

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



12 February 2026

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

**RAIB Report: Derailment of a passenger train near Walton-on-Thames,
Surrey on 4 March 2024**

I write to report¹ on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the recommendations addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 17 February 2025.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendations and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 1 is '**Closed**'. The status of recommendation 2 is '**Open**'.

ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address these recommendations.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Initial consideration by ORR

1. Both recommendations were addressed to ORR when the report was published on 17 February 2025.
2. After considering the recommendations ORR passed recommendation 1 to Colas Rail and recommendation 2 to Network Rail, asking them to consider and where appropriate act upon them and advise ORR of its conclusions. The consideration given to each recommendation is included below.
3. ORR also brought recommendation 1 to the attention of Amey Infrastructure Wales as it was concluded that that there are equally important lessons for them. ORR did not ask these organisations to provide a reply.

Recommendation 1

The intent of this recommendation is for Colas Rail to have a robust process in place to deliver work in such a way as to avoid the risk of redundant material being dropped or left on track.

Colas Rail, working in consultation with Network Rail, should undertake a risk-based review of its planning and processes (including work package plans and task briefing sheets) to ensure that appropriate methods of work are in place to ensure the safety of the line when redundant material is to be collected from on or near the line. This review should particularly consider the risk of redundant material being dropped or left on the track in a position where it may be struck by trains.

Colas Rail should develop a timebound programme to make any appropriate changes identified to its rules, policies, and procedures (paragraphs 147a and 148a).

This recommendation may be applicable to other contractors.

ORR decision

4. In response to the RAIB recommendation, Colas Rail has put in place a number of measures aimed at reducing the risk of redundant material being left on the line when it is returned to traffic. Measures taken include revision of the track hand back process, introduction of a scrap metal risk assessment, updates to construction phase plans and new planning apps aimed at providing improved assurance that a work site is clear. Colas is trialling geotagging as a method of tracking the movements of staff and equipment such as Road Rail Vehicles.
5. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Colas Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Information in support of ORR decision

6. On 30 April 2025 Colas Rail provided the following initial response:

Most of the actions were started immediately post the incident thought the recommendation and your subsequent letter have given us the opportunity to do a full review to make sure we had covered all aspects.

*Our plan has been shared with Network Rail (**Name redacted** - Southern) to discuss our approach, response and shared for further distribution/discussion between his counter parts across other regions.*



Walton on Thames
RAIB Derailment Rep

7. On 19 January 2026 Colas Rail provided the following Word document with an update and supporting pdf document:



Walton on Thames
RAIB Derailment ORR



ENG-A3-012.pdf

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is for Network Rail to have adequate processes in place to ensure the co-ordination and supervision of work on complex Capital Delivery worksites.

Network Rail, working in consultation with the Rail Safety and Standards Board, should review GERT8000, the Rule Book, and standard NR/L2/OHS/019, 'Safety of people at work on or near the line' to determine how co-ordination and supervision of activities should be undertaken on a site of work which involves the interaction of multiple persons in charge.

This review should explicitly consider how individual task and overall work site safety is managed by a single controlling mind where there is one or more of the following:

- multiple sites of work within a site of work
- multiple shifts and handovers of responsibility
- different teams with staff employed by different companies (including prime contractor and labour suppliers).

The review should also consider the interaction required between controllers of site safety, persons in charge and engineering supervisors and how these roles work together to ensure that the line is safe for the passage of trains following work.

Network Rail should develop a timebound programme to make any appropriate changes identified to its rules, policies, and procedures (paragraphs 145a, 146b, 146c).

ORR decision

8. Network Rail has provided a timebound plan for the review of the relevant Rule Book content and standard NR/L2/OHS/019 to determine how co-ordination and supervision of activities is addressed. The outcome of the review is expected to either conclude that no changes are required and changes to training material and rebriefing are appropriate, or changes to the standard and Rule Book should be recommended.

9. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to close it.

Status: Open.

Information in support of ORR decision

10. On 13 May 2025 Network Rail provided the following initial response:

Action Plan

Please provide milestones with dates

1. Review of appropriate Rule Book content and NR/L2/OHS/019 standard to confirm how co-ordination and supervision of activities are covered in both. To start June 2025 complete October 2025
2. To consider how on a site of work which involves the interaction of multiple persons in charge whether change is required to the Rule Book and NR/L2/OHS/019. To start September 2025 complete December 2025
3. To consider how individual tasks and overall work site safety is cover in the Rule Book and NR/L2/OHS/019 managed and whether any changes are required. To consider whether the role structure is appropriate to manage:
 - multiple sites of work within a site of work
 - multiple shifts and handovers of responsibility
 - a. To start December 2025 complete February 2025
4. To consider if the recommendation can be dealt with by appropriate briefing and amendments to existing training materials. To start February 2026 complete April 2026
5. To make recommendations or otherwise to change the Rule Book or NR/L2/OHS/019. To start February 2026 complete December 2026

Risk and interdependencies

The review will require the RSSB Operations Rule Specialists and Network Rail technical lead of trackworker safety and the NR/L2/OHS/019 standard to work together to undertake the review work.

To engage with stakeholder as required following the review and other work to check finding and the proposed actions to close out the recommendation.

The risks are making sure of availability of appropriate knowledgeable and experienced stakeholders who can interpret the Rule Book and standards as they are designed to be delivered.

Evidence required to support closure of recommendation

1. Evidence of the review of appropriate Rule Book content and NR/L2/OHS/019 standard to confirm how co-ordination and supervision of activities are covered in both.
2. How consideration was undertaken for how on a site of work which involves the interaction of multiple persons in charge whether change is required to the Rule Book and NR/L2/OHS/019. To start September 2024 complete December 2025
3. How consideration was undertaken for how individual tasks and overall work site safety is cover in the Rule Book and NR/L2/OHS/019 managed and whether any changes are required. To consider whether the role structure is appropriate to manage:
 - multiple sites of work within a site of work
 - multiple shifts and handovers of responsibility
 - a. To start December 2024 complete February 2025
4. How consideration was undertaken if the recommendation can be dealt with by appropriate briefing and amendments to existing training materials. To start February 2026 complete April 2026
5. Provision of business case for change and standard change remit to cover the recommendations to change the Rule Book or NR/L2/OHS/019. To start February 2026 complete April 2026

Action Plan Checklist

Are resources in place to deliver this action plan and task allocated to the correct owner?	☐
Are the actions timebound and overall timescale appropriate to the risk?	☐
Have you considered and noted any overlap with other related safety initiatives in progress elsewhere in the business?	☐
Have you identified the risks and interdependencies of this action plan?	☐

Have you considered how you will track/monitor the delivery of this plan?	☐
RAIB Recommendations - I have included the output from the cost benefit analysis tool (if appropriate to use) and/or the benefits of delivering the recommendation	☐

Action Plan Approval

I as the Network Technical Head (or Band 1 or above equivalent with relevant accountabilities) approve the action plan for delivery of this recommendation. I confirm I have reviewed the action plan and I am satisfied that it meets the recommendation intent and the required criteria above.

Name:

Role:

Date: