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14 September 2021

Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Partial failure of Bridge 94, Bromsgrove stream on 6 April 2011

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 22 March 2012.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 1 is **'Implemented'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 15 September 2021.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Oliver Stewart', written in a cursive style.

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The purpose of this recommendation is to promote the improvement of asset knowledge and to assist asset maintainers and railway staff in identifying the location of structures on site.

Network Rail should introduce a programme of marking the position of all track-supporting structures which are not apparent from the surface, so that their presence can be taken into account by those responsible for managing incidents, maintaining the railway, and designing and upgrading infrastructure.

ORR decision

1. Network Rail reviewed the recommendation and concluded that the requirements identified by RAIB were not a reasonably practicable way to address the intent of the recommendation, due to the difficulty of keeping signs up to date and properly maintained and also had the potential to import additional risk. This is described in more detail in the Network Rail submission, but the most important considerations are described thus:

“We did consider physical markers on site, but this approach was discounted due to disproportionate cost to implement and maintain the site-based markers compared to the benefits when considering alternative methods to meet the overall intent.

In the case of Bromsgrove Bridge 94 the structure’s change in direction beneath the track would make physical marking challenging and restrict track maintenance activities to ensure markers remain in the correct location and are visible at all times.”

2. Network Rail has instead addressed the intent of the recommendation by marking the position of all track-supporting structures which are not apparent from the surface using the existing GeoRIMN geographic information tool, which is widely available to maintenance staff and contractors and provides a ‘single source of truth’ regarding the position of such assets.

3. In addition to use of GeoRINM, Network Rail has drawn attention in its closure statement to track standards that require track maintenance work to take into account at the planning stage the possibility of culverts or under bridges being present. Network Rail also has a standard setting out the legal requirements and client’s duties under the Construction (Design and Management) Regulations 2015.

4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it

Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

5. On 22 February 2013 ORR reported the following:

Network Rail has provided short term and long term actions and a timetable for carrying out those actions. ORR accepts that the actions and the proposed timetable are commensurate with the degree of risk and mitigation that the actions will provide.

Update

6. On 15 June 2021 Network Rail provided the following closure statement:



[N188-05]
Bromsgrove Rec 1 cl

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 1

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Summary

1. Network Rail has provided short term and long term actions and a timetable for carrying out those actions. ORR accepts that the actions and the proposed timetable are commensurate with the degree of risk and mitigation that the actions will provide.

Steps taken or being taken to address the recommendation

2. In its response on 27 June 2012 Network Rail explained:

In the short term we propose:

- *Provide access and relevant training for CARRS database, which contains details of all structure assets – Dec 2012 (nominal £20K). This will enable maintenance staff to have visibility of structure assets prior to undertaking work e.g. installation of expansion switches as in the case of Bromsgrove.*

In the longer term:

- *the location of structures using GPS will be incorporated into the development of Civils Strategic Asset Management Solution (CSAMS) and its further integration with hand held devices (Cost included in CSAMS/ Offering Rail Better Information Systems (ORBIS) project)*

Develop programme of installation of markers of structure assets where there location cannot be readily ascertained at track level. (Cost of this work estimated to be circa £1m). This programme will extend over a three year period.

Timescales: *development stage of the programme to be completed by December 2013. Start date for implementation phase will be January 2014 and the completion of the implementation phase will be December 2015.*

ORR decision

3. ORR in reviewing the information received from Network Rail has concluded that in accordance with the Railway (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, it has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to implement it.

ORR does not propose to take any further action in relation to this recommendation unless we become aware of an inaccuracy in what we have reported, in which case we will write to RAIB again.

Status – Network Rail is taking action to implement the recommendation