

Oliver Stewart
RAIB Recommendation Handling Manager



6 August 2025

Dear Andy,

RAIB Report: Train overspeeding at Spital Junction, Peterborough on 17 April 2022.

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 10 July 2023.

The annex to this letter provides details of actions taken in response to the recommendation and the status decided by ORR. The status of recommendation 1 is **'Closed'**.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of Lumo drivers overspeeding at diverging junctions where there is a significant reduction in maximum permitted speeds.

Lumo (East Coast Trains Limited) should review, and amend as necessary, its route risk assessment process to ensure that it considers junctions where there is a potential for a greater risk of overspeeding (such as where there is a large distance between the point where a driver is given a clear aspect and the junction and/or where there is a large speed differential between the main and diverging routes).

Based on this revised risk assessment, Lumo should review the control measures in place intended to ensure that the risk from drivers exceeding permissible speeds at diverging junctions is adequately mitigated. This review should include consideration of the professional knowledge, training and assessment of its train drivers. Lumo should implement any changes necessary to mitigate the risk of overspeeding at junctions.

ORR decision

1. Lumo has confirmed that the actions set out in the October 2023 response to the recommendation are now complete: the Lumo driver training procedure has been reviewed and updated; a driving simulator is in place for scenario-based training; and a new cohort of driver managers are in post. Taken together, these measures should ensure Lumo drivers are better equipped to deal with out of course scenarios.
2. Grand Central has completed a review of route risk assessments in response to the incident. In response to this recommendation and recommendation 1 from the RAIB report *Train overspeeding at Spital Junction, Peterborough station*, Grand Central has increased focus on non-technical skills and is making greater use of simulators to better prepare drivers for out of course operational scenarios.
3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Lumo and Grand Central have:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - have taken action to close it.

Status: Closed.

Previously reported to RAIB

4. On 5 April 2024 ORR reported the following:

Lumo has conducted a review of route risk assessments with an emphasis on junctions with a greater risk of overspeed, together with the associated training and briefing material given to drivers. We have asked Lumo for an update on the actions set out in October 2023 letter (as most were expected to be completed by January

2024) and more information on the programme to fit C-DAS and if it will address the exceedance of permissible speeds at diverging junctions.

As Grand Central was the TOC involved in the 4 May 2023 overspeed incident at Spital junction², we have considered its response to this recommendation equally to that of Lumo. We have asked Grand Central for an update on the review of route risk assessments that was expected to be completed by the end of 2023.

Update

5. On 4 April 2024 Lumo provided the following update:

I can confirm the following, my updates in red below

In response to your query around C-DAS I have sent that question onto the fleet team for a more technical answer, from my own understanding of the system I understand it to be connected into the ECTS system so it is likely that it will work in conjunction with it, in effect providing the same level of protection as ECTS does through the speed hook.

I am not 100% sure how this would work in traditional signalling areas however as it would need to be intuitive enough to work in conjunction with the setting of a signal where an alternative route is provided by the signaller

Lumo, following on from the incident carried out:

- *A full review and revision into all Lumo's route risk assessments, training, briefing, and assessment documentation given to customer drivers relating not just to this junction but to all other junctions on the route where the potential for overspeeding could occur. This review and update was completed on 27/05/2023 and has been subject to further ongoing update and review since.*
- *Produced regular bulletins around the risks of this particular junction signal, incorporating the content into safety briefing cycles. This was completed in July 2022 and has been further repeated since following on from a similar incident at the same location.*

And in addition to this Lumo has also:

- *Carried out a further review of the content of its driver training and associated procedures, this is an ongoing piece of work, expected to be completed in December 2023 and expected to be implemented in time for the new driver intake in January 2024.*

² [Train overspeeding incident at Spital Junction, Peterborough - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/train-overspeeding-incident-at-spital-junction-peterborough)

This is completed, our reviewed and updated OM02 Driver Training Procedure was issued to the business in January 2024 and has been further updated since (currently with Document Control for a further re-issue)

- *Recently introduced an on-site full cab simulator into the business to strengthen scenario- based training to its customer drivers and apprentice customer drivers, this is expected to be fully operational in time for the next driver intake in January 2024.*

The Lumo simulator is now fully installed at the Lumo offices and is being used as part of the current apprentice driver intake, the simulator is currently going through acceptance checks and software updates to make it ready for ECDP operations

- *Recently introduced a new layer of Driver Managers into Lumo with the aim of strengthening resilience, improving assessment, operational knowledge, and training capacity within the Customer Driver team.*

This is now in place and embedded within the business, 4 new driver managers are now in post

6. On 9 April 2024 Grand Central provided the following update:

I can confirm that a comprehensive review of our Driver Route Risk Assessments has been undertaken. We are therefore confident that Assessments are current and robust.

Following the completion of the Assessments, we are now going through a process to review them against our route learning “norms” and ideally would like to complete this process during Q2.

Other learnings from the incident include a much greater focus on human performance factors and a number our Driver Leadership team will be attending further RSSB training in the first half of this year.

Previously reported to RAIB

Recommendation 1

The intent of this recommendation is to reduce the risk of Lumo drivers overspeeding at diverging junctions where there is a significant reduction in maximum permitted speeds.

Lumo (East Coast Trains Limited) should review, and amend as necessary, its route risk assessment process to ensure that it considers junctions where there is a potential for a greater risk of overspeeding (such as where there is a large distance between the point where a driver is given a clear aspect and the junction and/or where there is a large speed differential between the main and diverging routes).

Based on this revised risk assessment, Lumo should review the control measures in place intended to ensure that the risk from drivers exceeding permissible speeds at diverging junctions is adequately mitigated. This review should include consideration of the professional knowledge, training and assessment of its train drivers. Lumo should implement any changes necessary to mitigate the risk of overspeeding at junctions.

ORR decision

1. Lumo has conducted a review of route risk assessments with an emphasis on junctions with a greater risk of overspeed, together with the associated training and briefing material given to drivers. We have asked Lumo for an update on the actions set out in October 2023 letter (as most were expected to be completed by January 2024) and more information on the programme to fit C-DAS and if it will address the exceedance of permissible speeds at diverging junctions.

2. As Grand Central was the TOC involved in the 4 May 2023 overspeed incident at Spital junction³, we have considered its response to this recommendation equally to that of Lumo. We have asked Grand Central for an update on the review of route risk assessments that was expected to be completed by the end of 2023.

3. The recommendation was passed to all TOCs and FOCs, all of whom have acknowledged it, apart from Rail Operations Group (ROG). The responses are summarised in Annex B.

4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Lumo and Grand Central have each:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- are taking action to close it

Status: Open.

Information in support of ORR decision

³ [Train overspeeding incident at Spital Junction, Peterborough - GOV.UK \(www.gov.uk\)](https://www.gov.uk/government/news/train-overspeeding-incident-at-spital-junction-peterborough)

5. On 13 October 2023 LUMO provided the following initial response:

Lumo, following on from the incident carried out:

- *A full review and revision into all Lumo's route risk assessments, training, briefing, and assessment documentation given to customer drivers relating not just to this junction but to all other junctions on the route where the potential for overspeeding could occur. This review and update was completed on 27/05/2023 and has been subject to further ongoing update and review since.*
- *Produced regular bulletins around the risks of this particular junction signal, incorporating the content into safety briefing cycles. This was completed in July 2022 and has been further repeated since following on from a similar incident at the same location.*

And in addition to this Lumo has also:

- *Carried out a further review of the content of its driver training and associated procedures, this is an ongoing piece of work, expected to be completed in December 2023 and expected to be implemented in time for the new driver intake in January 2024.*
- *Recently introduced an on-site full cab simulator into the business to strengthen scenario- based training to its customer drivers and apprentice customer drivers, this is expected to be fully operational in time for the next driver intake in January 2024.*
- *Recently introduced a new layer of Driver Managers into Lumo with the aim of strengthening resilience, improving assessment, operational knowledge, and training capacity within the Customer Driver team.*

As a result of this review, Lumo has also fully engaged with its sister organisations, Network Rail and others involved on the East Coast Main line through

- *Sharing learnings and the sharing of updated route risk assessments at industry meetings such as Train Operators Sub Group, Operations Standards Expert Group and National Operations Standards Forums*
- *Engaged with Network Rail at a number of both local and national level bow tie risk assessment events to look at both operational and technical mitigations that would prevent a future incident from occurring, making suggestions to Network Rail on technical solutions to mitigate the risks from this event occurring at high-risk locations such as OTTO and re- introducing technical signalling mitigations such as approach release to yellow. It is also anticipated that the introduction of ECTS to the Southern Section of the*

East Coast Main line in 2026 will also reduce this risk further

- *Worked with Hitachi to provide an overarching speed limiter to prevent overspeed above 125mph running. Work is also ongoing to develop the ETCS software required for the introduction on the ECML (Expected in 2025/2026). We are also assisting Hitachi in the development of the train Driver Advisory System (DAS) that will provide dynamic train speed advice to our drivers.*

Lumo will continue to work with industry partners both internally with our operations and fleet partners and externally with the infrastructure manager and the RSSB to ensure risks from overspeeding presented at this and other locations are controlled to a level that is as low as reasonably practicable with the full involvement of our employee appointed safety advocates.

6. On 13 October 2023 Grand Central provided the following initial response:

Thank you for your email concerning the above incident and I am sorry that I haven't been able to get back to you sooner.

Upon becoming aware of the incident at Spittal Junction, GC Drafted an initial Bulletin on what we had learned at that time, for all our drivers highlighting the potential risks of sun blinds restricting view of signals This was of course, well before the RAIB investigation and report were issued.

Since this incident, we have discussed all aspects of P468 / Spital Jn when carrying out a formal driving assessments with our Drivers that include :

- *the anticipated approach when not on green signals*
- *the route options which can & cannot be accepted*
- *the line speeds for the diverging junctions*
- *the need to check and double check whether there is an associated junction indicator illuminated having approached P468 at caution.*

This was of course, well before the RAIB investigation and report were issued. On 4th May this year, a further incident occurred at this location with one of our own GC services. This is now subject of a further RAIB investigation, as you will no doubt be aware. In line with our internal incident investigation process, a 72 Hour review was undertaken following this incident and the outputs from this were that a further Bulletin was issued to our drivers highlighting this route risk, along with reminding drivers of this risk in a wider context (ie – can apply in other locations too) and so to remain vigilant at all times.

GC have held a special workshop involving all managers involved with train drivers (training, assessing, line management, etc), along with our professional safety and operational heads. An action to review all existing Route Risk Assessments was agreed, with a focus on location. This will review will be completed by year end 2023

and will additionally form part of the review we are undertaking as part of the East Coast Digital Programme workstreams.

It is worth also highlighting that this workshop considered a wide range of driver safety performance factors and expert speakers from several external bodies provided support to this event. There are follow up sessions planned to monitor and ensure progress with the actions agreed through this exercise.

Whilst not specifically a reaction to the incident on 17th April 2022, we have implemented a process where our planning teams will help inform our Driver Leadership team on any significant timetable changes that may trigger a further review of route risk assessments.