrote to the region in October 2024 to set out our expectations for a revised performance improvement plan. We welcome the positive engagement we have had with the region in working to resolve these issues.
5. In September 2024, **we accepted W&W's plan to address the underlying issues causing the poor train reliability and punctuality in the region**. While we continue to closely monitor implementation of the plan, performance has continued to improve since our last update at RF3.
6. We are **reasonably confident of Network Rail's ability to deliver its efficiency programme for FY25**. Each of Network Rail's regions has at least 74% of their efficiency programmes that have either been delivered or have a high confidence of delivery. There is **a rating of 90% for FY25 across the whole of GB**. We recently commissioned an independent reporter, Nichols, to assess the robustness of Network Rail's CP7 efficiency plans and further details can be found in our recently published [Annual Efficiency and Finance Assessment](#).

Next steps

Network Rail has indicated that further details on the funding gap and renewals in NW&C will be worked through by RF9. We will provide a targeted review of this information to DfT at RF9 in February 2025.

I am happy to discuss any of the points in this letter or our report with you.

Yours sincerely


Will Godfrey



Review of Network Rail's Delivery Plan update (RF6)

FY 2025

29 November 2024



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Purpose and background

This report provides our assessment of Network Rail's delivery plan update in period 6 of year 1 of control period 7 (CP7), known as 'RF6'. The plan sets out what it is forecasting to deliver for its operating, support, maintenance, and renewals (OSMR) activities, and its income and expenditure forecasts for the remainder of 2024-25 (year 1) and the subsequent years of CP7.

Network Rail updates its OSMR delivery plan for CP7 on an annual basis. ORR reviews the updated plan as part of how we hold Network Rail to account against the Periodic Review 2023 (PR23) final determination, as well as to provide assurance to funders about Network Rail's delivery. Specifically, we focus on:

- Network Rail's progress against its 2024 Delivery Plan (DP24), which sets out how Network Rail intends to deliver our PR23 final determination, and is approved by the Secretary of State (SoS); and
- changes since the last iteration of the plan (the RF3 plan). We presented the findings of our review to the Department for Transport (DfT) on 30 August 2024.

Our review focuses on the key areas agreed with DfT prior to the start of CP7, and highlights material changes which ORR would like to bring to DfT's attention. Annex A provides a number of supporting charts.

Unless we refer to a specific region or business unit of Network Rail, the figures in this note are for Network Rail GB-wide and are presented in cash prices. Where future forecasts are included, this is based on the Bank of England's May 2024 inflation forecasts, as per Network Rail's approach.

1. Financial update at RF6

Funding gap

The funding gap at RF6 is £577 million which is similar to the level at RF3 (£570 million). At RF3, Network Rail included further savings in its plan (e.g. £193 million of savings from the HS2 works at Crewe), but because this has been more than offset by rising inflation (£227 million), the total gap has not changed significantly at RF6.

- 1.1 The funding gap, and Network Rail's plan for resolving it, has been a key issue since the PR23 final determination. Following our review of Network Rail's delivery plan, the company missed our deadline to resolve the funding gap in the first six months of CP7 (as set in our [March 2024 Delivery Plan letter](#)). There has been regular engagement between the two organisations on this matter, including exchanges of letters. However, the RF6 submission itself had limited information on this.
- 1.2 It is important that Network Rail resolves the gap in a timely manner. The longer this issue takes to resolve the more likely it will be that core renewals are cancelled or deferred. We are already seeing Network Rail regions starting to reduce their CP7 renewals forecasts, as discussed further in the asset management section (chapter 3) below.
- 1.3 There are a range of solutions available to Network Rail to resolve the gap. It could plan to generate additional income (e.g. property income), it could reduce or rephase work which does not impact on core renewals, it could aim to deliver higher efficiencies (the recent joint study on Network Rail's CP7 efficiencies found that plans were at a good point of development and that there were further opportunities to exceed early CP7 targets), and it could use risk funding. It may have to cut core renewals, but we would accept this only if other options are considered first because this would have a larger negative impact on long-term network outcomes (and have implications for future control period funding).
- 1.4 Network Rail has recently said to us that it wants to reduce the funding gap to £450 million by the end of this financial year, which would be a fifty percent reduction from the delivery plan at the start of the year. A waterfall chart showing

the movements in the funding gap from Network Rail's delivery plan to the end of FY25 is included in Annex A.

- 1.5 We have written to Network Rail to resolve this issue and show it is protecting core asset renewals, and our view remains that the forecast funding gap should be reduced to zero.

Financial risks

- 1.6 Network Rail faces a number of financial risks in CP7 which could make using risk funding to close the funding gap more difficult and emphasises our view that Network Rail needs to present a holistic view of both the funding gap and financial risk.
- 1.7 Rising inflation remains a concern, and the latest forecast for CP7 has resulted in an additional £227 million to Network Rail's CP7 plan. Input prices, which are in addition to general inflation, are declining in some areas; however this could be offset by the recently announced increases in National Insurance employment contributions (NIC).
- 1.8 The October 2024 Budget increased NIC rates and lowered the thresholds at which they are paid. Network Rail's initial view is that this change, enacted from April 2025, will increase its direct staff costs by over £200 million in CP7, and that further increases could come through the supply chain. It is possible that this could be partly offset by lower pay settlements as the impact on employers' finances is worked through.
- 1.9 Schedule 8 is another key risk for Network Rail. This year Network Rail is forecasting to pay operators £100 million, compared to £259 million in FY24, and risks having to pay a further £100 million in FY26 unless train performance improves.

Efficiency delivery

- 1.10 At RF6, we are reasonably confident of Network Rail's ability to deliver its efficiency programme for FY25. Each of Network Rail's regions has at least 74% of efficiency programmes either delivered or with a high confidence of delivery, with a rating of 90% for FY25 across the whole of GB.
- 1.11 Our commissioned review of Network Rail's efficiency plans by independent reporter Nichols has now delivered its final findings. The key findings show:

- (a) Network Rail's efficiency plans for CP7 are reasonable and there is generally a clear and strong alignment of Network Rail's regional and functional delivery plans. These fully align to the efficiency target in ORR's PR23 final determination.
- (b) Documentation about the business changes underpinning efficiencies (based on a sample of initiatives) is variable, with both good examples as well as those with insufficient supporting information.
- (c) The delivery status ratings used by Network Rail (known as BRAG ratings) provided by the regions and functions broadly aligned with Network Rail's central tracker. BRAG ratings rank the confidence of delivery from Blue (already completed and benefits fully realised) to Red (still to be identified or minimal plans in place).
- (d) There is good evidence of risk management through the governance and assurance process.
- (e) There is evidence of good practice, plus knowledge sharing and (while not documented) of the application of lessons learnt from CP6.
- (f) Delivery plans make use of overplanning on efficiency initiatives to manage delivery risk, which is good practice. However, there could be a greater consistency in the approach to the application of over-planning, supported by suitable analytical techniques. The application of efficiency overlays and unidentified items may be obscuring the view of real forecasts.

1.12 While Nichols' review has found that Network Rail's CP7 efficiency plans are broadly robust at this stage, we have some concerns with the reduction in non-cashable efficiency savings from Project Reach (circa £250 million) over CP7. This is caused by a delay to Project Reach, which will also reduce spend on the project which can be used elsewhere (for example, in closing the funding gap). Network Rail states that the reduction in efficiencies can be made up through other non-cash efficiency programmes, but we will monitor this closely.

2. Train performance

Overview of Network Rail's passenger and freight performance as at period 7

- 2.1 All figures quoted below refer to performance as at the period 7 forecast, unless stated otherwise.
- 2.2 Eastern is the only region in England & Wales forecasting to miss its year 1 targets for passenger On Time performance from our PR23 final determination. Eastern is discussed in further detail below, with charts for the region included in Annex A.
- 2.3 All England & Wales regions, apart from W&W (as noted in Network Rail's delivery plan) are forecasting to meet their year 1 targets for freight cancellations from our PR23 final determination. W&W is discussed in further detail below, with charts for the region included in Annex A.
- 2.4 Scotland is forecasting to miss the year 1 target for the Scotland Train Performance Measure (STPM), which is a joint performance target between Network Rail Scotland and ScotRail. For STPM, Scotland's MAA is 89.5% at period 6, which is below Scotland's delivery plan target of 90.7% (and the Scottish Minister's HLOS target of 92.5% – subject to adjustments for extreme weather and delays to interconnecting services and ferries). That said, Network Rail Scotland's contribution to the STPM is currently on target. There is risk of Network Rail Scotland's performance declining if there is excessively severe weather in the autumn/winter of FY25. We have reviewed Network Rail Scotland's autumn preparation and are monitoring the impact closely.
- 2.5 Network Rail Scotland is slightly off target for freight cancellations, forecasting 1.5% for FY25 at period 6 against a target of 1.4%. At this stage, achievement of the freight cancellations year 1 target is still credible, subject to performance during the autumn/winter period.
- 2.6 Network Rail's Network Licence requires it to do everything reasonably practicable to deliver the reasonable requirements of funders. For CP7 this includes delivering the conditions for freight growth during CP7. At RF3, we said that we were monitoring the progress that Network Rail was making on establishing regional freight growth boards in England & Wales. Each region in England & Wales now has a freight growth board in place and we attend these as an observer to ensure the regional freight growth initiatives are being delivered and stakeholders are

being engaged. We are pleased to report that good progress has been made on the creation of the growth boards and from our engagement, we think the System Operator has provided good leadership to the regions in their development by, for example, sharing the lessons from Network Rail Scotland's experience of running its freight board during CP6. Our view is that Network Rail Scotland's freight board is now well established, and all regions can learn from its experience in getting to this point.

- 2.7 The industry Performance Improvement Fund (PIF), which is applicable to England & Wales because Scotland has a separate dedicated fund, is progressing well. A total end of year 1 outturn of £5.1 million is forecast against a budget of £6 million. Nine projects are in flight, whilst 12 more are awaiting approval. We do have slight concerns that the approval process is slow and there is also a risk of the fund being unevenly distributed as in CP6 because the fund operates on a first come, first served basis and Eastern and Southern have been the most proactive. However, given the performance concerns in Eastern (see below) we are supportive of Network Rail having an increased focus on resourcing performance there.

Eastern

[Redacted]. The region is forecasting to significantly miss the Passenger On Time year 1 target of 70.4%. We wrote to the region in October 2024 to set out our expectations for a revised performance improvement plan. We welcome the positive engagement we have had with the region in working to resolve these issues.

- 2.8 At the end of Period 7, the region's Moving Annual Average (MAA) for Passenger On Time was 68.1%, which is significantly worse than the region's own MAA target of 69.4% for period 7. The On Time MAA forecast range for the end of the year 1 is 68.0% to 69.1%.
- 2.9 Declining performance is also seen in passenger cancellations where the MAA is 3.9% vs the year 1 target from our PR23 final determination of 3.4%. The region's forecast range for passenger cancellations is between 3.7% and 4.0%. Freight cancellations are also worse than the year 1 target of 1.3%, with the MAA standing at 1.9% and with the region reporting a forecast year-end range of 1.5% to 1.8%.

- 2.10 As a result of this continued decline in performance, we wrote to the region on 9 October 2024 to set out our expectations for it to review and refresh its improvement plan to ensure it is robust and suitable for its purpose. We have asked for this updated plan to be provided to us by 20 December 2024, alongside requesting a response from the region in the interim that sets out its approach to making alterations to its plan. We are continuing to discuss this through regular engagement with the region and welcome the positive engagement we have had so far.

Wales & Western

In September 2024, we accepted Wales & Western's (W&W's) plan to address the underlying issues causing the poor train reliability and punctuality in the region. While we continue to closely monitor implementation of the plan, performance has moderately improved since our last update at RF3.

- 2.11 The region's Full Year Forecast (FYF) for On Time is on target at 60.4%, while the MAA On Time performance is at 59.9% at period 7, which is an increase from 59.6% at period 4 when we last reported at RF3. This remains below other regions as the region continues to recover from its poor performance at the end of CP6. It has forecast to meet our year one On Time trajectory of 60.4%.
- 2.12 Passenger cancellations are unchanged since RF3 at 4.9% and unlikely to meet the year end regulatory trajectory (of 3.8%), with TOC fleet and traincrew issues currently the largest adverse trends.
- 2.13 As highlighted in Network Rail's delivery plan, the region is not forecasting to achieve its year 1 target for freight cancellations of 1.6%. Its freight cancellations MAA has marginally improved to 1.9%, from 2.0%, since we last reported at RF3.
- 2.14 [Redacted]. We will continue our active monitoring through regular review meetings with the region.

3. Asset management

Core renewals

Network Rail's RF6 regional plans show reductions in certain core asset renewal volumes in both FY25 and the control period as a whole. The Technical Authority's (TA) initial assurance found material concerns for North West & Central (NW&C), moderate issues for Eastern, minor issues for Southern and Wales & Western (W&W) and no issues for Scotland. The TA's view is being developed ahead of RF9. However, based on previous assessments, we consider that without suitable mitigation the long-term risk to asset sustainability of the network appears to be increasing.

- 3.1 Significant concerns remain with Network Rail's plan; these echo the concerns highlighted in our final determination and our delivery plan assurance work for the DfT earlier this year. Financial pressures have meant that the core renewal programme has not been given the level of protection we expected; while other more discretionary areas of spend in Network Rail's business continue to increase in cost.
- 3.2 When considered alongside the funding gap, the planned deferral of renewals to fund Schedule 8 payments is of concern if not mitigated and, based on the evidence supplied, the risk to the long-term sustainability of the network is now increasing. This in turn could lead to increased performance and safety risks long-term (noting that Network Rail has not yet adequately presented its application of the safety-risk bowtie principles to demonstrate mitigations). Network Rail has indicated that it is planning to release centrally held funding (from Group) to address the cost pressures from Schedule 8; this would allow Network Rail to reinstate these renewals in RF9.
- 3.3 The lack of a clear explanation of the rationale for the re-working of Network Rail's plan is also of concern. Should this winter be worse than anticipated in Network Rail's plan, expenditure and activity would need to be redirected from planned renewals to cover reactive activity which is less efficient. This will exacerbate the pressures on the renewals plan and potentially lead to further deferrals.

- 3.4 Projected delivery volumes by the regions across CP7 have reduced for some core assets in RF6. Changes to the NW&C plan reported at RF6 to reduce earthwork volumes over CP7 by 42% vs its delivery plan and similarly structure volumes by 31% in Southern are of particular concern. Our 2024 [Annual Health and Safety report](#) highlighted the importance of maintaining earthwork resilience, highlighting that the rate of high-consequence earthworks failures was at its highest since the inception of this metric in 2008.
- 3.5 Network Rail did not initially provide a full explanation for this as details were omitted from the NW&C RF6 pack as the TA was still considering the changes. We recently met with the TA to discuss RF6 and it has explained that there are several drivers including a change in unit rates used to estimate the work. The movement from the most favourable rates used by any of the regions in Network Rail to the most expensive has increased the NW&C cost pressures and resulted in a reduction in volumes. Significant changes to unit rates, such as this, so early in a control period are concerning and we are seeking to understand why they have changed so drastically and why volumes have been reduced as a result, instead of other options being considered. The TA highlighted its concerns with changes to NW&C's plans and is closely working with the region (including a peer review conducted by Southern) to understand how volumes can be reinstated.
- 3.6 As work is underway to address this, we propose to conduct a targeted review for NW&C at RF9.
- 3.7 Also of concern is the planned deferral of renewals to fund Schedule 8 payments in Eastern of £68 million over CP7; which is not consistent with the requirements to protect core renewals set out in our PR23 final determination. Additionally, Eastern has changed its strategy for sustainment of Operational Property in CP7 and the implications and any mitigation actions are still being developed and assessed. We will work with Eastern to clarify the mitigations and plan and will update in our RF9 report.
- 3.8 Track effective volumes (a measure of the asset life benefit from additional work) have reduced in both NW&C and Eastern in both year 1 and across CP7. This includes a change in strategy with NW&C electing to use lighter rail in much of its planned work in CP7. The implications of this and other changes have not yet been fully explored by Network Rail but will form part of our RF9 assessment. We do not think a reduction to the volumes committed to at the time of the final determination is maintainable without impacting long-term sustainability. We will be commissioning a review into track ahead of RF9 (to report early 2025) to

increase our understanding of the current level of sustainability and practices to support this key asset.

- 3.9 In Southern, there has been a change in strategy for underbridge work. This has increased the volume of work planned but the effective volumes (measure of asset life benefit) have decreased. We will follow up with Network Rail on the implications of this on asset sustainability in future control periods ahead of RF9.
- 3.10 Across the remaining assets, work remains relatively aligned to the delivery plan, with the exception of signalling [Redacted]. We recognise changes are likely to occur across a control period and consider Network Rail's plans are reflective of the revised project timescales and do not increase deliverability risk. Network Rail is engaging with Alstom's senior leadership to establish if there will be any further delays to these programmes, and what the financial impact of these delays will be.

Maintenance

- 3.11 A reduction in core asset renewals expenditure in CP7 requires Network Rail to obtain further life from its assets through increased minor works and maintenance activity to reduce the risk on asset sustainability. Over the first six months of the control period, we have challenged Network Rail to improve the clarity of high-level information on maintenance activities to allow us to monitor progress in this area. To this point, effective mitigation of the risk on asset sustainability was not demonstrated in the RF6 submission, so we are continuing to challenge Network Rail for the information that will allow us to draw conclusions and provide our assurance to funders.
- 3.12 We will continue to work with Network Rail to ensure clarity of maintenance activities and alignment to its plan. To support this, an independent reporter review will be undertaken in early 2025. This aims to understand:
- (a) if the actual volumes of maintenance delivered aligned with planned activities in the final year of CP6;
 - (b) whether Network Rail's proposed local maintenance access strategy for CP7 supports the volume and type of maintenance for years 1 and 2; if not, what is being done to address this and is it sufficient; and
 - (c) the dependence of the regions' plan on central functions within Network Rail.
- 3.13 Through these activities, we will expect Network Rail to significantly progress its high-level reporting to support monitoring in this area.

Digital signalling portfolio, including strategic renewals

- 3.14 Network Rail's CP7 plan includes strategic renewals; i.e. projects or programmes that can span numerous asset types and are of significant importance e.g. the Trilink programme in the North West & Central region. In most cases these renewals have complex funding arrangements and, as such, the governance will need to be appropriate for each project or programme.
- 3.15 We have used the information given by the Industry Partnership for Digital Railway (IPDR) to assess Network Rail's digital signalling portfolio and strategic renewals plans at RF6. We have also reviewed the information submitted by NW&C for West Coast Mainline North (WCML-N) (also known as Trilink). There are discrepancies across this information with reporting differences between IPDR and the regions. We recognise that Network Rail has labelled the data as requiring further assurance but in the absence of assured output we have used the dataset that is on the same basis as the one provided for our determination in order to make comparisons. We will push Network Rail to reconcile the data for RF9.
- 3.16 There are additional cost pressures reported in the digital signalling portfolio which total approximately £150 million across CP7. These cost pressures include a £105 million cost increase in strategic renewals in the regions and an adjustment of £50 million in IPDR for a cost increase for On Track Machine (OTM) fleet fitment. This means the total budget for the digital signalling portfolio, including a digital signalling specific 'overlay' at RF6, is circa £1.7 billion vs circa £1.6 billion at the delivery plan. The £105 million cost increase is made up of increases to:
- (a) East Coast Digital Programme (infrastructure and enablers) – £74 million.
 - (b) Midland Mainline South St Pancras – £0.3 million
 - (c) West Coast Mainline North (Trilink) Carlisle – £28 million.
 - (d) Great Western Mainline Paddington to Hayes – £2 million.
- 3.17 Network Rail has told us that mitigations are in development to manage the cost increases for OTM fleet fitment (£50 million) now plans have matured, and we will work with Network Rail to clarify these ahead of RF9.
- 3.18 In summary, Network Rail is forecasting to spend £0.1 billion more on digital signalling than anticipated in its delivery plan. There are a number of different drivers for this as explained above, including some reporting anomalies which we are following up with Network Rail.


4. Health and safety

- 4.1 The RF6 submission from Network Rail does not refer specifically to the impact of any changes on health and safety. In the information provided by Network Rail, there is limited reference made to the 'safety risk bowtie'. The assurance document provided by the Technical Authority indicates that the use of the bow tie is still in its infancy with the first pilot asset grouping (track) only now being developed into a prototype tool. In PR23, Network Rail committed to using its bow tie analysis to evidence its assessment of the implications of changes to its plans. We have escalated this issue to Network Rail's Chief Health and Safety Officer.
- 4.2 While some of the content of Network Rail's submissions stated, generically, that changes to its plans had been assessed as having no material impact on health and safety, there was no evidence to support such statements. In some regions, Network Rail is planning to defer renewal work on assets that have been identified as high risk (due to the condition of the asset) but has deemed this to be acceptable as the risk is unlikely to be realised in the short term. No supporting evidence to demonstrate it was safe to defer this work was provided. It was also unclear what mitigations will be put in place.
- 4.3 The lack of safety related discourse across the RF6 submissions has made it difficult to judge whether Network Rail's decisions around deferrals or changes to budget allocation are appropriate based on health and safety risk and puts emphasis on the need for its safety bow tie analysis and the inclusion of Health and Safety narrative in future submissions.
- 4.4 Within the information provided by Network Rail, there are examples of deferral of renewal volumes and/or reallocations of budget which could have implications for health and safety, key examples include:
- Network Rail appears to be reducing spend in Electrical Safety Delivery (ESD) in some regions compared to its delivery plan despite this being a key safety deliverable in the final determination.
 - There is reference to slippage in spend relating to critical, priority occupational health programmes (such as asbestos management).
 - The TA has highlighted a high likelihood of future issues with retention of trained/expert engineering staff.

- The TA has highlighted delays to the procurement of infrastructure monitoring. In the PR23 final determination, we were clear that accurate asset information is vital and infrastructure monitoring is an enabler to this. High quality asset information is fundamental to making safe decisions, particularly when fewer renewals are being delivered.
- Weather Risk Taskforce work has slipped by £1.1 million from year 1 into year 2. Although this is a relatively small reduction in comparison to the indicated original FY25 spend of £13.7 million, no commentary was provided to demonstrate that there would not be a detrimental impact on outcomes in this important area. We will monitor the implications of this through our liaison with Network Rail's monthly steering group.

Annex A: Supporting charts and tables

Figure A.1 Funding gap movements from Network Rail's delivery plan to FY25 end



Note that in our [Control period 7 delivery plan and holding Network Rail to account: letter to Network Rail dated 28 March](#), we referenced a £400 million funding gap. This was based on reductions in expenditure which Network Rail identified as opportunities, but which were not ultimately embedded in the delivery plan. Because of this, the baseline funding gap in DP24 reflecting planned activity committed to in Network Rail's plans – including those of its regions – is approximately £900 million (as shown on the right-hand side of figure A.1).

Figure A.2 Eastern – Network Rail attributable delay per 1,000 miles MAA (increase means worsening performance)

[Redacted]

Figure A.3 Eastern – On Time MAA (increase means improving performance)




Figure A.4 Eastern – Freight cancellations MAA (increase means worsening performance)




Figure A.5 Eastern – Passenger cancellations MAA (increase means worsening performance)




Figure A.6 Wales & Western – On Time MAA (increase means improving performance)





Figure A.7 Wales & Western – Freight Cancellations MAA (increase means worsening performance)



Note: In the delivery plan WW are targetting 2.1% at end of Yr 1.

Table A.1 Red, Amber, Yellow, Green ratings of different asset groups, with areas of highest concern shown with a red border

Region / Function	Track	Lineside	Signalling	Level X	Structures	Earth-works	Drainage	Ops Property	E&FP	Telecoms
Eastern	Y	A	G	G	Y	A	G	A	Y	Y
NW&C	Y	G	Y	G	A	A	G	A	G	Y
Southern	G	A	Y	G	Y	Y	Y	A	Y	Y
W&W	Y	G	Y	G	A	G	G	Y	G	Y
Scotland	Y	Y	Y	G	A	G	G	Y	G	Y

Table A.2 Forecast delivery of effective volumes of each asset group for FY25 vs Network Rail's delivery plan

Eff Vol RF6 vs DP (FY25)	Eastern	NW&C	Scotland	Southern	W&W	GB
Track - PL	-8%	-1%	1%	1%	8%	-1%
Track - S&C	-11%	-22%	4%	17%	2%	-4%
Signalling	-32%	31%	-13%	0%	18%	-13%
Structures	9%	-31%	17%	-38%	-20%	-10%
Earthworks	-2%	11%	38%	0%	-4%	12%
E&FP	2%	2%	0%	11%	0%	4%

Table A.3 Forecast delivery of effective volumes of each asset group for CP7 vs Network Rail's delivery plan

Eff Vol RF6 vs DP (CP7)	Eastern	NW&C	Scotland	Southern	W&W	GB
Track - PL	-7%	-5%	0%	0%	0%	-3%
Track - S&C	6%	-14%	1%	3%	3%	0%
Signalling	11%	2%	38%	8%	0%	11%
Structures	-6%	-10%	2%	-31%	0%	-11%
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