Schedule – Amendments to the September 2024 Delay Attribution Principles and Rules

Originators Reference Code /		DAB P384		
No [For DAB input]				
Name of the	Delay Attribution Board			
original sponsoring		•		
organisation(s)/				
point of contact				
Exact details of the				
change proposed	Ada	new DAPR Scenarios N.4.1.o and	d p as belo	DW:
	0	Passengers falling/collapsing onto	RY/VD	Operator of
		the platform during the course of		train
		boarding or alighting from a train		involved
		(including when train movements		(R##*/V##*)
		are halted in consequence)		– incident
				classed as
				occurring on
				board
	р	Platform closures for safety or	V* (as	Operator of
		security reasons relating to	relevant	train
		passenger behaviour on board a	to	involved
		train (including when train	incident)	(V##*) -
		movements are halted in		incident
		consequence)		classed as
				occurring on
				board
Reason for the	DAE	B believe that it is a well-establishe	d principle	that
change		senger train operators are fully res	•	
	incid	dents stemming from passenger ad	ctivity that	originates
		n on board their services, even who		
	stat	on platform. For example, existing	Process a	and Guidance
		ument PGD06 on application of Jo	•	-
		icitly that the usual considerations		•
		ation incident qualifies for Joint Re		
		e incident in question originated or		
		100% responsibility of the TOC inv		ardless of the
	Sub	sequent impact on station operatio	ns.	
	Furt	hermore DAR also haliova that the	a nrinciala	that
		hermore, DAB also believe that the sengers are considered to be "on be		
		ly (most obviously via a slip/trip/fal		•
		rding or alighting from a train is an		
	Jua	iding or diighting from a train is air	CUICI WEII-	ootabiioi iou

one. DAPR principle N9.1.e has long since covered this principle (albeit it is specifically concerned with passengers falling between the train and the platform rather than fully onto the platform).

Notwithstanding the above, the DAB Secretary has been made aware of a limited number of disputes that have arisen in recent years where station operating delay principles have been cited without cognisance of the fundamental point that the incident in question originated on board a train.

On consideration, this is felt to be at least partly a consequence of the fact that, notwithstanding references elsewhere in DAPR, this is not currently documented within Section N4 – "Passenger Related Incidents" – even although this could reasonably be expected to be where readers first turn to for guidance on such issues.

As such, it is hoped that by adding some typical scenarios that may occur as a symptom of an issue that originates on-board (including falls during the course of boarding/alighting) to Section N4.1 on passenger-related issues, these principles will become more prominent within DAPR and add clarity for readers.

1. Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?

If yes,

For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.

For Train Operator – Please provide an impact assessment on your own business.

No

2. If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.

N/A

Network Rail	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN.
DAMG	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN

Secretary	N/A
Note	

Board	No comments had been forthcoming from the consultation, and with no
Consultation	further issues raised by members, the proposal was approved for referral to
	ORR as originally written.

Originators	DAB P385
Reference Code /	
No [For DAB input]	
Name of the	Delay Attribution Board
original sponsoring ,	
organisation(s)/	
point of contact	
Exact details of the	Replace paragraph F1.3, including a change of heading, as below:
change proposed	F1.3 Application of the autumn Attribution Process
	The period during which this guidance should apply will normally be aligned to the commencement and cessation of the route railhead treatment programme undertaken by Network Rail. E.g. autumn attribution can be "turned on or off" by joint agreement where adhesion related delays on a route are observed, predicted, reported or apparent in line with the prevailing conditions as per individual agreements for managing the adhesion delays between Network Rail and operators.
	F1.3 Adhesion principles during and outside of "Autumn"
	The scenarios covered in Section F can mainly be expected to occur within the "Autumn" period, which in this context specifically refers to the window during which the programme of railhead treatment activity undertaken by Network Rail is planned to take place.
	However, the same principles – including those illustrated in flowchart F1.6.1 – equally apply to adhesion events associated with autumnal conditions that occur outside of this formal timeframe.
	It should be remembered, however, that some of the considerations for attribution covered in this document are far less likely to be pertinent outside of "Autumn" than within it (i.e. it is highly unlikely that railhead treatment will have been planned outside of the defined period).
Reason for the change	DAB understand that uncertainty continues to exist on the subject of whether DAPR Section F should be applied to issues of adhesion in autumnal conditions but which do not arise within the recognised industry "Autumn" period.

	Whilst the intention of Section F1.3 has always been to cover the point that these principles do also apply outside of Autumn, references to them "normally" applying in Autumn and that they "can be turned on or off" have perhaps proved to be more confusing than helpful (with the latter phrase implying erroneously that the application of the principles in Section F are somehow optional/discretionary)
	The proposed change to F1.3 will hopefully make more explicit:
	a) What is meant by "Autumn" in industry operational and attribution terms
	b) That the principles in DAPR should be applied both within and outside of "Autumn", albeit some considerations in adhesion flowchart F1.6.1 are far less likely to be relevant outside of Autumn than they are within it.
2. Do you porceive that	this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial insect)
	this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on business of any other industry parties?
affected industry parties	
For Train Operator – Plea No	ase provide an impact assessment on your own business.
-	an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed e any financial effect of the proposal.
N/A	

Network Rail	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN.
DAMG	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN
Secretary	N/A

1	 	 1	1	

Note

Board	No comments had been forthcoming from the consultation, and with no
Consultation	further issues raised by members, the proposal was approved for referral to
	ORR as originally written.

Originators	DAB P386
Reference Code /	
No [For DAB input]	
Name of the	Delay Attribution Board
original sponsoring	
organisation(s)/	
point of contact	
Frank datable of the	Add a grown who are a superior of C. C. and below to superior and a scientian
Exact details of the	Add a new sub-paragraph E4.6.1 as below (new text in red – existing
change proposed	paragraph E4.6 included for context only):
	E4.6 In circumstances where a threshold section delay is demonstrated to be a combination of known separate causes then this delay should be split into relevant sized delays and attributed to incidents with appropriate Delay Codes describing the cause. For example, a 3-minute delay split to 1 minute in IR due to a TSR and 2 minutes in RB due to passengers loading.
	E4.6.1 In instances where an alerted threshold section delay is demonstrated to consist of a combination of loss in running and overtime at intermediate stations but no cause can be identified for one or both elements, delays should be allocated as a single entity, in accordance with the principles in Section E2, in the first instance. If separate causes for different elements of the delay are subsequently identified, delays should then be reallocated to appropriate incidents in accordance with E4.6 above.
	The exception to the above is for published, boarded, speed restrictions where the timeloss impact has been calculated in advance.
Reason for the change	A need for a consistent industry approach to the management of section delays which consist of a combination of loss in running and overtime at intermediate stations has been identified. Existing DAPR section E4.2 is clear that, when individual different causes are identified for a given section delay, the appropriate number of minutes should be allocated against each separate cause. However, it has not previously commented on the process for allocating delays that can be seen to consist of different elements but where no cause for these can be identified upon investigation. This can lead to such delays being treated inconsistently.
	The new proposed wording will clarify that such delays do not need to be broken down into separate elements (e.g. a 4 minute passenger train section delay consisting of 3 minutes

loss in running and 1 minute station overtime for which no cause can be found should be allocated as a four-minute "TO" delay with there being no requirement to allocate the final minute to a separate "R8" incident). However, in the event that causes are subsequently identified for such incidents, E4.6 will still apply (i.e. the delay should be split between different incidents that explain the three and one-minute elements). Note that Section E2, referenced in the new text, is the section on "Delay not apparently due to Network Rail". This has been referenced to emphasise that delays allocated under this new principle must still be subject to full investigation by Network Rail before being allocated as Train Operator responsibility.

5. Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?

If yes;

For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.

For Train Operator – Please provide an impact assessment on your own business.

No

6. If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.
N/A

Network Rail

C. NO, UNLESS SUGGESTED AMENDMENT IS APPLIED

Whilst Network Rail are in agreement with the basic principle here, it feels that an exception needs to be applied for speed restrictions where an associated expected time loss has been calculated in advance of delays occurring (i.e. a planned TSR or an ESR which is fully boarded and cautioning is no longer required).

This is the one scenario where an expected timeloss has been quantified and it would not be logical or fair to allocate delay in excess of this to the associated incident.

Network Rail would therefore ask that an additional sentence is added to the end of the proposed section E4.6.1 stating that "The exception to the above is for published, boarded, speed restrictions where the timeloss impact has been calculated in advance".

DAMG

B. YES, BUT AMENDMENT(S) TO THE PROPOSAL ARE RECOMMENDED

Whilst the principle of this proposal is accepted by the respondees it is noted that this proposal will have a financial consideration on industry parties. Currently the industry works to a principle of reactionary delay being allocated to the largest prime cause and a tendency when a train loses time due to an incident, not to analyse the duration of the primary, rather to accept it.

As an example, a train arrives into a platform 4 mins late due to a points failure, the train TRTSs straight away but another late running train is given priority for 4mins, before the route clears, as the train hasn't departed passengers are taking the opportunity to board the train, meaning that the train departs 9 late.

Currently all the mins would be coded to the regulation as the largest cause, but this proposal would require 4mins to regulation and 1 min of station overtime. Thus resulting in any reactionary now being applicable to both 4min delays.

We support the improvement in data quality this guidance enables but request that examples of what are acceptable levels of subthreshold allocation are, and also examples where it is not acceptable

It is our concern that inconsistent application will be done not for the purpose of improvement, but to change accountability

Secretary Note

Network Rail's argument that boarded speed restrictions should be exempt from the basic principle is based on the logic that this is the only form of delay event where an expected timeloss is mathematically calculated in advance of trains actually running for use in attribution. Certainly, there may be other forms of delay where people mau feel able to quantify the reasonable/expected impact but not to the same degree of precision or consistency.

Members will need to consider the pertinence of the DAMG feedback to this proposal as it appears to relate to concerns that a delay with multiple known causes (including reactionary minutes) would be accounted for differently if this proposal was to be applied, whereas the incention of the proposal is purely to counter the excess use of codes TO and T8 for elements of a section delay where no cause is known.

Board Consultation

The Board agreed that the caveat requested by Network Rail was valid for the reasons explained in their proposal response. It was therefore agreed that the text "The exception to the above is for published, boarded, speed restrictions where the timeloss impact has been calculated in advance" should be added to the end of the proposed new paragraph E4.6.1 – exactly as proposed by Network Rail.

Whilst the comments provided by DAMG were also given full consideration by the Board, it was determined that the concerns and suggestions raised were not directly relevant to this proposal. Specifically, the scenario presented by DAMG in their response is concerned with the allocation of delays associated with multiple known causes in a single section whereas this proposal is specifically concerned with section delays where causes are not known, even if can be observed that they consist of different elements.

As such, no further amendments to the proposal were deemed appropriate in relation to the DAMG comments. However, it has been agreed that the Board will look to develop new guidance on the attribution of section delays consisting of multiple elements as a separate new workstream, to address any uncertainty on attribution principles.

It was therefore agreed that the proposal be forwarded to ORR for approval subject to the addition of the caveat recommended by Network Rail within E4.6.1.

Originators Reference Code /	NR P234				
No [For DAB input]					
Name of the	Network Rail				
original sponsoring organisation(s)/					
point of contact					
pomeor comact					
5	101 1 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 101 1				
Exact details of the change proposed	Amend the Long and Short descriptions of Delay Code "OT" in Se DAPR as below:	ection S of			
	OT Operational Safety TSR/ESR implemented for	SIGHT			
	Operational Safety reasons and/or sighting	TSR			
	issues relating to foot crossings, level				
	crossings or signals (Not vegetation caused)	OPS			
		SPEED			
	Also add a new scenario O18.4.p as below:				
	p. TSR/ESR imposed for the stated OT	Network			
	1 1 1	Rail			
	Restriction"	(OQ**)			
Dancar fautha	Network Baillean and a great land and the second in the se				
Reason for the change	Network Rail have noted a small but material increase in the nu Temporary Speed Restrictions described in the Weekly Operatir				
Change	as being "Safety - Operational Restriction[s]". NR do not believe	_			
	guidance on how to allocate such incidents is currently in place.				
	This categorisation of TSR appears to be being used to cover a n				
	disparate safety-related issues. Until this point, Network Rail ha endeavouring to code the associated incidents (where P-code a				
	does not exist) to the most appropriate pre-existing delay code				
	by-case basis (e.g. XN for TSRs imposed due to concerns over th				
	of crossing misuse).	,			
	However, it is now felt that there is a need for DAPR to formally how such incidents are allocated on the basis that:	define			
	a) The number of instances/range of scenarios covered by "Safety – Operational Restriction" TSRs is evidently on the increase.				
	b) Despite these being specifically defined as "operational" rest some of the associated TRUST incidents have been allocated to operational delay codes.				
	c) Certain causes (e.g a recent TSR that was imposed via an ORR to ensure that drivers who may be more familiar with tilting sto				

remembered to drive at slower speed when driving non-tilting stock around a curved section of line) do not have a clear, available cause code. Specifically in the context of this particular example, there is no DAPR basis/precedent for allocating TSRs as TOC (and certainly not as ORR) responsibility.

As such, Network Rail are of the view that the allocation of "Safety – Operational Restriction" TSR's should be restricted to one defined delay code within the "Network Rail Operating Causes" O* series , for simplicity and to bring principles into line with all other categories of TSR.

Furthermore, it is believed that this can best be achieved by amending and expanding the definition of existing delay code "OT" which is already referred to in DAPR as being for "Operational Safety" TSR's but presently only those specifically involving sighting issues. Redefining this code so that it covers <u>all</u> instances of Operational Safety TSR is felt to be preferable to adding an entirely new code for the same purpose.

This proposal will therefore amend the current description of code OT to make this clear and add a new scenario within Section O18 (on speed restrictions) illustrating its use. Since there are limited scenarios where an Emergency Speed Restriction could be imposed on the same basis, references to ESRs are also included in the proposed wording.

Industry Responses

Network	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN.
Rail	
DAMG	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN

Secretary	N/A
Note	

Board	No comments had been forthcoming from the consultation, and with no
Consultation	further issues raised by members, the proposal was approved for referral to
	ORR as originally written.

Originators Reference Code /			NR P235		
No [For DAB input]					
Name of the original sponsoring	Network	Rail			
organisation(s)/ point of contact					
Exact details of the change proposed	K7 c, d ar	nd e w	erences to "not withstanding sc ith "if opportunities to mitigate and b, did not exist". [Full Table	via subseq	uent regulation,
	K7 Regu	latior	of early running trains		
		No.	Circumstances	Delay Code	Incident Attribution
		a.	Train running early and out of path (any reason) and regulating error occurs at point of delay (i.e. early train could have been held at that point causing no delay)	ОВ	Attribution to LOM code controlling section that regulation error occurred (OQ**)
		b.	Train running early and out of path that could have been held at a prior regulating point where no delay would have occurred (no regulating error at point of delay)	OC	Attribution to LOM code controlling section where train could have been held
					Note – if the section is on another Route then Section B6.17 applies (OQ**)
		C.	Train running early and out of path on control agreement. (not withstanding scenario a) if opportunities to mitigate via subsequent regulation, per scenarios a and b, did not exist	OD	Attribution to go to the Control Manager that agreed running early (OQ**)
		d.	Train running early and out of path due to a Driver/Shunter request that signaller agrees to (i.e. not processed through Control) (not withstanding scenario a) if opportunities to mitigate via subsequent regulation,	ОС	Attribution to LOM code controlling the 'box that allowed early running (OQ**)

		nor congrise a and hadid		
		per scenarios a and b, did not exist		
	e.	Train running early and out of path as a direct result of a known incident – e.g. diverted via quicker route. (not withstanding scenario a) if opportunities to mitigate via subsequent regulation, per scenarios a and b, did not exist	Prime cause incident	Attribution to the incident causing early running.
Reason for the change	of the term misinterpred The intention reinforce the consequent attribution printerpreted the clauses clauses should be been. Although the current on the printerprinter cause subsequents and subsequents.	t wording of the above claus "not withstanding" within the ted and requires amendment on of the caveat "not withstand failures to mitigate/prever ce of an early run represent ourposes. However, this has to the contrary – with some cc, d and e take precedence ould be applied even if the comet). The revised wording proposed version, it is believed that it ciples for attributing delays a trains. Specifically: The unning scenarios c-e should se" if opportunities to mitigate to regulation did not exist. (a failure to mitigate delay in ctually occurred) should also	em, is beint. Inding scent delay an anew properties (understreaders and ever an ever and ever an ever an ever an ever an an area	enario a" is to crising in ime cause for andably) been assuming that (i.e. the later of clause a uccinct that we any dubiety d with the early considered as a delay by

7. Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?

If yes;

For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.

For	Train Operator -	- Please	nrovide an	imnact	assessment i	on vour own	husiness
, 0,	II alli Opciatol	i icasc	pi oviac aii	IIIIDUCL	ussessificite (on your own	Dusiliess.

No – Internal Network Rail attribution issue only

8. If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.

N/A

Industry Responses

Network Rail	A.YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN.
DAMG	A.YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN

Secretary	N/A
Note	

Board	No comments had been forthcoming from the consultation, and with no
Consultation	further issues raised by members, the proposal was approved for referral to
	ORR as originally written.

Originators Reference Code /	NR P236
No [For DAB input] Name of the original sponsoring organisation(s)/ point of contact	Network Rail
Exact details of the change proposed	Amend the definition of External Events (i.e. those in the X* series) in Section S of DAPR as below:
	X – EXTERNAL EVENTS - NETWORK RAIL
	Abbreviated Departmental Cause Codes: EXT These codes cover events considered to be outside the control of the Rail Industry (or the result of actions undertaken by non-Track Access Parties that are of the industry but cannot be contractually held responsible for delay). , but normally These are attributable to Network Rail under the Track Access Performance Regime.
	Also amend the long and short descriptions of delay code XE in DAPR Section S as below:
	XE Emergency GSM-R call raised outside the Network Rail network (made by a non track access party and/or in respect of a legitimate safety related issue arising outside of NR Infrastructure)
	Fleet-related safety issues (including GSM-R calls) originating from outside of the Network.
	Add a new scenario H3.3.h (within this section on off-network operating incidents) as below:
	h Unauthorised ingress of fleet which is not under the control of a Track Access Party onto the network. XE Network Rail (XQ**)
Reason for the change	A limited number of scenarios have recently arisen relating to the unauthorised ingress of railway fleet that is not operated by a Track Access Party onto Network Rail infrastructure. In one such scenario, a shunt move which should have taken place entirely within a confines of a depot moved onto the network due to driver error and, in another, a handbrake defect resulted in a shunter loco rolling out of a yard and onto the network.

DAPR is currently silent on how such issues should be allocated although, since attribution principles are based on responsibility for such issues either lying with Network Rail or a Train Operator, there is no scope to allocate responsibility for these incidents to the non-TAC party involved

It is therefore proposed that these incidents must logically be classed as "External" (i.e. default Network Rail responsibility). Since the maintainers/fleet owners are part of the rail industry in general terms, a minor amendment to the existing definition of External codes (to qualify that not all such incidents are "outside the control of the Rail industry" in broad terms) is deemed helpful.

Rather than proposing the introduction of a new delay code for these relatively infrequent issues, it is instead proposed that the pre-existing code "XE" is expanded/redefined to cover these scenarios. This code currently relates exclusively to issues with GSM-R calls that are initiated by non-TAC parties from off-network locations but which impact the operation of trains on the network. In this sense, it has clear links with the above new scenarios as matters involving the interaction of railway traction that has no contractual right to be on the network but still ultimately impacts its operation.

9. Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?

If yes;

For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.

For Train Operator – Please provide an impact assessment on your own business.

No

10.If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.

N/A

DAMG A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN	Network Rail	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN.
	DAMG	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN

Secretary	N/A
Note	

Board	No comments had been forthcoming from the consultation, and with no
Consultation	further issues raised by members, the proposal was approved for referral to
	ORR as originally written.

Originators Reference Code /		N	R P237	
No [For DAB input]				
Name of the	Network	k Rail		
original sponsoring				
organisation(s)/				
point of contact				
Exact details of the	Add a no	ew Section K11 to DAPR as	halow:	
change proposed	Add a ne	ew Section KII to DAI K us	Delow.	
change proposed	K11 – D	elays due to the applicatio	n of local signalling	g instructions
	No.	Circumstances	Delay Code	Incident
				Attribution
	a.	Local instruction	OR	Network Rail
		correctly applied for		LOM code
		general, non-fleet		(OQ**)
		specific safety		
		purposes (including		
		those associated		
		with permissive		
		working at stations)		
	b.	Local instruction	I* (specific to	Network Rail
		correctly applied to	asset	(IQ**)
		mitigate the impact	involved)	
		of a known		
		Accepted Design Limitation with an		
		infrastructure asset		
	C.	Local instruction	MP/QH/QI	Train
	0.	correctly applied to	(Appropriate	Operating
		mitigate adhesion	to	Company
		risks (e.g	circumstance	(M***)/Network
		application of a	per DAPR	Rail
		"clear run" policy)	Section F)	(QQ**)/Network
		during Autumn	,	Rail (QQ**)
	d.	Local instruction	MP	Train
		correctly applied to		Operating
		mitigate adhesion		Company
		risks (e.g		(M***)
		application of a		
		"clear run" policy)		
		outside of Autumn		
	e.	Local instruction	MW	Train
		correctly applied to		Operating
		mitigate weather-		Company
		related risks to fleet		(M***)
		(where no		,

	f.	operational restriction would otherwise be required) Incorrect application of a local signalling instruction*	OC	Network Rail LOM code (OQ**)
Dogga fautho	instruct operati clear ar in scene	rect application" in the above tion to a train that should no onal circumstances did not r nd identifiable at the point o parios where regulation that i may not have been necessary	nt have been subject merit it. In both cas of delay and not ap of sis accordance with	ct to it or where the ses, this should be plied retrospectively
Reason for the change	with the current code permise risk of identife to mition to the company of the control of the	It this should be address Section K on the regulaning when OR should b	gnalling instruct and when not to ferenced once (ction K8). This is ed, particularly vectors in particularly we estimate the second of the contraction in particularly and the contraction and signal	ions, DAPR to use the in the context of s felt to present a were there is an place specifically a new clause to ling of train,

11.Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?

If yes;

For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.

For Train Operator – Please provide an impact assessment on your own business.

No

12.If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.

N/A

Industry Responses overleaf

Network Rail	A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN
DAMG	C. NO, UNLESS SUGGESTED AMENDMENT IS APPLIED
	Clause B. add in including clear run policy e.g. Not signalling a train up to red on a steep falling gradient, use of stopping mode at high risk level crossing, or restricted aspects on approach to steep rising gradients.
	Clauses C. & D. a local instruction for an adhesion risk relates to the condition of the rail head, and not the operation of the train, as such removal of references to TOC based accountability needs to occur
	If there is a fault with the train or the train is working within accepted design limits for the train, then the delays should be coded to the fault, or clause E. applied,
Colas	D. NO, PROPOSAL IS OBJECTED TO OUTRIGHT
	The Schedule 8 impact of this proposal will, particularly in the Autumn season, have the potential to make particular flows unviable. Ultimately costs will be passed back to customers, making rail freight an unattractive option for their haulage. We are unwilling to bear such costs and delay responsibility where the decision making is entirely out of our control.
DRS	D. NO, PROPOSAL IS OBJECTED TO OUTRIGHT
	DRS are very concerned by this proposal and its potential wider impact on our business. We envisage that from a Schedule 8 perspective, this could render certain flows commercially unviable, particularly in the Autumn season.
	The application of clear run policies is outside of the control of the operator. Why therefore should the operator bear the costs and responsibility of the delay impact of that decision making? It is the responsibility of Network Rail to manage trains on the Network.
	DRS believe that implementation of this change will lead to operators refusing to sign any Autumn Agreements with clear run policies in them. This will therefore promote worse performance on the Network contrary to DAB objectives.
	DRS believe that this proposal is anti-freight and goes against industry strategy. As a freight operator, we are regularly reassured of our rightful place on the network and the industry desire to accommodate freight trains and the provisions required for them. The government goal to grow the rail freight market will be damaged by this proposal as any increased costs to freight operators will ultimately be passed back to customers in increased rates, further reducing already very tight margins.

Freighliner

D. NO, PROPOSAL IS OBJECTED TO OUTRIGHT

In respect to the proposed changes to DAPR K11 parts C and D, these are objected to outright by Freightliner.

In recent years, clear run policies have been successfully introduced at certain high risk locations for freight services both during and outside of Autumn, where freight trains are at risk of "slipping to a stand" if they are not given a clear route of green signals. The application of the policy is usually at the discretion of the signaller and helps to minimise the likelihood of delay minutes occurring.

Freightliner does not believe that we should be exposed to the risk of delay minutes being attributed to the operator as a result of a policy being applied that we have no control over in terms of application or its management. Clear Run policies usually form one of the key mitigations delivered by Network Rail as part of Autumn Agreements, which also typically include similar commitments from Operators. The proposed amendment is likely to result in Freight Operators withdrawing from such Autumn Agreements as we will now be exposed to performance risks that we have no control over.

In addition to the negative impact this will have on overall performance to other operators on the network, Freightliner believes that this is likely to have further unintended consequences such as forcing operators to unnecessarily reroute these services to avoid these locations or even worse making certain flows no longer commercially viable to operate during Autumn.

GBRf

D. NO, PROPOSAL IS OBJECTED TO OUTRIGHT

GBRf Objection to Proposed Attribution Changes

1. Network Rail's Role in Managing Services

Network Rail are responsible for managing train services in real time. Signallers have full control over train regulation, enabling them to minimise delays across the entire network. The current delay attribution framework incentivises signallers to prioritise minimising delays, ensuring an efficient system. Removing this incentive risks increasing overall delays, as Freight Operating Companies (FOCs) would have no direct means to minimise delays for which they are held accountable.

2. Increased TDA Challenges

FOCs frequently challenge allocated TDA incidents due to incorrect root cause identification or inaccurate reaction delay allocation. Any increase in the attribution of delays to FOCs would inevitably result in a rise in TDA disputes. This contradicts the industry's goal of reducing delay attribution workload and would instead increase the burden on both FOCs and Network Rail.

3. Costly Benchmark Recalibrations

The new control period, which began on 1 April 2024, introduced benchmarks for Network Rail and FOC performance allowances over the next five years. Changes to attribution rules mid-control period would necessitate recalibration of these benchmarks. Specifically:

- The "FOC on Other" benchmark would need to increase to account for additional third-party delay minutes attributed to FOCs.
- The "NR on FOC" benchmark would need to decrease as Network Rail would incur fewer delay minutes.

Such recalibrations are complex and require significant consultancy input, leading to substantial costs. These costs would not be supported by FOCs.

4. Risk to Freight Business and Environmental Impact

This proposal could render certain key freight flows, such as Grain - Colnbrook aviation fuel, economically unviable. This particular flow has operated for a number of years and it is only in recent times that a network rail implemented box instruction has come into existence in order to minimise the risk of the trains slipping to a stand in wet weather thus enabling network rail to management the network more effectively. Attributing these delays and their reactions reduces the economic viability of rail freight. Any reduction in the economic viability of rail freight could drive this flow to road haulage. resulting in:

- Approximately 20,000 additional lorry journeys annually through London.
- A significant increase in CO2 emissions, counteracting the rail freight growth policy and negatively impacting environmental objectives.

Conclusion

GBRf objects to this proposal on the following grounds:

- It could lead to increased delays across the network.
- It would exacerbate TDA attribution workloads.
- It would require expensive recalibration of benchmarks.
- It risks driving freight business away from rail, undermining the green agenda.

This proposal not only threatens the operational efficiency of the network but also poses significant environmental and economic challenges.

Secretary Note

Clearly a groundswell of objection to this proposal from the freight community. Members will need to familiarise themselves with the individual responses but the two overriding FOC points are:

- a) It would not be right for operators to be held responsible for a signalling delay that they have had no influence over (regardless of the reasons for the delay being incurred and/or the potential risks of not holding a train).
- b) The proposal represents a material change (contrary to the Network Rail entries on the proposal, which indicate that it is not) which would result in operators paying more in S8 and, ultimately, may prevent them from running some trains due to their becoming commercially unviable.

Obviously it is at the discretion of members how this should be handled but the following reminders may be helpful for context:

- The question of why FOCs are not more involved in deciding/agreeing local instructions particularly where clear run policies to mitigate adhesion risks are deemed necessary was touched upon during a 2024 Board meeting. To my understanding, checks were going to be made on what instructions were in place on the network with the view of engaging FOC's more closely In their appropriateness/possible fine-tuning. I think it's therefore a legitimate question to ask as to whether it remains the case that FOCs are not involved in these decisions and, if not, whether it is likely/plausible that the situation will change in the near future.
- In terms of the S8 impact of the proposal (if we assume that this is a material change and that there will be one) members are reminded that, historically, the Board would not have rejected a proposal purely on the basis that there will be a financial impact if it was otherwise deemed to be the right thing to do. However, it would/should have been the case that such proposals are accompanied with an assessment of the S8 impact of the change and the recalibrations necessary to ensure that parties are not financially disadvantaged, which obviously hasn't happened here. Whether, in the current environment, such exercises would be too "costly" to be plausible (as the GBRf response suggests) may be a matter for consideration as such.
- In context of the above, it should be borne in mind that DAB are not obliged to accept or reject the proposal outright at this meeting....if it is deemed necessary to obtain further operation or commercial information to inform a final decision this is entirely plausible (albeit it will mean that any DAPR amendment will need to be postponed until September at the earliest).
- If the Board do decide to reject the proposal outright, however, a decision may be needed on whether a counter-proposal – emphasing that any delays associated with the application of a local signalling instruction are NR's responsibility regardless of circumstance – may be necessary.

Against the above, the requests stated in the DAMG response are relatively minor and probably only require considerarion in the event that it is decided that the proposal is otherwise suitable to go forward to ORR.

Board Consultation

The Board noted the number of objections to the proposal, received from train operators (and freight operators in particular). As per the Secretary's notes, it was suggested that these objections could be boiled down to two key points; firstly that freight operators should not be responsible for signal delays associated with the application local instructions that they had not explicitly agreed to (even if these were applied with a view to assisting the FOC) and , secondly, that the changes represented a material change in attribution principle which would lead to an increase in FOC-responsibility delay (and an according commercial impact on the operators).

Network Rail countered the objections by stating the the proposal was only intended as a clarification of existing principles relating to use of code OR rather than a material change (hence the fact that the original proposal was detailed as not having a wider/commercial impact). Although it was acknowledged that attribution principles associated with local signalling may not have always been applied correctly since code OR was add to DAPR in 2021, it was flagged that the justification for introducing the code within the associated proposal (NR P207) was explicitly that it was for use "where they are not implemented for an identified cause" (i.e. it was never the intention that the code should be used for all delays associated with local signalling arrangements regardless of circumstance).

The proposal, including consideration of whether the current wording could benefit from non-material revisions to address any potential misinterpretations, was discussed at length by members. However, with it being evident that that there was no unanimous Board view as to how to proceed, the Chair called for members to vote on the proposal.

The result of the vote was that 8 of the 12 members (four Network Rail representatives and all four of the passenger train operator representatives) voted to progress the proposal – without amendment – to ORR for review and approval. (This majority constitutes Board approval, as per the conditions of the Network Code, Part B, Paragraph 2.6.1.)

Originators	NTL/08
Reference Code /	
No [For DAB input]	
Name of the	Northern Trains Limited
original sponsoring	
organisation(s)/	
point of contact	
Exact details of the	Add 'CBTC' to the list of systems covered by the 'M2' Code – Entries
change proposed	requiring update listed below with amendments in red:
	The following two entries within the "Contents" table:
	G3 Failure of ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/ CBTC System
	O13 ETCS/ CBTC and or ERTMS Equipment Failures
	The "Circumstances" entry for Scenario G1.2.b:
	Delays associated with faults relating to train borne safety
	systems within the cab (For ETCS/ ERTMS / CBTC see Section G3)
	Section G3: G3 Failure of ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/CBTC* System
	G3.1 When operating on an ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/CBTC enabled line, trains
	that are fitted with the on-board
	ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/CBTC rely on the system being able to draw a level of information, such as positional referencing and line topography, from track mounted balises.
	In the event of a failure of the ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/CBTC system, causation coding should be as follows:
	a. Delay associated with the trainborne ETCS/ERTMS/ATO/CBTC system
	b. Delays associated with the ETCS/ERTMS /CBTC track-mounted balise
	c. Delays associated with RBC issues affecting ETCS / ATO /CBTC operation (NOT balise related)
	d. GSM-R related issues affecting ETCS / ATO /CBTC wireless communications system
	e. Delay associated with incorrect ETCS /CBTC system operation by Signaller / Controller
	f. Delays associated with incorrect ETCS /CBTC system operation by Driver
	g. Delays associated with PIS issues affecting the CBTC system Delay Code: RV
	Incident Attribution: Train Operator – separate Incident to be created for each directly affected (R##*)
L	

*CBTC (Communications Based Train Control) is a form of Train Control that is similar to ETCS, used on the Mainline Railway Network by the Elizabeth Line Class 345 Electric Multiple Units. Section O13: O13 ETCS and or / ERTMS / CBTC Equipment Failure The code J7 is used for failures of ETCS or, ERTMS or CBTC equipment (excluding communications link and ETCS Balise (See Section G3). Description of Delay Codes JR/J7/M2/OC/OF in Section S: Delay due to RBC issues affecting ETCS / **RBC** ATO/CBTC operation **ETCS** (not balise related) ETCS/ERTMS/CBTC Equipment ETCS/CBTC J7 Failure (excluding communications link FLR and balises) Delay due to ATO / ETCS/CBTC ETCS/CBTC M2 equipment Signaller including mis-routing (not ERTM OC **SIGNALLER** /CBTC/ETCS related) Delay due to incorrect ETCS/ CBTC system or OF **ETCS CTRL** equipment operation by Signaller / Controller Reason for the Communications Based Train Control (CBTC) has been relatively newly change introduced to the Mainline Railway Network by the Elizabeth Line Class 345 Electric Multiple Units. CBTC is a form of Train Control that is similar to ETCS, but it is not specifically referenced by the 'M2: Delays and cancellations associated with the trainborne ETCS/ERTMS/ATO system' code. Rather than proposing a new code and given the similarities of the system to ETCS it therefore seems more logical to expand this code to include CBTC in this existing code.

13.Do you perceive that this proposal will have a wider impact (including commercial impact) on your business or the business of any other industry parties?
If yes;
For Network Rail – Please provide an impact assessment indicating the impact of the proposal on all affected industry parties.
For Train Operator – Please provide an impact assessment on your own business.
It is not believed that the proposed change will have any wider industry impact.
14.If you have provided an impact assessment as per question 1 above, please provide a proposed solution to neutralise any financial effect of the proposal.
Not applicable.

Network Rail

C. NO, UNLESS SUGGESTED AMENDMENT IS APPLIED

Network Rail consider the definition of CBTC that has been proposed for addition at the end of Section G3 to be factually incorrect, or at best very misleading. Specifically, the GBTC system is used on the Crossrail Central Operating Section (CCOS) i.e. outside of the Network Rail network. The reference to it being "used on the Mainline Railway Network" strongly implies that it is owned and used by Network Rail for trains running on its own infrastructure.

It is asked that this definition is either removed from the proposal entirely or is at least amended to clarify that the application is used specifically in connection with trains running on the CCOS.

DAMG

A. YES, PROPOSAL IS AGREED WITH AS WRITTEN

Secretary Note

This is a challenge over a point of fact in the wording of the proposal. Although I am no expert on the subject of CBTC, a check on the Siemans (system developer) website confirms that they describe the system as being in use on the Central Operating Section of the Elizabeth Line (i.e. not on NR infrastructure).

Assuming that members are in agreement that the current wording is wrong, options are to reword this section to reverse the explanation of where CBTC is used or to delete the entry altogether.

In this context, it should be remembered that the wording in question was not included in Northern's original proposal (outside of the associated "justification for change" text) and was only added at DAB's own recommendation. Presumably, as such, any changes we make to it at this stage will not be a matter of major concern to the TOC.

Board Consultation

The Board agreed that Network Rail's comments in relation to this proposal were legitimate, specifically that the reference to CBTC being used on the "Mainline Network" could mistakenly be taken to imply that it was used on Network Rail infrasture and/or owned by Network Rail.

Rather than attempting to reword the text at the end of Section G3 describing what and where CBTC was utilised, the Board agreed that the entry would be better reduced to a simple explanation of what the acronym stands for. This on the basis that it is not the purpose of DAPR to provide contextualisation over where and why a particular asset-type is in use.

The proposal was therefore approved for referral to ORR subject to the proposed final paragpraph of Section G3 being revised to state only "*CBTC (Communications Based Train Control)".