

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



24 July 2026

Mr Andy Lewis
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents

Dear Andy,

**RAIB Report: Pedestrian struck by a train at Lady Howard footpath and
bridleway crossing, Surrey on 21 April 2022**

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 2 addressed to ORR in the above report, initially published on 14 February 2023, and a revised report published on 6 February 2024.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 2 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that appropriate interim shorter-term risk mitigations are identified and implemented in a timely manner at level crossings that are awaiting long-term solutions to reduce the risk.

Network Rail should review its existing processes for level crossing risk management and include:

- explicit provision for considering a wider range of short- and medium-term risk mitigation options than is currently the case
- steps to ensure that those responsible for implementing risk controls are aware of all the options available, including those that might offer only incremental reductions in risk or interim mitigation pending implementation of preferred long-term solutions
- documented details of short- and medium-term risk controls, including both technical and non-technical options.

ORR decision

1. To support decision making around identifying appropriate interim shorter-term risk mitigations at level crossings that are awaiting longer-term risk-reduction solutions, Network Rail has introduced a Level Crossing safety Improvement Toolkit. The toolkit provides details of 56 currently available risk mitigation options: 19 long term, 19 medium term and 18 short term, based on how quickly implementation is expected to be achieved. Network Rail note that the toolkit is a live document and new mitigation options may be added, with briefing provided for end users.

2. Having reviewed the closure statement, we asked Network Rail to explain how all affected staff understand and are competent to use the toolkit and to also provide detail on the Narrative Risk Assessment review group. Network Rail explained in an update how information was cascaded to level crossing managers. In addition, Network Rail clarified that the purpose of the tool was to facilitate more consistent use of mitigation measures nationally.

3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

4. On 28 March 2024 ORR reported the following:

Network Rail will address the recommendation by updating the level crossing risk management toolkit, <http://www.lxrmk.com/>. The work is expected to be completed by the end of March 2024.

Update

5. On 23 January 2026 provided the following closure statement:



Lady Howard RAIB
rec 2 closure paper.pc

6. Network Rail have provided the following Level Crossing Safety Improvement Toolkit:



Level Crossing Safety
Improvement Toolkit

7. On 8 May 2026 ORR wrote to Network Rail as follows:

We have reviewed the closure statement and supporting information and have the following feedback.

The toolkit has been made available via SharePoint and communicated through a cascade briefing to Route Level Crossing Managers. However, this approach relies on informal dissemination and does not provide assurance that all relevant staff, including Level Crossing Managers, are aware of, understand, and will apply the full range of available options. There is no evidence of structured training, competency assurance, or mechanisms to confirm effective use. How will Network Rail check that all relevant staff understand and are competent to utilise the Level Crossing Safety Improvement toolkit to ensure its effectiveness?

The closure statement refers to “the national Narrative Risk Assessment (NRA) review group”, mentioned in the Claydon A12.1 closure statement. As this is an internal Network Rail recommendation, we haven’t seen this closure statement. Can Network Rail explain the purpose of the group and how it will work?

8. Network Rail responded on 12 June 2026 as follows:

Thank you for seeking additional clarification on the closure paper. In efforts to respond to the key themes of the questions, the below response tries to address these points individually and is broken down accordingly. If there are any further points to clarify, please do come back to us.

A general point of clarity in relation to ‘applying’ the full range of options

- *The full range of options listed in the tool are evaluated by the Level Crossing Manager (LCM) for appropriate consideration at the crossing being assessed. The selection of options is therefore crossing and level of risk specific and is based on targeting identified hazards. It is not expected that LCMs will model every conceivable option in the list which could be applicable to the crossing type, but they would need to demonstrate and record their rationale for choosing or dismissing relevant controls.*

LCM understanding and training

- *The options within the tool are not new, novel, or unfamiliar, and this is not a new process. The tool itself required an update and more ownership and management to negate the use of local route held variants. It is now a controlled publication owned by the Technical Authority. It's use by routes will provide greater consistency across the business in exploring and determining short and long-term options to mitigate risk, as these are now more explicitly referenced.*
- *The tool itself provides a detailed summary of the options available to manage risk. These are categorised by key themes and crossing types. Critically, the list helps level crossing managers to determine if the measure is appropriate for use as short or long-term mitigation. It also provides appropriate secondary detail to support cost benefit analysis. Its release does not require new and bespoke training to administer or understand as the process remains unchanged. It will, however, form part of new to role training and feature in any ongoing refresher training.*

Assurance

- *The route level crossing managers were briefed at the community of practice meeting on 11th September 2025, in York. As is the typical line manager structure within Network Rail, they are the responsible managers for onward cascade briefing to their teams.*
- *The Technical Authority will be following this up at the community of practice meeting on 24th June 2026 to confirm that the cascade briefs have taken place.*
- *More broadly, ongoing assurance is achieved by the following means:*
 - *As part of narrative risk assessment assurance undertaken by the route level crossing manager (or their nominated deputy) pre-steering group.*
 - *As part of steering group assurance undertaken within each route and region when reviewing narrative risk assessments. This will enable:*
 - *Consistency with modelled options to become more readily apparent*
 - *Consistency with cost modelling (unless local specific intelligence supports reasoned deviation) to be evidenced*
 - *Better application of short and long-term options and more evidence of evaluation and thinking within NRAs to be expected*
 - *In addition, and more centrally, the Technical Authority are undertaking the following:*
 - *A representative from the team is undertaking spot checks at a selection of route led steering groups in efforts to assure the meeting and identify and share any good/bad practice.*

- *The Technical Authority led, Narrative Risk Assessment Review Group meeting structure, will also support assurance in the specific area of modelled options and the application of short or long-term controls. (TOR attached).*

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 2

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- explicit provision for considering a wider range of short- and medium-term risk mitigation options than is currently the case
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- documented details of short- and medium-term risk controls, including both technical and non-technical options.

ORR decision

1. Network Rail will address the recommendation by updating the level crossing risk management toolkit, <http://www.lxrmk.com/>. The work is expected to be completed by the end of March 2024.

2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to close it.

Status: Open.

Information in support of ORR decision

3. On 16 May 2023 Network Rail provided the following initial response:

Network Rail partially accepts this recommendation subject to the observations below.

Bullet point 1: The scenario of one train being hidden from view by another train remains a possibility at any level crossing on railway with greater than a single track. Whilst it is true that train frequency and user moment can influence opportunity for incident, the targeting of 'high risk' locations in isolation is contrary to our legal obligations under the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974.

Bullet point 2: In the same spirit as the response to bullet point 1, we are proposing an interim and longer-term solution that targets all relevant level crossings, as outlined below. Further risk-based decisions and risk mitigation will

follow, as appropriately evaluated by Routes and Regions, as part of BAU risk management protocols. This approach better fulfils our legal duties.

Bullet point 3: In regard to technology, Network Rail are committed to the continued rollout of MSLs through normal risk management protocols, where they are demonstrated to manage risk so far as is reasonably practicable. There are no immediate technology advances internationally within the industry that can be reasonably installed to better manage another train coming risk, beyond our current and in development, suite of MSLs (Overlay or Integrated). To develop and introduce more complex solutions for deployment on our rail network, will only increase costs and reduce the number of active warning systems that can be deployed. Safety awareness events have and continue to be used successful to promote awareness. Our 'Beware the bubble' campaigns focus on behaviours, distractions, physically and cognitively, and heighten public information and understanding.

In response to recommendation 1, we have agreed to design and develop a new sign to heighten awareness of 'another train coming' risk. This new sign will be deployed at all footpath, bridleway, and user worked crossings with greater than a single line. This new sign will be incorporated within the revised PCSBR legislation currently in flight.

As an interim measure to legislative change, the new sign design will be laminated and rolled out across the network at the aforementioned locations. It is anticipated that this will be achieved within 4 weeks of the finalised design being approved, which is expected to be no later than mid-July.

Once the newly designed signage has been adopted into law, and the physical signs are available for manufacture, the laminated signs will be replaced by more robust materials. In effect, the 'another train coming' signage will be a core part of our introduction of the new PCSBR signs, at those locations already outlined.

Our approach to this recommendation follows a review of our current risk management process and incorporates good practice decision-making based on a systemic review of level crossing safety. It recognises that there are no other reasonably practicable controls to afford mitigation toward 'another train coming' risk, with closures or MSLs being the only other alternatives. The focus on signage therefore accounts for the fact that closures and MSLs are not viable economic options that can be progressed across the affected estate with immediate effect.

It is proposed to close this recommendation once the laminated signage is deployed across the appropriate assets, with rollout of the permanent signs to be part of Route and Regional risk-based deliverability thereafter.

It should be noted that signage is not considered a substitute for technology deployment, as required to manage risk so far as is reasonably practicable and following our normal BAU risk management process. It is accepted, however, that the introduction of signage is a reasonably practicable measure to undertake in our management of level crossing safety.

Closure: 31st July 2023

Network Rail accepts this recommendation subject to the observations below.

We are satisfied that our level crossing standards, notably NR/L2/XNG/001, Provision and risk management of level crossings, and NR/L3/XNG/308, Risk assessing level crossings, appropriately identify the requirements for interim, short and long-term control measures as necessary. We also acknowledge that guidance is also available on the level crossing hub entitled 'Managing interim risk at level crossings', targeted toward and available for level crossing managers. Finally, we are also satisfied that our level crossing manager training package underpins the need for interim control measures.

In response to recommendation 2, we consider that there is an opportunity to review and update as appropriate, our level crossing risk management toolkit, <http://www.lxrmtk.com/> to bolster interim controls and address the recommendation. Accordingly, we have set aside a plan and a budget toward this objective. We will commence this work within the next few months, continuing throughout year 5 of CP6 and culminating the update by 31/03/2024.

Closure: 30th April 2024