

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



12 February 2026

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Freight train derailment at Eastleigh, Hampshire on 28 January 2020

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 2 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 4 March 2021.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 2 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is that Network Rail considers how dynamic track gauge measurement is undertaken in the areas of its network that are not traversed by its track measurement trains.

Network Rail should review its arrangements for the dynamic measurement of track geometry on the parts of its infrastructure not covered by its track measurement trains. The review should include the identification of high-risk locations where additional safeguards are required (such as those subject to high lateral forces, or where there is an increased risk of track geometry faults). Consideration should be given to the number and routing of track measurement trains and alternative ways of measuring track geometry under dynamic conditions. Any additional safeguards identified by this review should be implemented by means of a risk-based programme

ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed arrangements for dynamic measurement of track geometry at the frequencies stated in NR/L2/TRK/001/Mod11 for areas not covered by track measurement trains. Identification of high-risk locations is included in standard NR/L2/TRK/001 'Inspection and maintenance of the permanent way'.
2. Three alternative methods to the track measurement train are available to a TME to dynamically measure track geometry: Freight Operations of Gauge (FRoOG) MPV, S&C Track Recording Machine and the Class 153 VIU (Visual Inspection Unit). There is currently four Class 153 VIU available to use, with further commitment to add two more by May 2026 and a proposal for a seventh. Currently, Eastern, Southern and Anglia have access to a Class 153, with one spare to be used, as appropriate. Scotland has ordered an additional Class 153 VIU and it is scheduled for delivery in the summer of 2026. NW&C and W&W have provided commitment to purchase one. All regions have access to the MPV and FRoOG.
3. It is proposed to close the recommendation on the basis that the review has provided a process by which high risk locations may be identified. The closure does not provide a list of those high-risk locations, but it should be noted that this would only ever represent the situation at a snapshot in time. The measures described by Network Rail in the closure statement are more robust, as they provide routes with the tools needed to more dynamically identify high-risk locations that are not traversed by track measurement trains.
4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

5. On 3 February 2022 ORR reported the following:

Network Rail has reviewed technological solutions for detecting unsafe track gauge and a number of different devices are now being trialled. In addition, Network Rail is aiming to improve monitoring of S&C by updating standards and making changes to training .

From the initial response provided by Network Rail it was unclear if track geometry for S&C was only taken into consideration, or if it also covered plain line. The initial response from Network Rail only referred to S&C, but when challenged confirmed the recommendation would also be addressed in terms of plain line track geometry.

Update

6. On 3 November 2022 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



[N206-05] Eastleigh
Rec 2.docx

7. On 26 November 2024 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



Closure Statement
Rec 2 27-09-2024.pdf

8. On 31 July 2025 Network Rail provided the following updated closure statement:



Closure Statement
Rec 2 v2 30-07-2025.

9. On 15 September 2025 ORR wrote to Network Rail as follows:

Can you clarify which methods of recording track geometry are available to which region? If all methods are not available in all regions, is there a plan for roll out? Also, what has been the uptake in each region?

We need to know this information to clarify that the last part of the recommendation has been addressed (*Any additional safeguards identified by this review should be implemented by means of a risk-based programme*).

10. On 25 September 2025 Network Rail responded as follows:

The MPV covers England, Scotland & Wales. There is of course only one of these. It's heavily used and is directed by the Routes as they see fit.

There is only one FRoOG. It's used a DU level as they see fit. I do not know whether any of the Regions are seeking to get one of these. They can though, it's been approved.

The 153's are listed below:

VIU1 Eastern Region plan in place

VIU2 Southern Region plan in place

VIU3 Spare, used as appropriate currently

TCMU Currently Anglia specific, also designed to run as a PLPR unit

VIU4 NW&C in progress, expected end of 2025

VIU5 W&W in progress, expected mid 2026

VIU6 Scotland proposed only at present, no firm date or absolute commitment.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 2

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ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed technological solutions for detecting unsafe track gauge and a number of different devices are now being trialled. In addition, Network Rail is aiming to improve monitoring of S&C by updating standards and making changes to training .
2. From the initial response provided by Network Rail it was unclear if track geometry for S&C was only taken into consideration, or if it also covered plain line. The initial response from Network Rail only referred to S&C, but when challenged confirmed the recommendation would also be addressed in terms of plain line track geometry.
3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - is taking action to implement it by April 2022.

Status: Implementation ongoing. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.

Information in support of ORR decision

4. On 21 April 2021 Network Rail provided the following initial response:

Action Plan

Please provide milestones with dates

Network Rail will conduct a review of its management of dynamic gauge, focussing specifically on the risk associated with S&C. The review will consider the controls currently in place to manage gauge (both static

and dynamic) within S&C, as well as what technology could be deployed to support maintenance staff in managing the associated risk.

A series of three actions have been created to address this recommendation:

1. Conduct a review of historic gauge spread derailments, including a review of the relevant bow-tie controls **Target completion: June 2021**
2. Undertake an assessment of existing technologies / devices to monitor gauge spread in S&C **Target completion: June 2021**
3. Conduct a review of the Network Rail standards and controls framework with respect to management and measurement of gauge **Target completion: April 2022**

All associated actions are expected to be complete by **April 2022**

Evidence required to support closure of recommendation

Evidence will be provided against each of the numbered actions in order to support closure of the recommendation:

1. A catalogue of all previous gauge spread derailments will be produced, summarising causal factors and identifying relevant which of the track bow-tie controls are relevant to each failure.
2. Technologies will be evaluated in their ability to support detection of un-safe gauge at critical locations in S&C which have been identified through existing assessments. Where specific products are identified, trial product acceptance will be undertaken in order to support a pilot in the railway environment.
3. Following on from the bow-tie review, each control measure will be assessed for effectiveness and potential for enhancement as required. Where controls are required to be enhanced / modified, or where new controls are needed, working groups will be established to deliver the necessary changes with the standards issued and briefed.

5. On 3 September 2021 Network Rail provided the following update:



Current Progress – Recommendation 2

Conduct a review of historic gauge spread derailments, including a review of the relevant bow-tie controls	Undertake assessment of existing technologies / devices to monitor gauge spread	Review existing standards on gauge measurement
- Review completed - Additional information to be added following NTH(T) comments - Results will be used to help inform requirements in other actions	- Multiple devices are being considered to support management of gauge spread risk - Broader view of S&C monitoring strategy is ongoing, with the development of a technical specification for S&C monitoring metrics	- A combination of standards and training package updates will be completed - These will be targeted at manual geometry inspection and will include a new module for TRK/001 - Approval is being sought by Track CDG in two weeks


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