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4 February 2026

Dear Gareth,

### **Firebreaks and performance on the West Coast Main Line ('WCML')**

This letter is being sent in response to ORR's request of 20<sup>th</sup> January 2026 for further information from Network Rail on access to the West Coast Main Line, specifically at the south end on the fast lines.

#### **Pre-December 2025 timetable introduction**

- 1. Please set out your assessment of using one or more of the 9 firebreak paths (in each direction) using punctuality, reliability, primary and reactionary delay metrics. Please provide the same for the 07.00 Manchester to London path used by Avanti.***

In Network Rail's letter to ORR dated 07 February 2025 ('*Network Rail representations for applications affecting the West Coast Main Line (South)*') a supporting timetable capacity assessment was provided which identified further pathing opportunities in the structure of the WCML fast lines timetable between Rugby and Euston. The assessment was based on the December 2024 (SX) timetable and indicated that a theoretical 9 additional Up direction paths and 9 additional Down direction paths existed on the fast lines after the inclusion of First Rail Stirling's proposed Euston-Stirling services and the additional Avanti Euston-Liverpool services which were expected to run from December 2025. This figure of 9 paths in each direction consisted of a combination of paths identified in the December 2022 Concept Train Plan ('CTP') - but were at the time either not yet running or not supported with any access rights, in addition to a number of new theoretical paths which have been identified by prospective new operators and pathed into the structural 'firebreak' gaps which then existed in the WCML timetable. This distinction is important to note because the structural firebreak gaps that featured in the December 2022 CTP would have formed part of the baseline assumptions in the performance modelling undertaken and endorsed by the cross-industry Event Steering Group ('ESG'), noting that the 07:00 Manchester-Euston path formed part of the baseline December 2022 CTP and was therefore factored into associated modelling and conclusions.

Table 1 below shows an updated version of the summary table previously included in Network Rail's 07 February 2025 representations, and highlights which of the 9 paths (in each direction) had been included in the December 2022 CTP and therefore formed part of the ESG's baseline performance modelling assumptions, as these services were all expected to operate. The December 2022 CTP paths represent 4 out of the 9 paths in the Up direction (including the 07:00 MAN-EUS path) and 3 out of the 9 paths in the Down direction. The ESG performance modelling report from 2022, which included total delay minutes and punctuality impact (T1/T3) data, has been attached as Appendix A to this letter.

Theoretical Fast Line paths at Euston (Dec 2025 timetable, 06:00-22:00 SX)					
Up	In CTP?	Notes	Down	In CTP?	Notes
08:58	Yes	Currently used by 07:00 MAN-EUS (as allocated in CTP)	06:02	Yes	Allocated to 06:02 EUS-BPN in CTP (not yet run)
10:58	No		08:20/36	No	
12:58	Yes	Allocated to 09:45 BPN-EUS in CTP (not yet run)	09:20/36	Yes	Allocated to 09:20 EUS-BPN in CTP (bid for May 26)
15:58	Yes	Allocated to 12:52 BPN-EUS in CTP, bid for May 26	11:20/36	No	
16:58	No		12:20/36	No	
18:58	No		14:20/36	No	
20:58	No		17:36	Yes	Currently used by 17:36 EUS-BPN (as per CTP)
21:43	Yes	Allocated to 19:32 CHE-EUS in CTP, bid for May 2026	18:36	No	
21:58	No		19:20	No	

Table 1. Additional WCML Fast Line paths; both planned (Dec 2022 CTP) and theoretical

Network Rail provided robust performance evidence in its representations dated 07 February 2025 and 25 April 2025, based on a combination of December 2022 ESG performance modelling (including sensitivity tests) alongside data on current WCML performance. The 25 April 2025 letter sets out relevant performance information in the 'WCML Performance – London Euston to Rugby' section and confirmed that Network Rail does not support any additional WCML South applications seeking to utilise additional capacity on the fast lines, as this would have a significant detrimental impact to performance. The current quantum of services, combined with the realities of operating a mixed traffic railway, already have significant performance challenges and contribute to delivering performance at a level below expected levels.

The performance modelling undertaken by the December 2022 ESG did include the Euston-Stirling paths in the analysis (operating in the xx.20/36 and xx.58 paths subsequently sought by other operators in other hours) but the modelling outputs were based on a full 06:00-22:00 (SX) period, rather than hour by hour comparisons. Nonetheless, a sensitivity test to assess the relative impact on performance of removing the 5 Euston-Stirling paths (in each direction) from the timetable was undertaken as part of the modelling, which quantified the specific impact of having the xx.20/36 and xx.58 Euston-Stirling paths in the 5 planned hours. This showed a relative impact of reducing total delay minutes by 100 minutes and 11 seconds if all 5 services in each direction were removed.

Data that is specific to the performance of the 07:00 Manchester-Euston service since December 2025 is included in response to the ORR's Question 5 below.

**2. *What was the modelled impact, including cumulative delay on later services, of including a train in each of the 9 firebreak paths (in each direction, up and down) referred to in the February 2025 representations?***

Further to the answer provided to Question 1 above, some of the 9 paths (in each direction) are either in operation or would have been factored into the December 2022 ESG performance analysis. The remaining 5 Up direction and 6 Down direction paths represented the firebreak gaps in the December 2022 CTP. Consideration of the relative performance risks from using these paths, based on the flighting of services within the current timetable structure, is set out below.

**Up Direction**

**10:58 Arrival at London Euston (9-minute slot following 1B31 and preceding 1A16)**

Making use of this arrival slot at London Euston requires a new service to follow 1B31 (09:21 Birmingham New St – London Euston) from Rugby. 1B31 is pathed to follow 1A15 (08:34 Manchester Piccadilly - London Euston) on minimum headways. There is a tightly spaced flighting of Up direction services south of Rugby on the fast lines in the timetable structure which means that utilising the 10.58 arrival slot would result in consecutive fast line arrivals at 10:54, 10:58, 11:03, 11:06, 11:09 and 11:12). Flighting an additional train in the firebreak path would therefore result in an increased risk of reactionary delay and causing on-time failures at London Euston.

**16:58 Arrival at London Euston (9-minute slot following 1B49 and preceding 1A52)**

This 16:58 timetable slot follows 1B49 (15:21 Birmingham New St – London Euston) and precedes a flight of five fast line services closely spaced within a 14 minute period (with arrivals at Euston following at 17:03, 17:06, 17:11, 17:14 and 17:17). Whilst this flighting broadly follows a similar pattern most of the day, train movements in the evening peak are more intense than other hours due to a high-priority Empty Coaching Stock ('ECS') move that is planned to then arrive at 17:21. This means that there is the flight of five services then a one-minute gap and this ECS movement. It is inevitable that any delay to 1A52 will ripple through the next 5 services arriving at Euston.

The firebreak in the timetable is therefore particularly important to maintain at this point. 1B49 is later than 3 minutes at Euston 50 % of the time.

**18:58 Arrival at London Euston (9-minute slot following 1B54 and preceding 1A64)**

This 18:58 slot follows 4 minutes behind 1B54 (17:24 Birmingham New St – London Euston), it then precedes 1A64 (16:43 Liverpool Lime St – London Euston) which arrives after a 5 minute gap at 19:03, with subsequent fast line arrivals planned at 19:06, 19:11, 19:14 and 19:17. Utilising this 18:58 slot therefore removes the current 9 minute firebreak slot which precedes a closely spaced sequence of 4 services arriving. 1B54 is more than 3 minutes late at Euston 60 % of the time, so having the additional recovery available in the pattern reduces the likelihood of reactionary delay impacting as many services as the previous examples.

**20:58 Arrival at London Euston (9-minute slot following 9M86 and preceding 1A75)**

Utilising the 20:58 firebreak slot would require a path following 9M86 (14:52 Edinburgh – London Euston) and result in a sequence of arrivals at Euston at 20:54, 20:58, 21:03, 21:06, 21:13 and

21:17. The sequence isn't as tight in this hour due to the absence of the xx.09 Manchester arrival which usually operates in other hours.

**21:58 Arrival at London Euston (11-minute slot following 9M59 and preceding 1A79)**

The proposed 21:58 arrival slot would run 4-minutes behind 9M59 (15:57 Glasgow Central – London Euston) and 7 minutes in front of 1A79 (19:43 Liverpool Lime St – London Euston). In comparison to other hours, there is some recovery time within the following services to reduce the chance of reactionary delay impacting multiple services, meaning that collectively there is lower risk south of Rugby to using this slot from a performance perspective.

**Down Direction**

**08:36 Departure from London Euston (3½-minute slot following 1H63 and preceding 9S54)**

Filling in the slot behind 1H63 (08:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly) effectively takes two separate three-train flights (1Y19, 1S45, 1H63 and 9S54, 1F14, 1U27) and would form them in to one continuous flight of seven services on, or close to minimum headways at points on the south end of the WCML. 1H63 is more than 3 minutes late at Rugby 50 % of the time and a contributing factor in that lateness is the punctuality of 1Y19 (08:23 London Euston – Birmingham New St) at the start of the initial flight at the point it crosses to the Slow Lines at Ledburn Jn.

**11:36 Departure from London Euston (3½-minute slot following 1H66 and preceding 9S65)**

Continuing the theme of creating long flights of services on minimum headway using this slot will also create a continuous flight of 7 services at or near minimum headway behind 1H66 (11:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly) which is more than 3 minutes late 20 % of the time.

**12:36 Departure from London Euston (3½-minute slot following 1H67 and preceding 9S70)**

Due to the standard-pattern nature of the middle of the day, this slot again has very similar characteristics to the previous Down direction slots, in this case following 1H67 (12:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly). Creation of a flight of 7 services at or near minimum headway places the services at the end of that sequence at significant risk of reactionary delay.

**14:36 Departure from London Euston (3½-minute slot following 1H69 and preceding 9S80)**

This slot has the same characteristics as the previous Down examples which all follow the xx.33 Euston – Manchester service, and therefore the same conclusions regarding the risks apply. In this particular hour the proposed service would follow behind 1H69 (14:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly) which is 3 or more minutes late by Rugby 10 % of the time.

**18:36 Departure from London Euston (7-minute slot following 1H73 and preceding 9K39)**

In a similar way to the previous 17:36 example filling this firebreak will create a long sequence of trains at or near minimum headway on the Down Fast. In this case the slot itself is larger and the sequence created would be of ten services rather than eleven however with 1H73 (18:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly) being 3 or more minutes late 40 % of the time by Rugby the challenges of successfully departing this sequence of trains through the throat at Euston on time by this stage in the evening peak are clearly illustrated. There would still be additional risk of reactionary delay by filling this slot although partly mitigated by having the second unfilled slot behind it.

**19:36 Departure from London Euston (3½-minute slot following 1H74 and preceding 9K42)**

This slot returns to a similar pattern as 14:36 and earlier slots where a flight of 7 services on or near minimum headway would be created by filling it. 1H74 (19:33 London Euston – Manchester Piccadilly) is 3 or more minutes late by Rugby 40% of the time so the chance of that reactionary delay occurring once the firebreak has been filled is significant.

3. ***Please provide your assessment of how the inclusion of a train in the 07.00 path differed from use of a 'firebreak' path according to punctuality, reliability, primary and reactionary delay measurements.***

As previously mentioned, the 07:00 Manchester-Euston path was included in the December 2022 CTP and therefore did not represent a firebreak path, as it was always expected to be utilised. The performance modelling undertaken to inform the December 2022 ESG factored this path into the baseline assumptions. Performance data to reflect how this service has been running since the December 2025 timetable change is included in answer to Question 5 below.

Within the current timetable, the 07:00 Manchester-Euston service follows 1R18, originating at Liverpool, into Euston on minimum headway from Watford. The service following the 07:00 Manchester path is not on minimum headway and therefore does not form part of a flight of services.

4. ***Please provide the modelling used to conclude that 9 firebreak paths was (and whether it continues to be) the optimum number. Please set out what consideration was given to the impact of operating services in some of these paths and the outcome of that.***

Further to the answer set out to Question 1, there were 5 firebreak gaps in the Up direction in the December 2022 CTP, and 6 firebreak gaps in the Down direction. The other paths highlighted in Network Rail's representations of 07 February 2025 were all paths forming part of the December 2022 CTP, of which some have subsequently commenced operating. Also as set out in Network Rail's representations letter of 07 February 2025, the conclusions from the detailed performance modelling undertaken to support the December 2022 ESG (including sensitivity tests) indicate that the quantum of fast line services contained in the December 2022 CTP represented a critical threshold level in terms of manageable capacity utilisation, beyond which the introduction of any further services was likely to trigger a disproportionate compromise to network performance through increased reactionary delay.

This can clearly be seen in the performance extract in Table 2, which shows that the impact of adding the 13th and 14th fast line paths each hour ('Additional identified flows') to the fast lines timetable structure results in a clear performance deterioration (both in terms of T1 and T3 metrics), with a risk highlighted to the Up Fast Line (between Rugby and Euston) due to the flighting of services.

Metric	Operator	Dec-19		Dec-22 Difference to Dec 19			
				Full Timetable		Without Additional Identified Flows	
		T-1	T-3	T-1	T-3	T-1	T-3
All Stations	Overall	76.0%	91.1%	5.3%	1.2%	7.7%	2.4%
	Avanti West Coast	66.2%	84.7%	3.6%	0.5%	11.6%	5.6%
	West Midlands Trains	75.2%	92.3%	9.5%	2.1%	10.6%	2.7%
	Cross Country	66.2%	88.1%	10.3%	2.3%	13.7%	2.3%
Up Euston Arrival	Overall	67.2%	85.9%	0.4%	0.5%	8.9%	3.6%
	Avanti West Coast	66.8%	81.6%	-5.2%	-0.1%	6.3%	3.6%
	West Midlands Trains	68.9%	90.1%	6.0%	-1.7%	8.9%	0.3%
	Arriva Rail London	66.7%	88.6%	14.4%	4.1%	14.6%	4.1%

Table 2. December 2022 CTP performance modelling outputs and threshold levels

A copy of the RailSys modelling 'WCML South Operational Modelling for IPG Dec 22' is attached as Appendix A to this letter.

The timetable modelling completed for the December 2022 ESG continues to be valid as, the WCML South timetable structure remains aligned with the structure of the December 2022 CTP. The outputs and conclusions from the ESG modelling remain valid whilst that timetable structure is in place.

**Post-December 2025 timetable introduction**

- 5. Please provide your performance assessment of the 07.00 using punctuality, reliability, primary and reactionary delay metrics (as of 11 February 2026) since the December 2025 timetable introduction.

Figure 1 below shows the lateness profile of 1R19 (07:00 MAN-EUS) from the start of the December 2025 timetable to 27 January 2026. On average over this period this service originates 0.3 mins late and terminates 6.7 minutes late, due to losing time at multiple locations across the route - most notably when passing Ledburn Jn.




Figure 1. Lateness profile of 1R19 since the December 2025 timetable change

1R19 has 3 scheduled stops on its journey (Manchester, Stockport and Euston) so T3 is only recorded at those places. Figure 2 provides a summary of the number of occasions that 1R19 has been a T-3 failure since the December 2025 timetable change. At Manchester 1R19 has been a T3 failure on one day in this period, Stockport a failure on 3 days and Euston a failure on 11 days.

Date	Manchester	Stockport	Euston
15/12/2025	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
16/12/2025	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%
17/12/2025	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
18/12/2025	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
06/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
07/01/2026	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
08/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
12/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
13/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
14/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
15/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
16/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
19/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
20/01/2026	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%
21/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	100.00%
22/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%
23/01/2026	100.00%	100.00%	0.00%

Figure 2. T-3 failures for 1R19 since Dec 2025 change

In terms of daily lateness figures, Figure 3 shows the daily lateness in minutes for 1R19 at each of the scheduled call locations since the December 2025 timetable change. The range of lateness at Euston for this service extends from arriving 2 mins early (16<sup>th</sup> January 2026) to 37 mins late (7<sup>th</sup> January 2026).

Date	Manchester Picc	Stockport	London Euston
15/12/2025	0	1	7
16/12/2025	2	3	2
17/12/2025	0	1	4
18/12/2025	-1	1	2
19/12/2025	0	1	4
06/01/2026	-1	2	19
07/01/2026	7	9	37
08/01/2026	-1	0	0
12/01/2026	0	1	0
13/01/2026	0	1	5
14/01/2026	0	1	4
15/01/2026	0	0	3
16/01/2026	0	1	-2
19/01/2026	-1	2	6
20/01/2026	2	3	0
21/01/2026	0	1	1
22/01/2026	-1	0	3
23/01/2026	-1	1	32

Figure 3. Total lateness (in minutes) for 1R19 since December 2025 change

There have been no recorded cancellations of 1R19 to date since the December 2025 timetable change. This includes any 'Failed to Stop' ('FTS') incidents.

In terms of delays, there have been 115 minutes attributed to 1R19 since the December 2025 timetable change, with the majority of these minutes being due to Network Rail responsible incidents (Figure 4).

	Network Rail	TOC-on-Self	TOC-on-TOC
Primary	63	-	-
Congestion	12	5	13
Late Start	18	4	-

Figure 4. Delay minutes attributed to 1R19 since Dec 2025 change

Looking at the subsequent reactionary delays, the data in Figure 5 shows that 1R19 has the subsequently caused 58 mins of reactionary delay to other services, primarily on their own operations:

	Affected Operator	Reactionary delay mins
Congestion	Freightliner Intermodal	4
	Northern	2
	CrossCountry	2
	East Midlands Railway	2
	Caledonian Sleeper	8
	Avanti WC	19
Late Start	Avanti WC	21

Figure 5. Reactionary delay minutes caused by 1R19 since Dec 2025 change

**6. Please explain Network Rail’s current view on the use of ‘firebreak paths’ on the West Coast (south) and how these align with industry processes for train planning.**

As set out in Network Rail’s representations of 25 April 2025, the analysis of the performance of the fast line timetable on WCML South (between Euston and Rugby) demonstrated the importance of ample recovery being available to absorb sub threshold delays before locations where there are multiple services tightly flighted. The WCML is currently not performing to a consistently high level, and recovery from incidents are taking longer to recover due to the successive flighting of trains on the WCML fast lines. This is particularly being felt at Rugby in the Up direction when services are converging, and at Ledburn Junction and Rugby in the Down direction towards the afternoon / evening peak. Having firebreaks in the timetable at key conflict points helps to prevent spread of delay service group to service group.

Part D and the Decision Criteria under Condition D4.6 apply to any timetable decisions being made in line with the Network Code. The Objective (Condition D4.6.1) requires Network Rail to share capacity for the safe carriage of passenger and goods in an efficient and economical manner. This is achieved through the application of the Decision Considerations (Condition D4.6.2). All 12 of the Considerations are of equal weighting/value until such time that a higher value is assigned by Network Rail. D4.6.2(c) relates to train performance. Network Rail submit that it can, in line with the Decision Considerations, utilise the Decision Criteria to justify why an otherwise compliant train should not be accepted into a timetable on performance grounds, considering how well the planned timetable is performing and how well the timetable can recover from perturbation that occurs.

Please contact us if there is any further information you require.

Yours sincerely,



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North West & Central Region



Hannah Linford  
Capacity Planning Director  
System Operator

**Appendix A – Copy of December 2022 ESG RailSys Technical report (see attachment)**

Appendix B – Sensitivity extract from December 2022 ESG performance modelling

3.4 Sensitivity Test 1: Open Access Removed – Delay Minutes Overview by TOC

TOC	Class	Dec 2022 Variant				Dec 2022 ST1				Dec 2022 Variant vs Dec 2022 ST1		
		Total delay time (hh:mm:ss)	Total train kilometres (Km)	Delay sec. per Km	No. of trains	Total delay time (hh:mm:ss)	Total train kilometres (Km)	Delay sec. per Km	No. of trains	Total Delay increase (hh:mm:ss)	Delay sec. per Km increased (%)	Change in train kilometres (%)
Avanti West Coast	1	08:32:13	66,235	0.46	241	07:55:50	66,235	0.43	241	-00:36:23	-7.10	0.00
Avanti West Coast	5	00:08:33	445	1.15	26	00:08:34	445	1.15	26	+00:00:01	0.19	0.00
Avanti West Coast	9	03:07:37	14,920	0.75	57	02:52:56	14,920	0.70	57	-00:14:41	-7.83	0.00
West Midlands Trains	1	06:08:03	27,707	0.80	172	06:01:11	27,707	0.78	172	-00:06:52	-1.87	0.00
West Midlands Trains	2	07:43:32	17,230	1.61	434	07:42:31	17,230	1.61	434	-00:01:01	-0.22	0.00
West Midlands Trains	3	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
West Midlands Trains	5	00:03:00	100	1.81	17	00:02:57	100	1.77	17	-00:00:03	-1.67	0.00
Arriva Rail London	2	00:26:52	541	2.98	114	00:26:34	541	2.95	114	-00:00:18	-1.12	0.00
Arriva Rail London	5	00:03:05	83	2.22	20	00:03:06	83	2.23	20	+00:00:01	0.54	0.00
Southern	2	00:49:39	2,209	1.35	37	00:49:45	2,209	1.35	37	+00:00:06	0.20	0.00
Southern	5	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CrossCountry	1	01:53:37	9,503	0.72	116	01:53:22	9,503	0.72	116	-00:00:15	-0.22	0.00
CrossCountry	3	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
CrossCountry	5	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Transport for Wales	1	01:45:27	5,144	1.23	147	01:42:03	5,144	1.19	147	-00:03:24	-3.22	0.00
Transport for Wales	2	00:01:21	99	0.82	14	00:01:23	99	0.84	14	+00:00:02	2.47	0.00
Transport for Wales	5	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Caledonian Sleeper	0	00:00:34	2	14.60	1	00:00:35	2	15.03	1	+00:00:01	2.94	0.00
Caledonian Sleeper	1	00:02:14	656	0.20	2	00:02:15	656	0.21	2	+00:00:01	0.75	0.00
Caledonian Sleeper	3	00:01:07	23	2.88	2	00:01:04	23	2.75	2	-00:00:03	-4.48	0.00
Caledonian Sleeper	5	00:00:30	11	2.68	1	00:00:30	11	2.68	1	+00:00:00	0.00	0.00
Grand Union Trains	1	00:27:32	2,620	0.63	8	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
East West Rail	2	00:27:30	278	5.93	55	00:27:21	278	5.90	55	-00:00:09	-0.55	0.00
East Midlands Railway	1	00:19:23	624	1.86	39	00:19:14	624	1.85	39	-00:00:09	-0.77	0.00
East Midlands Railway	2	00:06:11	396	0.94	14	00:06:14	396	0.95	14	+00:00:03	0.81	0.00
East Midlands Railway	5	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Northern Trains	1	00:33:57	1,472	1.38	56	00:30:26	1,472	1.24	56	-00:03:31	-10.36	0.00
Northern Trains	2	02:09:58	5,635	1.38	268	02:09:09	5,635	1.38	268	-00:00:49	-0.63	0.00
Northern Trains	5	00:06:23	49	7.76	25	00:06:21	49	7.72	25	-00:00:02	-0.52	0.00
TransPennine Express	1	00:22:13	482	2.77	35	00:22:13	482	2.77	35	+00:00:00	0.00	0.00
TransPennine Express	5	00:00:11	3	4.09	1	00:00:11	3	4.09	1	+00:00:00	0.00	0.00
Locomotive Services	5	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Short Term Freight	0	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Short Term Freight	6	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	00:00:00	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A
Long term Freight	0	00:05:48	294	1.18	11	00:05:53	294	1.20	11	+00:00:05	1.44	0.00
Long term Freight	1	00:31:21	3,298	0.57	18	00:28:59	3,298	0.53	18	-00:02:22	-7.55	0.00
Long term Freight	3	00:01:59	217	0.55	1	00:01:51	217	0.51	1	-00:00:08	-6.72	0.00
Long term Freight	4	02:25:42	10,372	0.84	61	02:23:09	10,372	0.83	61	-00:02:33	-1.75	0.00
Long term Freight	5	00:00:02	2	1.00	2	00:00:02	2	1.00	2	-00:00:00	0.00	0.00
Long term Freight	6	00:52:59	3,553	0.89	46	00:52:33	3,553	0.89	46	-00:00:26	-0.82	0.00
Long term Freight	7	00:00:02	2	0.98	1	00:00:02	2	0.98	1	-00:00:00	0.00	0.00
<b>Total</b>		<b>39:18:35</b>	<b>174,207</b>	<b>0.81</b>	<b>2042</b>	<b>37:38:14</b>	<b>171,586</b>	<b>0.79</b>	<b>2034</b>	<b>-01:40:21</b>	<b>-2.79</b>	<b>-1.50</b>

Table 11 Sensitivity Test 1 Delay by TOC