

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager
T: 020 7282 3864
M: 07710069402
E-mail oliver.stewart@orr.gov.uk

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Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Trains passed over washed out track at Baildon, West Yorkshire on 7 June 2016

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendations 2 & 3 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 16 February 2017.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendations and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendations 2 & 3 is '**Implemented**'.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendations, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 1 June 2021.

Yours sincerely,



Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is to improve Network Rail's emergency response to incidents on the track particularly in situations where emergencies are first identified by members of the public.

Network Rail should develop and implement a system to enable its controllers to be able to rapidly translate geographic or post code information provided by others on locations adjacent to the railway, into track location information so enabling the effective direction of responders

ORR decision

1. When we initially received the closure statement in October 2019 different Network Rail routes were using different methods of identifying locations using publically available systems. Network Rail have now confirmed the widespread use of what3words by control rooms to easily identify locations, a system also widely used by the emergency services.

2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it

Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

3. On 19 February 2018 ORR reported that Network Rail had reviewed existing arrangements among the different routes for communication arrangements to identify locations using information other than that which is specific to the railway, such as ELRs. Once appropriate arrangements had been formalised, Network Rail would brief them to the routes.

Update

4. On 22 October 2019 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



2187_001.pdf

5. Network Rail state in summary the following:

The recommendation featured as an agenda item at the National COM meeting from June 2017, where the recommendation was shared with all Route COMs. Feedback was requested from all Routes on best practice that already exists on the

communication/translation of converting location details from local information (non railway) i.e. postcode etc. to railway specific (ELR, miles and chains etc.).

The feedback received showed that LNE use Geo RINM or Google Maps through the Information Coordinators. Anglia, Wessex and LNW South do the same but their Incident Controllers find the information. All other routes utilise the same technology with minor differences in terms of who conducts the task.

The full feedback was reviewed and any lessons learnt from individual Routes was discussed at the National COM meeting.

6. On 3 May 2021 provided the following additional information:

Thank you for the below, most of our control rooms use What-3 words app now (like many of the emergency services).

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the effectiveness of communicating safety critical information between incident controllers and signallers and drivers, in order to reduce the time taken to alert trains in emergency situations.

Network Rail should review how its controllers respond to emergency phone calls about the safety of the line, to make sure that important information is captured and accurately transmitted to relevant railway responders, and implement any identified improvements. The scope of the review should include consideration of the following:

- a) controllers making direct contact with the initiator of the emergency call to clarify the nature of the emergency situation and its location (paragraph 69), and
- b) the most appropriate way for GSM-R emergency calls to be made to train drivers, whether from the control room directly, via the shift signalling manager, or via the signaller

ORR decision

7. ORR received an updated response from Network Rail in January 2019. This satisfied the intent of the recommendation by introducing a standardised framework for dealing with reports by telephone from a range of sources and also identifying a protocol for GSMR calls. It also confirmed that the specific upgrades to communications on LNE route had been completed.

8. Although we were content that the new standard operating procedure had taken the actions required by the recommendation, we were also aware of developments associated with the '21st Century Operations' programme which might affect procedures in this area. We delayed reporting to RAIB in order to establish this. There have been no material alterations, although we believe that a revised competency framework will secure further improvements. That is considered a routine development that will not require to be reported to RAIB as a significant change.

9. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it

Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

10. On 8 October 2018 ORR reported that Network Rail had reviewed how controllers on the LNE route respond to emergency calls and had introduced a new standard operating procedure. In addition, Network Rail was installing a dedicated telephone line between power signal boxes on the LNE route so to enable more efficient communication in an emergency. The work was expected to be completed by 14 August 2018, but was delayed. The completion date was in the process of being reforecasted, but had not yet been confirmed.

Update

11. On 22 January 2019 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



Baildon Rec 3
Closure Statement.p

12. Network Rail state in summary the following:

Network Rail has reviewed the way controllers respond to emergency phone calls, the outcome of that review has resulted in:

a. Network Rail has introduced a suite of standard operating procedures one of which is how to handle a call from the Network Rail helpline and other calls (Which includes members of the public, fire service, police service etc). This details the steps required and includes obtaining full details from callers and the requirements to log all details immediately. The briefing process carried out following this incident has emphasised the need to contact members of the public to obtain full details from the person reporting the incident, including nature of the emergency and the exact location.

b. Network Rail has reviewed the most appropriate way for GSM-R emergency calls to be made to train drivers. The most appropriate means of making a call is to contact the shift signaller manager directly as controllers do not always know which signalling panel controls which area (in multi panel locations) and the control GSMR locations cover larger areas than signallers. All Controllers are now fully competent in the use of GSMR and there is an extensive programme of refreshing controllers in the use of GSMR for emergency calls using simulators that are now located permanently in the control development suite. We have also

developed an aide memoire that is located directly in front of the GSMR terminal to remind controllers how to undertake an emergency call. Additionally if a Controller was required to stop trains quickly in an area this can be done by GSMR. Communication between the Control and Signaller is by use of dedicated emergency phone numbers, however if an emergency call is instigated by either driver, control or signaller all those parties receive the emergency call. On the LNE route Network Rail has dedicated emergency lines to and from Kings Cross, Peterborough, Doncaster, York and Tyneside signalling centres, but for the remainder of smaller signalling locations GSMR would be used.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is to improve Network Rail's emergency response to incidents on the track particularly in situations where emergencies are first identified by members of the public.

Network Rail should develop and implement a system to enable its controllers to be able to rapidly translate geographic or post code information provided by others on locations adjacent to the railway, into track location information so enabling the effective direction of responders

ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed existing arrangements among the different routes for communication arrangements to identify locations using information other than that which is specific to the railway, such as ELRs. Once appropriate arrangements have been formalised, Network Rail will brief them to the routes.
2. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - is taking action to implement it, but ORR has yet to be provided with a timebound plan.

Status: Progressing. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

3. On 22 January 2018 Network Rail provided the following initial response:

The recommendation featured as an agenda item at the National COM meeting in June 2017, where the recommendation was shared with all Route COMs. Feedback was requested from all Routes on best practice that already exists on the communication/translation of converting location details from local information (non railway) i.e. postcode etc. to railway specific (ELR, miles and chains etc.).

The feedback received so far shows that LNE use Geo RINM or Google Maps through the Information Coordinators. Anglia, Wessex and LNW South do the same but their Incident Controllers find the information. All other routes utilise the same technology with minor differences in terms of who conducts the task.

The full feedback will be reviewed and any lessons learnt from individual Routes will be displayed and discussed at Level 0 visualisation at Eversholt Street with the RMDs and also shared with other Routes. It will also form part of the lessons learnt pack as part of the NOC reporting.

Timescale: 31/06/2018

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the effectiveness of communicating safety critical information between incident controllers and signallers and drivers, in order to reduce the time taken to alert trains in emergency situations.

Network Rail should review how its controllers respond to emergency phone calls about the safety of the line, to make sure that important information is captured and accurately transmitted to relevant railway responders, and implement any identified improvements. The scope of the review should include consideration of the following:

- a) controllers making direct contact with the initiator of the emergency call to clarify the nature of the emergency situation and its location (paragraph 69), and
- b) the most appropriate way for GSM-R emergency calls to be made to train drivers, whether from the control room directly, via the shift signalling manager, or via the signaller

ORR decision

4. Network Rail has reviewed how controllers on the LNE route respond to emergency calls and have introduced a new standard operating procedure. In addition, Network Rail is installing a dedicated telephone line between power signal boxes on the LNE route so enable more efficient communication in an emergency. The work was expected to be completed by 14 August 2018, but has been delayed. The completion date is in the process of being reforecast, but is yet to be confirmed.

5. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to implement it, but ORR has yet to be provided with a revised time-bound plan.

Status: Progressing. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Previously reported to RAIB

6. On 19 February 2018 ORR reported that Network Rail had not provided a formal response to this recommendation.

Update

7. On 27 June 2018 Network Rail provided the following update:

Network Rail has initiated a review on LNE Route on how its controllers respond to emergency phone calls about the safety of the line, to confirm that important information is captured and accurately transmitted to relevant railway responders.

The purpose of the review was to determine whether process improvements are required, and whether these are Route specific or applicable nationally.

The outputs of the review are detailed below.

The review included consideration of the following:

a) controllers making direct contact with the initiator of the emergency call to clarify the nature of the emergency situation and its location:

Following the incident at Baildon, York Route Control has introduced a suite of standard operating procedures, one of which is how to handle a call from the Network Rail helpline and other calls which include members of the public, fire service, police service, etc. This procedure details the steps required and includes guidance on obtaining full details from callers and the requirement to log all details immediately. The briefing process carried out following this incident has emphasised the need for controllers to contact the person reporting the incident to obtain full details of the nature of the emergency and its location.

b) the most appropriate way for GSM-R emergency calls to be made to train drivers, whether from the control room directly, via the shift signalling manager, or via the signaller:

The most appropriate way for GSM-R emergency calls to be made to train drivers is to contact the shift signaller manager directly, as controllers do not always know which signalling panel controls which area (in multi panel locations) and the control GSM-R locations cover larger areas than signallers.

LNE are in the process of implementing a dedicated telephone line between power boxes on the LNE route and route control to be used as an emergency line which will immediately highlight that it is an urgent/emergency call. Should contact not be possible in a timely manner however then an emergency call should be made using the control GSM-R terminal.

LNE have led an extensive programme of refreshing controllers in the use of GSM-R for emergency calls using simulators, which are now located permanently in the control development suite. LNE have also developed an aide memoire that is located directly in front of the GSM-R terminal to remind controllers how to undertake an emergency call.

Further on-going actions include:

- 1. Continue with roll out of dedicated lines at signalling locations with shift signalling managers, and*
- 2. Continue with the programme of development in the use of GSM-R.*

Timescale: 14 August 2018