Revising railway safety regulations: Consultation responses summary

Key points from consultation:

- 1. Proposal for different regs for mainline and non-mainline railways. Mainline railways should have one set of regs which should be ROGS.
- 2. Not all duty holders are ready to take on a less prescriptive form of regulation
- 3. Future proofing regs for ERTMS is necessary
- 4. Exclusions for LUL/others could be clearer
- Concern from landowners/agricultural sector about removal of fencing requirement ("prevention of unauthorised access"). Others have noted 19th c legislation still exists on this.
- 6. Some thought that many aspects of the proposed regs can be dealt with through HSWA, RGS, ROGS or TSIs.
- 7. Not clear what ORR is trying to remedy with a train protection management system (TPMS) and why specific regulation is required for a train protection system (TPS) but not other safety critical elements (eg brakes).
- 8. Any regs introduced on TPS should apply to Infrastructure Managers (IM) as well as Train Operating Companies (TOC).
- 9. Some TOCs already have a TPMS in place and it is not clear why ORR thinks that it needs to be a requirement.
- 10. Difficult to comment on the Impact assessment (IA) without guidance on what ORR would expect to see in the TPMS
- 11. Some support for retaining hinged door prohibition.
- 12. Rationale for change to kmh measurements unclear to some.
- 13. General support for enforcement flexibility between HSE and ORR.

ORR response to those key points, in number order

- 1. The hazards facing the mainline and non-mainline railway are broadly similar and it is right to have one set of regulations addressing these. Furthermore, having two sets of regulations would not meet the objective under the Red Tape Challenge of reducing regulation of industry where possible. The purpose of ROGS is different from the purpose of the proposed regulations and therefore it is not appropriate to amend ROGS in this way.
- 2. In our view, from our on-going monitoring of the capability of industry duty-holders to manage and control the risks they create, we think that duty-holders are able to cope with less prescriptive law but not cope with complete deregulation. However, in the area of prevention of unauthorised access to the railway ("fencing") we agree that the balance between prescriptive and non-prescriptive law should be different to the balance we had originally proposed. Hence we intend to retain (rather than revoke) the specific requirement to prevent unauthorised access.
- 3. Changes have been made to the draft regulations which will (in our view) future proof them properly for the rollout of ERTMS.
- 4. Having considered the issue carefully, we believe that the exclusions for LUL and others are sufficiently clear.
- 5. We have reviewed the issues raised and concluded that the current requirement to prevent unauthorised access should be retained. Hence we have amended the proposed Regulations to include the existing requirement on preventing unauthorised access almost verbatim.
- 6. We note that the industry had diverging views on deregulation and therefore there is value in developing new regulations. Some of the existing requirements can be dealt with through HSWA, and that gives the rationale for the revocation of a number of the existing Regulations. However, using Railway Group Standards as the approach does not provide the same degree of public assurance that is provided by law for the issues covered by the proposed regulations.
- 7. The train protection management system (TPMS) provision is designed to ensure that train protection system (TPS) equipment is adequately maintained. For other safety critical components, such as brakes, we judge that the general duties of HSWA to properly maintain (so far as is reasonably practicable) and the requirements of the Work Equipment Regulations on maintenance will apply very

General comments		 clearly. For train protection systems we do not think there is the same legal clarity, given the different types, their evolution and the sharing of responsibility for such a system across a number of duty-holders. Hence we believe that a specific regulation for TPS is needed. 8. The definition relating to TPMS regulation has been amended to include a duty on the IM. 9. A functioning TPS is a vital safety component on the railway. The original Regulations were designed to make sure that a TPS was installed on the railway. A key purpose of the updated Regulations is to make sure (in the public interest) that the TPS is properly operated, maintained and (where appropriate) updated. We recognise that many TOCs and Network Rail already have a management system in operation for their TPS, so this requirement will not add a regulatory burden for them. 10. We will publish guidance on the TPMS as part of our package of guidance on the Regulations. 11. We intend to revoke the hinged door prohibition. Given the low number of hinged door rolling stock, we think it is appropriate for this to be managed either through the safety management system of the relevant company or through the condition on secondary door locking in the Mk1 prohibition. 12. We are obliged by law to consider metrication of Regulations. 13. We intend to develop our approach on enforcement flexibility with HSE.
ASLEF	Door NOT agree to any reversition OPP carried	
ASLEF	Does NOT agree to any revocation, ORR carried out a 'better regulation' review of RSR 99 and MPR 97 in 2007-2008 and no changes were made to either set of regulations at that time. ASLEF does not see any real change since the last review. The current review is a politically motivated act forced through by the Government's ideological obsession with cutting "red tape".	The RTC was initiated by Government and we were asked by them to review certain railway-related regulations. We are also bound by section 72 of the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008 which requires us to keep our functions under review and (in exercising these functions) not to impose burdens which may be unnecessary, or maintain burdens which may have become unnecessary. The regulations have been reviewed in accordance with this and in the light of technical and operational changes on the railway.
ATOC	ORR can go further with its proposals and remove those Regs which are not needed relying on any requirements being	Option 1 - Deregulation would result in RGS, ROGS and TSI's being used to ensure current standards and prohibitions on the mainline railway were maintained. However some safety critical aspects of the railway should not be left to voluntary standards such RGS;

DD Calcardian	incorporated into RGS or which are covered by TSI's. Three approaches could be adopted: Option 1 - No specific mainline regulation (preferred approach); Option 2 -Separate mainline and nonmainline regulatory regimes; Option 3 -Combined mainline & nonmainline regulatory regimes.	TSI's are not appropriate as they do not apply to most of GB railway because it is not new interoperable railway; and ROGS are outcome based and implement the safety directive. Option 2 – Superficially having separate regulations for mainline railways may look attractive but actually many of the safety issues across both types of railway are broadly similar and the management approach in ROGS provides sufficient flexibility to regulate mainline and non-mainline railways in a proportionate way. The purpose of the RTC is to reduce regulation where appropriate and creating 2 sets of regulations (one for mainline and one for non-mainline railways) would not reduce the number of regulations in accordance with the aims of the RTC Option 3 - We have chosen this option as we believe it provides the best way of maintaining regulation where we think it is still appropriate. It also allows for certainty of legal requirements for operations that cross between mainline and non-mainline systems, such as tram-train.
DB Schenker	Within the ROGS there is a differentiation between mainline and non mainline operations, and it is more appropriate to have separate regulations here. Specific benefits from this approach are regs would be clearer, more easily interpreted resulting in fewer exceptions and exemptions. It is noted that the consultation documentation refers to this but says that this could lead to confusion because operators would be subject to different statutory obligations. If a single set of regulations are maintained then this would occur, and potentially already does.	See our response to ATOC's similar comment on separation of regulations and the options available. The draft regulations contain requirements for dutyholders to meet which previously required a specific exemption from ORR. Therefore this approach provides clarity on what dutyholders must do and reduces the need for specific exemptions.
EMT	Support the intention of simplifying and updating the regulations as part of the Red Tape challenge.	
First Group, UK Rail First Capital Connect First Hull Trains	Can go further by removing all standalone regulation for the mainline railway as these can be included in RGS and ROGS and adopting risk-based approach. Separate regulations non mainline railways that fall outside the safety directive can be retained. If mainline regulation are to be retained then they should	See ATOC and DB Schenker responses above.

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First Scotrail	be separate from non-mainline regulations to	
	reflect position under ROGS. Advantage of this	
First Transpennine	would be reduction in number of exemptions	
Express	needed; reduction in amount of regulation;	
	regs would clearer and easier to understand;	
	and single set of regs (ROGS) would apply to	
	national network. Disagree that separate	
	regulation would be confusing as combined	
	regs will require exemptions.	
	sept num require exemplication	
GB Railfreight	Support separation of regs for mainline and	See ATOC and DB Schenker responses above.
	non-mainline railways as would be clearer and	'
	require fewer exemptions and exceptions.	
	Believe that single set of regulations would	
	continue confusion.	
John Cartledge	Drafted London Travelwatch response and no	
	longer represents those organisations but	
	supports ORR's approach to remove specific	
	requirements (some deriving from 19th	
	century statutes) where covered by more	
	recent generic legislation if no material	
	change in terms of safety policies and practices	
	would result.	
	would result.	
	The proposal to allow a more pragmatic and	
	flexible division of functions between HSE and	
	ORR makes sense, if the current wording has	
	proved problematic.	
London Midland	Supportive of the overall strategy of	See ATOC and DB Schenker responses above.
	simplification and reduction of the legislation	
	to meet RTC however current proposals could	
	be taken further.	
	Prefer separate regs for mainline and non-	
	mainline railways to reflect approach in ROGS.	
	Alternatively, a single set of section-based	
	regulations could be introduced to enable the	
	Tregulations could be introduced to eliable the	

	separation of the duties of mainline and non-mainline operators. This would ensure a significant reduction in the number of exemptions required and would reduce the overall size of the regulations. It would make content more applicable to relevant dutyholders and allow for more pragmatic interpretation. Furthermore potentially improve the response to compliance.	
Pass Focus & London Travel Watch	Welcomes ORR's work in contributing to the improvement of safety on the railways. The overall risk to passengers is significantly lower than a decade ago. No room for complacency and urge the ORR to continue in its vigilance. Concerned about potential over-reliance on the use of SMS. Although now mandatory, they are still variable in quality and usage across the industry. It will be important for the ORR to continue its evaluation of their effectiveness and of the contribution that they make to improving safety for passengers. Support review provision in draft regs.	We agree that ORR will need to continue to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of dutyholders' safety management systems part of ORR's health and safety strategy (see http://orr.gov.uk/about-orr/what-we-do/our-vision-and-strategy/health-and-safety-strategy)
Southeastern	Support overall aims of the proposals but having a single set of regs for mainline and non mainline railway may not be the best approach as this complicates rather than simplifies. Could requirements be included in ROGs as new schedules rather than as separate regulations. Support ATOC's position on TPMS.	See ATOC and DB Schenker responses above. We do not consider that the draft regulations should be included in ROGS instead because the primary purposes of ROGS and the draft regulations are different; ROGS are high level and outcome-based whereas the draft regulations are specific and linked to societal concerns about key safety issues on the railways.
Tyne & Wear Metro	Support the objective of simplifying and modernising the regulatory framework for railways, but believe that an opportunity has been missed to further remove unnecessary regulation. Supports the ATOC response. No	See ATOC response above.

Unite	justification for regs for mainline railways in the context of TSIs, Interoperability and Safety Directives. This would allow for a simpler set of appropriate regulations for non-mainline operators such as DBTW. Note that ORR has conducted earlier (recent) reviews of railway safety legislation and concluded that no changes were necessary. Very concerned that the regulator for a safety critical industry is talking in terms of "red tape", "burden on business" and "deregulation" as an excuse to weaken regulation, especially when it is acknowledged that there is still a great deal to be done to protect the safety and health of workers in the industry. Opposed to any changes and in particular do not consider it appropriate to move from specific duties to a reliance on general health and safety duties.	See ASLEF and ATOC responses above. Our experience of enforcement work has shown that we have relied on general powers held under the Health and Safety at Work Act 1974 for enforcement rather than using the powers we are proposing to revoke. We consider that retaining specific powers in the proposed Regulations s necessary for certain areas because they merit specific attention and clarity instead of being covered by the general duties of the HSWA
	nat we should revoke Regulations 3, 5, 6 and 7	
	o not support the revocation, please tell us	
why.	Yes	We agree that regulations 5,6, & 7 can be revoked.
Chiltern		vve agree that regulations 3,0, & 7 can be revoked.
DRS		However ORR has reconsidered its approach on regulation 3 on prevention of
DB Schenker		unauthorised access given the strong opinions made by stakeholders from the
East Coast		agricultural and rural landowners sectors. We note that the existing obligation is
EMT		colloquially known as the duty to "fence the railway" even though it is written in law as a
FirstGroup, UK Rail		duty to "prevent unauthorised access as far as reasonably practicable". We propose to
First Capital		retain the existing duty, and its wording allows for the nature of the barrier to prevent

Connect First Hull Trains First Scotrail First Transpennine Express GB Railfreight HRA London Midland Network Rail(HS) PACTS RIA RSSB Southeastern Southern		unauthorised access to be assessed as to the type of hazard; e.g arable fields adjoining the railway may need a different type of barrier to prevent unauthorised access compared to any barrier needed to prevent large livestock from gaining access to the railway. The way in which railway companies meet the existing responsibility will continue as we propose to perpetuate the existing wording. We agree with the agricultural and rural landowners that the generic obligations in ROGS and HSWA would not adequately replace the existing obligations in the Miscellaneous Provisions Regs if they were revoked. We also note that large animals do pose a risk to the safe operation of the railway as highlighted by the derailment of a passenger train by a cow at Polmont in 1984, and by some more recent incidents. Furthermore relying on the HSWA legislation to prevent unauthorised access would increase the burden on Network Rail and each adjoining landowner because under HSWA they would be required to undertake joint assessment of the risks at every location.
CLA	No. Do not support removal of or weakening of Reg 3 and this reg cannot be replaced by HSWA as HSWA has a lower threshold and has just a general duty to protect employees and others. Reg 3 provides a very clear guide to IM to fence the track and this also includes animals. It is important to retain specific reference to animals. ROGS contain no specific mention duty to fence. Members have complained about the time it takes Network Rail to resolve fencing issues in some cases Network Rail's reason is financial leaving the landowner unable to use the land or erect his own fencing.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Dallam Tower Estate	No. Network Rail are not particularly good at maintaining boundary fences bordering	See response to ATOC and others above.

Farmers Union of Wales	farmland & under RSR 99 there is no recourse to the land owner and occupier. Replacing regs this duty with a risk based approach will provide Network Rail with a greater opportunity not to and Network Rail may become more reactive than they are now. Under the draft regs, the maintenance of boundary fences would depend on the views of the employee carrying out the risk assessment. As land occupation and stocking varies this assessment may not accurately meet the types of boundary needed for different types of livestock used in a particular field and therefore invalidate the assessment. Boundary repairs can take months or years to be assessed and remedied, whereas a report of an unsecure private crossing gate gets an immediate response. Consider that this hierarchy of risk would be adopted and would see the further neglect of line side boundaries whereas the fallen boundary is no less of a risk than the private crossing gate. No -Extremely concerned that any moves to reduce the current statutory obligations to a	See response to ATOC and others above.
	•	See response to ATOC and others above.
Mark Heywood	No. Manages farm between Gloucester and Stroud/Stonehouse. Mainlines to/from London and Bristol run through the farm for about 1.5 miles. Support the NFU response and its criticism of	See response to ATOC and others above.

Knight Frank (on behalf of	No. Badminton Estate has a large section of	See response to ATOC and others above.	
	for some years. Boundary features including fences and ditches are in poor repair. Recent contact with Network Rail have failed to induce NR to fulfil its responsibilities in particular to clear rail-side ditches and culverts which are contributory to flash-flooding. In wet years such as 2012/2013, NR's failure to clear ditches has also caused moderate to severe waterlogging on neighbouring agricultural land. The impression given by Network Rail at a parish council meeting in May 2014, rail safety under Railway Safety legislation is the only criterion which drives action by NR to live up to its responsibilities is that in spite of NR's existing prescriptive obligations under other statute. Some action has been taken by NR in relation to long-standing complaints from Haresfield Parish Council about the pedestrian crossing in		
	Network Rail's performance as a neighbour and the shortcomings of NR in the management of rail boundary features. The statutory responsibilities of Network Rail in relation to boundary fences – and rail-side ditches and water courses - should be strengthened and that rail safety should not be the only criterion on which NR's management responsibilities are based and its performance judged. 'Good fences make good neighbours' and Network Rail has been a very poor neighbour		

	that would remove the Network Rail's prescriptive requirement to fence the railway. It is difficult enough to ensure that Network Rail comply with their existing fencing obligations and therefore any softening in this approach should be avoided. This stance will support that made by the NFU.	
National Farmers	No.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Union & National	Strongly object to proposal as removal of reg 3	
Farmers Union	could increase accident risk.	
Cymru	HSWA sets minimum requirements and railway	
	legislation often goes beyond this; in	
	particular in relation to animals accessing the	
	railway.	
	Notes that ORR's annual safety report	
	identifies there being a 76% risk to the public	
	arising from trespass and the report also says	
	that Network Rail does not yet have a	
	sufficiently mature health and safety	
	management system and is therefore heavily	
	regulated.	
	NFU members concerned about sections of	
	fencing being in a poor state of repair, missing	
	or inadequate and removal of specific reg	
	would place greater emphasis on landowners	
	and occupiers undertake these measures	
	which could increase risk of unsafe situations developing.	
New Forest	No.	See response to ATOC and others above.
National Park	Regulation 3 is not a duplication of HSWA and	·
Authority	ROGS as unlike existing MPR Reg 3(2) neither	
-	HSWA nor ROGs make specific reference to	
	persons not at work on the transport system,	
	nor animals.	
	The New Forest has a large numbers of large	
	animals that graze land alongside railway lines	

	and receives in excess of 13.5 million day visits a year. Shares other organisations' concerns that deleting the specific reference to both animals and persons will reduce the commitment to safety by the railway companies. Rail companies responsible for lines through the New Forest are subject to specific covenants on the maintenance of trackside fencing as well as the existing regulations yet on several occasions over the years Forest animals have got onto the railway line through defective fencing. Removing the specific reference to access by animals and people not working on the transport system will weaken current legislation. Not convinced that the specific issues covered by Regulation 3 are duplicated by other statutory obligations and therefore they should not be revoked.	
Network Rail	Q1 – Mixed message to withdraw MPR regs because covered in ROGS but not to do the same with the regs in the RSR. Should consider retaining general provision for the prevention of collisions and derailments. Sections of 19 th C railway legislation also refer to fencing the railway but there is no intention to repeal this legislation.	See also response to ATOC and others above. We note Network Rail's comments about existing legislation, which we think relates to section 68 of the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845 regarding fencing. However this obligation does not have the modern outcome-focussed approach to safety and in our opinion arises from the construction of the railway. The purpose of section 68 is for the benefit of owners and occupiers of adjacent land and not the general public and relates to the construction of the railway. The fencing duty in this section is to protect the landowner/occupier from the consequence of his livestock straying on the railway and prevent trespass from the railway on to adjacent land and an offence under this section is a civil rather than criminal one. We consider that it could exist alongside the draft regulations as it does not have general application and relates to liability.
Pass Focus and London Travel Watch	No overall disagreement.	See response to ATOC and others above.

TfL	Supports revocation of regulations 3 and 7. However ROGs does not cover work in depots and possessions, with the exception of Part 4 - Safety Critical Work. A specific statutory provision should be retained, in addition to the general duties under HSWA, to avoid collisions with people and assets as well as derailment in depots and possessions. The same applies for operating vehicles in depots and possessions without a suitable and sufficient braking system. Although train movements are generally slower in depots and possessions there are generally more staff on track in these locations.	We note the comments made on work being carried out in depots and during possessions but in our view any necessary enforcement can be done through HSWA.
Verderers of the New Forest	No. Object strongly to revocation of reg 3 of MPR. ROGS do not mention preventing person not at work on the railway or animals from accessing the railway and this is a serious omission. The lack of a specific requirement could lead to a serious incident in the New Forest. Even with current regs and contracts with Network Rail to fence the railway, defective fencing has always been a problem and the Verderers can supply examples of this. Future regs should not be weakened.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Q2: Do you agree th	nat Regulation 4 (Means of Communication)	
	n its modified form? If you do not support	
	s provision, please say why.	
ATOC	For no-specific mainline regulation & separate	As we have decided to keep the existing arrangements of combined regulation for
EMT	mainline/non-mainline regs 'no' does not support retention of Reg 4 as TSI already	mainline and non-mainline railways we note the comments on retaining the regulation in this instance.
FirstGroup, UK Rail First Capital	covers MoC for mainline railway as other	tilis ilistalice.
Connect	passenger safety systems are not subject to	
First Hull Trains	specific regulation.	
First Scotrail	Specific regulation.	

First Transpennine	For combined mainline/non-mainline regs 'yes'	
Express	because of requirement for non-mainline	
London Midland	railway.	
Network Rail(HS)		
Southern		
Chiltern	Agree that a form of communication between	
	passengers and those in charge of the vehicle	
	is required but do not have a strong view on	
	how this is implemented.	
DB Schenker	Should be retained for non-mainline railway	ORR considers that the TSI covers only new vehicles and therefore it is important to
GB Railfreight	but not necessary for mainline railway as this is	retain the requirement for existing as well as upgraded vehicles. The proposed regulation
Southeastern	covered by the TSI.	also provides more detail than the TSI over the form of the means of communication.
DRS	Yes	
East Coast		
HRA		
PACTS		
Network Rail	Yes, TSI's do not necessarily apply to upgraded	
	vehicles and therefore be retained.	
RIA	Yes but the reg should not contradict anything	In our view retaining the regulation does not contradict the requirements of the TSI.
	in the relevant TSI.	
RSSB	Reasons not convincing, not clear why any	We have taken a different approach for means of communication because systems such
	confusion over regulation would arise and why	as braking are covered by interoperability regulations for new rolling stock and existing
	the approach taken for brakes does not apply	rolling stock is covered by the general duties under HSWA. In our view enforcement of
	to the means of communication.	the requirement to specifically provide a means of communication would be difficult
	However does not impose any additional	under the general duties of HSWA.
	burden so do not object to retention.	
TfL	Paras 3.13 and 3.16 do not to adequately	The drafting of the regulations includes and future proofs driverless systems in the means
	support the potential introduction of ATO	of communication duty. The drafting refers 'to suitable and sufficient means for
	systems where this is not necessarily a driver	passengers to communicate with a person in a position to take appropriate action in the
	or person "in charge of the vehicle" on the	event of an emergency' and the person in a position to take appropriate action may
	train itself. Such support roles may be	include someone in a control of the vehicle in a driverless system. We note TfL's
	available for communication remotely and	comments but in our view driverless systems come under the existing regulation as
	these have been in extensive use in many	paragraph 27 of current guidance explicitly refers to driverless transport systems. We will
	existing ATO heavy and light rail systems	include similar drafting in the draft guidance for the proposed regulations.
	around the world for some years now (e.g.	

	France, Hong Kong and Singapore). The proposed wording in Regulation 5 (1) may not necessarily preclude the arrangements for communications in a full ATO system, but as drafted is open to interpretation. It would help if the regs could be drafted to future proof for full ATO as much as possible.	
UKTram	Para 3.15 of the condoc is not quite right as the MPR define "transport system" differently as "vehicle" only means a vehicle which is being used on a transport system not qualifying for the exclusion. Where a tramway is (partly) operating line of sight on a system wholly accessible to the public, this current regulation appears not to apply. In the draft of the regs, the proposed reg 5 draws on the meaning of vehicle used on a transport system but to the meaning of "transport system" in ROGS which includes all types of tramway operation. This makes the new legislation more onerous and may have serious implications for operation of heritage vehicles on systems like Blackpool. Implications for heritage tramways may be lessened by the exclusion s of any "system if the line speed on all parts of it is 40 km/h or less", this would still catch Blackpool and the other light rail systems.	Most tram networks have a mix of both street-level and dedicated carriageway and have arrangements for a means of communication, therefore compliance with the current MPR regulation will mean that a means of communication is provided during on-street running. Use of the ROGS definition (which includes all types of tram operation; street level or dedicated carriageway etc) will not therefore substantially alter the obligations placed on tram operators. We note the comments about heritage tramways but consider that heritage tramways are subject to appropriate safety requirements for their operations. The type of means of communication encompasses a range of systems and our guidance will set out more detail in this respect. We do not envisage changes to the current approaches in use on heritage tramways such as Blackpool Tram.
•	nat we should retain a regulation to mandate	
•	otection system? If not, why?	
ATOC	No shouldn't be retained. TPWS installation	In our view, a functional Train Protection System (TPS) remains fundamental to the
DB Schenker	completed in '03 and requirements for a TPS	continued safe operation of the railway and it is therefore in the public interest to retain
East Coast	can be dealt with through HSWA & ROGs along	this requirement in law. We also believe that further TPWS installation will happen in
FirstGroup UK Rail	with RGS.	future, even though most installation is substantially complete, because track and
FCC	Presume that tripcocks fitted to mainline trains	junction configuration will continue to change and therefore the installation of train
First Hull Trains	also achieve compliance with regs. –all except	protection systems will need to change as well. Furthermore we note that amongst the

First Scotrail First TPE GB Railfreight London Midland	East Coast, Hull Trains& LM	consultation responses there was no consensus in the rail industry on whether to retain or remove this provision and that there was support for retention of the regulation, as we had proposed. Some consultees were in favour of revoking the requirement and relying on other law
		and Group Standards to underpin continued use of a train protection system. We do not consider that either ROGS or HSWA are suitable for this purpose because neither explicitly addresses the public interest need to have such systems in place and functioning. We also consider that reliance on the essentially voluntary arrangements in Group Standards would not address the public interest need to have a high degree of assurance that there is systematic train protection on the railway.
		Mainline trains using 'train stop' train protection systems such as tripcocks are compliant with the proposed regulations where they operate over networks which are excluded from the train protection requirement under paragraph 3(4). Where tripcocks are in use on the mainline railway and used by mainline trains, we consider that these types of operation are capable of complying with paragraph (b)(i) in the definition of 'train protection system'. This is because paragraph (b)(i) refers to a system which 'causes the brakes of a train to apply automatically if the train passes without authority a stop signal such passing of which could cause the train to collide with another train,' and is installed so as to operate at each of those stop signals (except a stop signal on the approach to an emergency crossover, and at an appropriate place on every relevant approach) which in our view may, if appropriately set up, include 'train stop' train protection systems such as tripcocks. We will also include in the guidance references that tripcock systems are capable of being included in the definition. Under paragraph 3(4) of the proposed regulations, all LUL trains are excluded from the requirement to fit a train protection system either on the LUL's own network or where they are operating over another railway provided that a tripcock system is fitted. This drafting is broadly similar to the existing exclusion relating to London Underground and others in the Railway Safety Regulations 1999.
Chiltern	The requirement for compatible train protection systems is mandated through standards, track access agreements, operating licenses, Safety Certificates and does not need to be mandated through a further regulation.	See response to ATOC and others above.

DRS	Yes	
HRA Southern		
EMT	No. Having an operational TPS in place is now a	See also response to ATOC and others above.
	fundamental safety requirement and is no different to having measures to prevent collisions and derailments. These specific requirements are being removed from the regs (paras 3.7 and 3.8 of the condoc) and there is no justification for including this new requirement, especially in a review that is	We consider that MPR regulation 5 duplicates much of the provisions in the proposed regs and is therefore not need.
	designed to reduce red tape.	
Network Rail	Yes but see responses to Q1 and Q4.	
Network Rail (HS)	Yes. However, there should be flexibility within the regulation for specific types of operations that do not meet the criteria. See also response to Q4.	We have amended the provision in paragraph 3(4) so that the requirement to have a train protection system in place for the train and railway does not apply when the normal operations have been suspended to allow for engineering and maintenance works or for train testing.
PACTS	Yes. Though interoperability regulations may appear to replicate this for the mainline railway, consider that the proposed regulation will help ensure continued public confidence in railway safety. A secondary benefit of the regulation is that the "train stop" devices on London Underground and other metro systems are effectively mandated – something not achieved by interoperability requirements.	
Pass Focus &	Yes	
London travelwatch		
RIA	Not convinced that there is a need to retain this requirement. The CCS TSI now applies to the whole of the national rail network, (except where the Interop Regs explicitly exclude certain lines). Therefore, requirement to have	We consider that the CCS TSI applies to new and upgraded of the mainline railway only (with the exception of the TEN corridors) and therefore it is appropriate for the train protection system requirement to be retained.

	a TPS (either ERTMS or a "Class B" system such as TPWS or ATP), is already mandated. Question the additional value of retaining this regulation.	
RSSB	Should not be retained. It was right to include a specific legal requirement for TPS because of societal concern. TPS requirement should not be treated any differently from any safety critical elements of train operation which are covered by ROGS. Generic requirements in HSWA, the safety directive and ROGS which TOCs meet through the SMS are sufficient to ensure provision of TPS. Retaining the reg would not miss an opportunity meet RTC. Tripcock systems should also qualify and be explicitly included.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Southeastern	No because already adequately covered by RGS and requirements are now part of relevant structural subsystem.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Train Protections Strategy Group	No consensus in the group but feels it was right to include a specific legal requirement for TPS because of societal concern. TPS requirement should not be treated any differently from any safety critical elements of train operation which are covered by ROGS. Generic requirements in HSWA, the safety directive and ROGS which TOCs meet through the SMS are sufficient to ensure provision of TPS. Retaining the reg would not necessarily meet RTC. Tripcock systems should also qualify and be explicitly included.	See response to ATOC and others above.
TfL	Yes, however condoc addresses ATP, TPWS and ETRMS but there is no reference to tripcock systems. The definition in the draft regulations would cover it but greater clarity could be given for the tripcock system as a TPS.	See response to ATOC and others above.

	T	
Q4: What are your	views on the proposed changes to the	
drafting of the regul	lation on train protection systems? Are there	
any further changes	you feel we should make?	
ATOC	If reg is retained then:	(a) We agree that the TPMS requirement should apply to both IM and operators and
DB Schenker	(a) Properly functioning TPS relies on both operator and IM. A number of places	draft regulations have been amended to reflect this. We will publish draft guidance so that stakeholders have a better understanding or the requirements around the
East Coast	where the consultation document	TPMS. In summary, the content of a TPMS is not a prescriptive list of requirements
FirstGroup, UK Rail	does not refer to requirements on IM. (b) RSSB only - Drafting of regs does not	and the guidance will set out how dutyholders may achieve compliance. The TPMS is the organisation and arrangements for achieving the objective of having a
First Capital	clearly reflect separation of	functioning and properly maintained TPS. It will be part of the wider Safety
Connect	responsibilities between IM and RU set	,
First Hull Trains	out under ROGS. Neither RU or IM	work together to manage the TPS.
	should be checking up on the other	(b) Regulation 22 of ROGS requires that transport operators cooperate with each other
First Scotrail	and IM should not have powers of	(as well as other persons carrying out work on premises or plant owned or controlled
First Transpennine	infrastructure controller. Should be	by a dutyholder) as far as is necessary to achieve safe operation of that transport
Express	redrafted to reflect subsystem	system.
GB Railfreight	approach in Interop Dir.	(c) Our intention was not to imply that some operators do not already have a TPMS
GB Kallifelgift	(c) Concerned that ORR is implying that	system in place nor that existing TPS systems are not robust enough. It is expected
RSSB	TOCs do not have TPMS in place	that TPWS will be used on the railway for some years to come, beyond the original
Train Protections	already and IA asserts that TPS	life expectations for it, and therefore it is vital that operators management systems
Strategy Group	protection systems are not robust	take account of this to ensure that safe operation of this equipment continues and is
ourategy of our	enough.	properly functioning over its remaining life. In addition, the industry is embarking on
	(d) Pars 4.2 refers to TPS being 'properly	a transition away from traditional forms of signalling control, with signalling largely
	maintained'; this should be replaced	separate from the vehicle to one where the signalling equipment is effectively carried
	by 'properly functioning'	by it. It is therefore anticipated that operators SMS's will have to be adapted to
	(e) Not clear what situation ORR is trying	effectively manage this fundamental change in approach.
	remedy that is not covered by existing	(d) We agree that the proposed law should set out that the TPS should be 'functioning'.
	regs/general duties.	We also consider that the duty should continue to refer to 'properly maintained' and
	(f) Para 4.11 refers to providing	so we have amended the proposed regulations so that they refer to a 'a functioning
	'monitoring and regular assessment'	and properly maintained train protection system'. The guidance will set out in more
	which differs from the drafting in	detail what is meant by 'functioning' in the regulations.
	proposed reg 3(2)(c) which refers to	(e) See response to ATOC and others in question 3 above.
	' <u>continuous</u> monitoring etc ' and	(f) In the draft guidance we will include an explanation of what is meant by 'continuous
	therefore suggests something	monitoring'.
	different.	(g) See response to ATOC and other in question 3 above. Furthermore it is Implicit in the

	 (g) No justification for why TPS systems are singled out for different treatment to other system - eg brakes which is managed through the SMS. (h) Requirement to have a TPMS should be removed because: in the absence of any guidance on what this or 'continuous performance' means. Monitoring of TPS systems is done through routine reliability monitoring procedures and concerns about reliability are dealt with through this. TOCs already maintain TPS equipment through ORR-certified SMS; and Industry should decide how properly functioning TPS is achieved. 	requirement to have a functioning and properly maintained train protection system that the train will have brakes to either prevent a collision or prevent exceeding the permitted speed. (h) See response to ATOC and other in question 3 above.
Chiltern	If reg is taken forward then: (a) It is unclear what is meant by a TPMS. Mainline TPS are the responsibility of more than 1 party and it is unclear whether each party needs its own TPMS or whether this can be collectively managed through organisations such as RSSB. (b) TPS involve both IMs and RUs and it is unclear as to whether regs apply to just one or both. (c) Suggest that reg 3(3)(b) is amended as there are a few signals that are tripcock fitted that are not used by London Underground trains but solely by our trains. (see comments on regs) (d) Reg 3(2) largely duplicates obligations that exist elsewhere in legislation or in our Safety License.	 (a) We intend to publish draft guidance on the elements of a TPMS. (b) We agree that the TPMS requirement should apply to both IM and operators and draft regulations have been amended to reflect this. (c) The proposed regulations have been amended to exclude railway forming part of the LUL network from the requirement to have a train protection system in place to extent it has a 'train stop' train protection system in place. (d) See response to ATOC and others in question 3 above. (e) We have revised the various definitions relating to maximum speed and line speed to improve clarity. (f) See response directly above. (g) We have revised the drafting around stop signal to future proof against ECTS roll out and the guidance will deal with this in more detail. (h) The definitions of 'train' and 'locomotive' in the proposed regulations would include self-propelled single vehicles used by Chiltern and other operators.

	 (e) The term "line speed" is replaced by "maximum permissible speed". (f) "permitted speed" is replaced by "permissible speed". Permissible Speed is the term used in the mainline railway rule book and varies dependant on train type. (g) The term "stop signal" is replaced defined as "end of authority" for train protection systems without colour light signals. This then allows for ETCS roll out on national infrastructure and other in-cab signalling. (h) The term "train" is defined as "Light 	
	locomotive, self-propelled rail vehicle or road-rail vehicle in rail mode" as defined in the national rail rule book. Chiltern and other train operators have single vehicle multiple units in use over the national network.	
DRS	DRS always interpreted requirements of these regulations the way proposed changes are. Proposed change makes requirements in question more explicit and transparent. DRS do not foresee any further changes.	
EMT	If new regs are introduced then they should also cover IM. In particular, the main opportunity to reduce system risk lies with the fitment of TPWS equipment to signals not currently fitted, especially automatic signals on plain lines that protected stopping trains in platforms where faster non-stop trains use the same line.	The draft regulations have been amended to reflect that the duty on the TPMS also covers the infrastructure manager. The current Regulations do not cover the prevention of rear end collisions and we have not proposed bringing this within the proposed regulations because it would require a major change in the scope of the regulations. This decision does not of course preclude the industry from voluntarily installing a train protection system at other locations.
HRA	No issue with proposal.	

London Midland	Should apply to IM. Concerned about ORR's view that TOCs are not maintaining TPS.	See response (c) to ATOC and others above.
Network Rail	Any regs should promote migration to latest TPS. A number of exemptions have been granted in respect of TPWS and these will be carried forward, however updates to RGS do not appear to consider granted exemptions that may be included and may result in Network Rail being required to fit more TPWS. Making ATP and TPWs definitions apply equally reduces push for industry to move to ATP or ERTMS. Should apply to IM as well as TOCs.	We consider that the inclusion of the TPMS obligation will encourage migration to the latest version of train protection system where this is appropriate. Following the issues raised in consultation, we have reviewed all existing TPWS exemptions held by Network Rail, many of which are historic. In most cases we have concluded that the nature of the circumstances covered by the exemptions could be addressed through drafting changes to the parts of the regulations that cover the fitment of train protection systems to the infrastructure, with no impact on safety. This will provide clarity as to where the regulations are intended to apply and will remove the need for those exemptions to carry forward once the new regulations are introduced. We plan to review any remaining exemptions in force (both for Network Rail and others) before the new regulations are made We have included a new paragraph 3(3) which requires the infrastructure manager or operator to carry out a risk assessment when moving from an ATP or ECTS system envisaged under sub-paragraph (a) (in the definition of 'train protection system') to a TPWS system envisaged under sub-paragraph (b). The proposed regulations have been amended to apply both to infrastructure managers as well as operators.
Network Rail (HS)	Agree broadly with the principles in the proposed changes but there should be a degree of flexibility to remove the need for specific legislative exemption for engineering trains, maintenance plant, rescue of failed trains and test trains which do not have a train protection system. IM's and TOC's / FOC's have responsibility for the safe operation of the railway system through the SMS which are subject to "co-operation" under ROGS Reg 22. Therefore management of safety for trains lacking a compatible TPS can be done through	We note the comments made about the management of risk when operating trains without a train protection system in place in specific circumstances. We have included those circumstances in the draft regulations so that a specific exemption will no longer be needed. We do not agree that rescue of failed trains should be included as this type of operation is best managed through a specific exemption and the safety management system.

	this SMS rather than specific exemption from ORR as ROGS require appropriate SMS to be in place for the types of operation & HSWA requires employer to manage risks. RSR 1999 means that HS TOCs and IM have to have exemptions in place. HS1 rule books form part of SMS which could form mechanism to audit compliance with SMS for operating trains without a TPS.	
PACTS	The draft regs appears to be well drafted, and much clearer than the existing regs.	
RIA	Not convinced should be retained.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Southeastern	See comments on regs drafting	
Southern	Should be treated like other safety systems (eg brakes) are treated under ROGS reg 19. Draft Reg 3(2) should be removed.	See response to ATOC and others in question 3 above.
TfL	Newer signalling systems in use on LU and elsewhere no longer demarcate stopping points with a physical trackside signal. Definition of 'stop signal' could be extended to include 'the target stopping point' associated with an automatic train control system or similar.	See response (g) to Chiltern above.
	New specific requirement in new regulation 3(2) for a TPMS implies that ORR is expecting TOCs to have a separate system for managing TPS to the safety management system. The definition of a TPMS needs further description so RU's can understand if ORR expects a separate system for TPS management from the safety management system, a sub system or a fully integrated system. PFI maintained fleets should also be considered as information is held by the contracted train maintainer.	See response (a) to ATOC and others above.

Tyne & Wear Metro	Exclusion for TWMetro should be drafted in the in the same way as LUL as TWMetro operates over its own as well as mainline infrastructure. DLR & Glasgow Subway do not. TWMetro train protection seems to meet definition of TPS as does LUL tripcock system.	We agree that the exclusion from the train protection system prohibition for TW Metro should be similar to that that we have included for LUL.
	new definition of "relevant approach",	
-	nverted to 95km/h or 100km/h?	
ATOC DB Schenker East Coast FirstGroup, UK Rail First Capital Connect First Hull Trains First Scotrail First Transpennine Express GB Railfreight RSSB Train Protections Strategy Group	Unclear why imperial units are being replaced since network signage uses imperial distances. RSSB uses 100kph for 60mph and if this is to be adopted should follow RSSB.	The imperial distances are being replaced by kmh as a result of the 2009/3/EC which require the UK to use metric measurements except for measuring road distances and speeds. We have considered whether we should use the metric equivalent speeds used by RSSB. However we are concerned that using the RSSB equivalent of 100kmh will have the effect of reducing the number of locations where a TPS should be fitted with a negative impact on safety and therefore we consider that the speed in the new Regs should be 95kmh which equates to 59.03mph.
Chiltern	No strong view	
DRS	Decision should be made by ORR based on the evidence of perceived risk associated with the subject.	See response to ATOC and others above.
EMT	No strong views, but suggest that 100km/h is consistent with the table of speed conversions contained within GI/GN7608.	See response to ATOC and others above.
London Midland	Unclear why change being proposed especially when use of 2 different systems could cause confusion and potentially more safety related incidents.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Network Rail	Mph will exist for some years despite move	See response to ATOC and others above.

	to ERTMS which uses kmh. Should quote both until industry has an agreed date for	
	the switch.	
Network Rail (HS)	Yes, support move.	
PACTS	RSSB's suggested conversion is to 100km/h. Doubt there is much to choose in safety terms between 100km/h and 90km/h.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Pass Focus & London travelwatch	Urge ORR to convert 60mph to 95km/h. While we appreciate that this is slightly lower than 60mph, 100km/h is significantly higher than the current permitted speed (approx. 66mph!).	See response to ATOC and others above.
RIA	Not convinced by need to change this.	See response to ATOC and others above.
Southeastern	should be 100kmh	See response to ATOC and others above.
Southern	Should be 95kmh as 100kmh may permit removal of equipment protecting 60mph approaches and a reduction in safety.	See response to ATOC and others above.
TfL	Whilst the proposed regulations may use metric terms it is not clear whether this mandates use of metric systems. If there is to be a conversion to kph, then it needs to be accurate. This raises concerns TfL uses imperial distances and the change would require a lot of re-signing work and there would need to be a consistent application of metric speed indications on GB railways.	See response to ATOC and others above.
	we should retain the regulation to prohibit	
the use of Mark 1 rolling stock, with the proposed changes to the		
exemption system? If you do not support the retention, please tell us why?		
ATOC FirstGroup, UK Rail	If no specific mainline regs are implemented then this should not be retained as risk is	As we consider that the draft regulations should cover both mainline and non-mainline railways, we note the support for maintaining the prohibition in this instance.
i ii storoup, ok kaii	then this should hot be retailled as risk is	ranways, we note the support for maintaining the prombition in this instance.

First Capital Connect	very low of Mk 1 vehicles being used.	
First Hull Trains	Consider using other methods to prevent re-	
First Scotrail	introduction of Mk 1 vehicles such as	
First Transpennine	removing grandfather rights for vehicles not	
Express	in national vehicle register or changes to	
GB Railfreight	RGS. Supports retaining the prohibition if	
	combined regs are introduced and separate	
	distinct regs are introduced. Although the	
	prohibition should not apply to non-mainline	
	railways.	
Chiltern	No strong view	
London Midland	If a single set of regulations Yes –However LUL are the only TOC that operates MK 1 coaching stock and may be overly prescriptive for 'goal setting' set of regulations. If a dual set of Regulations Yes - It is therefore the position of LM that these requirements are retained, but as above, consideration is given to a goal setting approach.	See response to ATOC and others above.
DB Schenker	Yes	
East Coast		
EMT		
HRA		
Network Rail		
PACTS		
Pass Focus & London		
Travelwatch		
Southern		
TfL	Harley by the control of the control	
Network Rail (HS)	Unclear why this is needed because	It is unlikely that the control could apply or be achievable through interoperability
	interoperability requires vehicles to comply	authorisations for Mark 1 vehicles. As these vehicles form a significant part of the charter
	with the Reference Document Database	and heritage railway operators fleets and it is therefore important that measures to
	which restricts access. Control can be	remedy inherent poor crashworthiness are taken before carrying passengers on the

	achieved through authorisation (or	mainline railway or above 40kmh.	
	otherwise) of the vehicle onto the		
	infrastructure.		
RIA	No view		
RSSB	Retention of reg useful rather than essential.	See response to Network Rail (HS) above.	
	Although covered by ROGS simpler to retain		
	regulation.		
Southeastern	Should not be retained as most Mk1 stock	We consider that although there is a declining number of vehicles that may be	
	has been scrapped and risk of remaining	reintroduced onto the mainline railway, these vehicles form a significant part of the	
	Mk1 stock being introduced is unlikely to be	charter and heritage railway operators fleets and therefore it is important that measures	
	significant. Other approaches such removing	to remedy inherent poor crashworthiness are taken before operation on the mainline	
	grandfather rights to stock not in the rolling	railway or above 40kmh.	
	stock library. See also comments on reg 4.2.		
Tyne & Wear Metro	Exclusion for TWMetro should drafted in the	This exclusion is being removed as we consider that Mark 1 vehicles may only be	
•	in the same way as LUL.	operated on non-mainline railways where modifications to improve crashworthiness have	
	·	been completed.	
Q7: Do you agree tha	at regulation 5 (prohibition of hinged doors)		
should be revoked? I	f you do not support revocation, why do you		
think it should be ret			
ATOC,	Hinged door prohibition can be revoked as	We note that much of the Mark 2 and Mark 3 stock with hinged doors currently in use on	
FirstGroup, UK Rail	long as the fact that other vehicles (Mk2/HST	the railway has been modified so that the hinged doors may be centrally locked.	
First Capital	stock) which have hinged doors is taken into		
Connect	account possibly through change in RGS.		
First Hull Trains	, , ,		
First Scotrail			
First Transpennine			
Express			
Chiltern	Yes		
DB Schenker			
DRS			
GB Railfreight			
HRA			
PACTS			
Southeastern			
Southern			

TfL				
East Coast EMT	No. EMT and EC use Mk 3 coaches on its HST fleet which have hinged doors but are protected with a Central Door Locking system. Sensible to maintain the current wording of the Regulations.	Although there are a number of vehicles which have hinged doors that are still used or may be used in the future we expect that the risks associated with operating passenger services using hinged door stock will be dealt with through the safety management system.		
London Midland	No- any rolling stock that is used in mainline operations should have a central door locking system. Consideration should be given to communicating this in terms of a goal setting approach and avoiding the use of a historically based provision.	See response to East Coast and EMT above.		
Network Rail	Some heritage operators intend to operate non-mk1 hinged stock on the network. VSOE Pullman cars are also not Mk1.	See response to East Coast and EMT above.		
Network Rail (HS)	Support approach but can control/authorisation can be achieved through Reference Document Database. See response to Q6.	We note the support for the approach. See also response to question 6.		
Pass Focus and London Travel Watch	No overall disagreement.			
RIA	No view			
RSSB	No, support retaining prohibition whilst Mk2 & 3 coaches still being used on the network.	See response to East Coast and EMT above.		
•	vith our approach to issuing exemptions under s? If not, please tell us why?			
ATOC	Yes but if separate mainline/non mainline regulations issued then would not apply to non mainline regulations. If combined regulations introduced may lead to a clash with safety directive which aims to avoid specific national rules.	We think that the proposed regulations will not conflict with the Safety Directive.		

Chiltern	Supportive	
EMT		
DRS	Yes	
DB Schenker		
East Coast		
FirstGroup, UK Rail		
First Capital Connect		
First Hull Trains		
First Scotrail		
First Transpennine		
Express		
GB Railfreight		
HRA		
Network Rail		
PACTS		
RIA		
Southern		
London Midland	It is not clear what the extent, potential complexity or actual requirements of the revised system will be. Would welcome a streamlined exemptions process with appropriate assurances and decisions on permissions/refusals. A revised process which complicates the existing system is undesirable.	We re-issued our RDG for processing exemptions under the RSR 99 in May 2014. This process was amended to provide more clarity to stakeholders as well as streamline the process for considering and issuing exemptions. It is expected that the process for considering exemption applications under the proposed Regulations will be very similar to the current one.
Network Rail (HS)	Support approach but can control/authorisation can be achieved through Reference Document Database. See response to Q6.	We note the support for our approach, however see response to Network Rail (HS) in question 6 above.
RSSB	In principle yes, but ORR could adopt approach in ROGS (reg 2A). Having a list of exemptions is more transparent.	We do not consider that the broad approach to exemptions under ROGS is suitable for the specific type exemption that is required for elements of the draft regulations.
Southeastern	Doesn't apply to Southeastern	
TfL	Supports the proposal for the ORR to retain the power to grant exemptions. LU relies on	We have amended the provision in paragraph 3(4) so that the requirement to have a train protection system in place for the train and railway does not apply when the normal

	its current exemptions to undertake certain activities (mainly engineering-related, taking place outside the hours of passenger service) and would be concerned if the proposed review were to revoke any of these. An alternative approach would be to amend the regs to specifically allow non-compliance with the train protection requirements in engineering possessions or in non-passenger hours where there are appropriate and effective controls to ensure safety.	operations have been suspended to allow for engineering and maintenance works or for train testing and believe that this exclusion will also apply to LUL operations. See response to Network Rail (HS) in question 3 above.
-	nat the remaining provision in force	
[definition of a railw why?	vay] can be revoked? If not, please tell us	
ATOC	Yes	HRA only - We do not agree that the definition of 'railway' should be amended to exclude
Chiltern	HRA only - Subject to changes being to	heritage railways from the definition as regulation is important in ensuring continued safe
DRS	definition of 'railway'.	operation of heritage railways.
DB Schenker	,	
East Coast		
EMT		
HRA		
FirstGroup, UK Rail		
First Capital		
Connect		
First Hull Trains		
First Scotrail		
First Transpennine		
Express		
GB Railfreight		
London Midland		
Network Rail		
Network Rail (HS) PACTS		
RIA		
RSSB		
Southeastern		
Southeastern		

Southern		
TfL		
•	ith our assumptions in the impact assessment?	
•	why or if there are any other factors that you	
think we should take		
ATOC	ATOC unable to comment on IA in relation to	We intend to publish draft guidance
DB Schenker	TPMS due to the lack of guidance.	
East Coast		See response to ATOC and others in question 3.
FirstGroup, UK Rail	IA on Mk 1 stock is of limited relevance as	
First Capital	ATOC members do not regularly use this stock.	
Connect	Reference on p41 'train operating systems'	
First Hull Trains	should be to 'train protection systems'. Not DB	
First Scotrail	Schenker or GB Railfreight	
First Transpennine		
Express		
GB Railfreight		
London Midland		
Chiltern	The main costs arising from these new regulations will be the requirement for a "train protection management system". Unfortunately as this is not yet defined and there is no guidance, not clear how ORR can evaluate its impact.	See response to ATOC and others in question 3.
DRS Network Rail Network Rail (HS)	Yes	
EMT	No. Arguments used in the impact assessment to support the rationale to retain the existing regs are directly opposed to the arguments used to revoke regulations 3, 5, 6 and 7 of MPR. The assumption does not recognise that existing RGS (GE/RT8075) on fitment and upkeep of TPWS requires TOCs to upgrade the TPWS system when a vehicle undergoes	See response to ATOC and others above and also responses to ATOC and others on questions 3 and 4.

RSSB	alteration and the type of alteration provides a reasonable opportunity to bring the vehicle into conformity. This should provide sufficient assurance that the proposed changes will be delivered, without the need for regulation. Proposals will not cause industry to do anything differently so no reduction in costs to industry.	
Southeastern	unable to comment on IA in relation to TPMS due to the lack of guidance but there would be a cost to any railway undertakings if draft reg 3(2)(c)were used to force an upgrade of TPWs equipment. IA on Mark 1 rolling stock is not relevant to Southeastern.	See response to ATOC and others above, the responses to ATOC and others on questions 3 and 4 and also the response to Network Rail in question 4.
Southern	See answer to Q4.	
TfL	Agree that impact on costs is small. Some of the labour rates used in Table 5 in Annex B are considerably lower than TfL expects to pay in the London area. 5.1 (16) third paragraph contains the statement "There is therefore an ongoing need to preserve this important passenger safety provision which covers the mainline, non- mainline railways (for example LU) and tramways currently, particularly when driver- only operations are increasing on the network." This does not adequately account for ATO operations, existing operations on LU as well as that will be used on parts of the Thameslink core route. This is more than just DOO. These comments follow on from response to question 2.	We will review the impact assessment in light of these comments.

Q11: Do you have a	ny views that would help inform our	
development of an o	enforcement flexibility proposal?	
ATOC DB Schenker	No views but support ORR's intention.	
East Coast		
EMT		
FirstGroup, UK Rail		
First Capital		
Connect		
First Hull Trains		
First Scotrail		
First Transpennine		
Express		
GB Railfreight		
RIA		
Chiltern	No view on this	
DRS		
RSSB		
Southern		
London Midland	Beneficial for a degree of certainty to exist in	Since consulting on this general policy principle we have established that it will be
	these matters and should not be an overly	necessary to amend primary legislation before we can introduce a flexibility provision to
	complex matter to resolve, as both	the regulations which govern the enforcement allocation arrangements. We will assess
	organisations have similar enforcement	the impact of the policy, including any costs, in more detail when, and if, we have an
	powers and technical knowledge base.	opportunity to develop the necessary legal proposals.
	Unlikely to directly affect any of the TOC's as	
	it's an exercise of cooperation and likely to be cost neutral. HSE 'Fees for Intervention'	
	approach may change position were this to be	
	an additional cost enforced by HSE. Want	
	assurance that there would be no increase in	
	the NET cost to LM from Enforcement activity,	
	regardless of which organisation was involved.	

Network Rail	Further information needed for full response	
	in particular on criteria for allocation and	
	whether investigation needed specialist	
	railway knowledge.	
Office for Nuclear Regulation	Content with on ORR proposals on flexibility.	
	Clarity of enforcement responsibilities	
	between the different agencies involved,	
DACTC	helps both regulators and those regulated.	
PACTS	Swift resolution of ambiguities on	
	enforcement responsibilities in cases of	
	doubt can only be beneficial.	
	support ORR's intention 8, however it is	
Southeastern	important that both HSE and ORR take a	
	consistent approach to risk.	
	Support any sensible enforcement flexibility	
TfL	proposal aimed at providing clarity and	
	avoiding confusion.	

Comments of	drafting of the
regulations	

		Consultee	ORR comments
Regulation 1			
Regulation 2	Definition of 'Stop Signal' should be amended to take into account move to ETCS which does not use physical signals but grants movement authority to trains. Should be updated to include 'end of authority' (i.e stop signal) for ECTS.	ATOC, First Capital Connect, First Group, First Capital Connect, First Hull Trains, First Scotrail, First Trans Pennine express, Network Rail, RSSB, TPS Group, TfL	Definition has been amended so can include non-physical signals.
	The definition of 'stop signal' - LU uses signals for shunting and hand signals, both of which include stop signals	TfL	See above.
	Definitions relating to speed are confusing. It may be better to define 'speed restriction' as permitted speed reductions'.	Network Rail	Have amended the various definitions of speed to improve clarity.
	Definition of 'vehicle' suggest this includes vehicles used on platforms, as at the moment it seems to only be those of a rail mounted nature; it would benefit from clarification In (2) there is a repetition of "in"; it should read "is in	TfL	Disgaree. The regulations are drafted to only apply to vehicles on rails and not platform vehicles.
	An exclusion for "heritage railways" as defined in regulation 2 of ROGS.	HRA	As set out in our rersponse to HRA to question 9, we consider that it is important that this aspect of the regulations continues to apply to heritage railways.
Regulation 3(1)	Draft Regulation 3.(1) is set in the context of operation of a train on a railway. As a result, whilst it may be intended to also cover the infrastructure manager's responsibility to provide a properly functioning train protection	Southeastern	This error has been corrected in revised draft regulations.

	system, this is not explicit.		
Regulation 3(2)	Draft Regulation 3.(2) refers to the system being "properly maintained.", believe that this should instead refer to it being "properly functioning", i.e. the requirement should be defined in terms of the effect (output) rather than the action (input).	Southeastern	The draft regulations have been amended, see ORR response (d) to ATOC and others comments in question 4.
	Draft Regulation 3(2)(c) appears to introduce a new requirement for continuous monitoring. It is not clear whether this is intended simply to mean that TPWS performance should be monitored or whether the intent is to require continuous monitoring of TPWS in the driving cab. If the latter this appears to be an attempt to mandate fitment of Mark 3 (or later) TPWS control units to all mainline rolling stock, although several studies have concluded that the costs of such a change would be grossly disproportionate to the safety benefits.		This will be explained in more detail in the draft guidance.
	Reg 3(2)(c)Not clear why the word 'continuous' has been included when referred to in consultation document.	ATOC	This will be explained in more detail in the draft guidance.
Regulation 3(3)	Regulation 3.(3)(b) appears to create an unintended exemption for London Underground Limited by effectively allowing LUL to operate trains anywhere on the railway system without having a train protection system in use.	Southeastern, Network Rail	The exclusion has been amended to include network which LUL operates over but the exclusion only applies as long as there is a system in place to automatically apply the brakes of the train (such as a tripcock system).
	Appears to exemption trains operating between Gunnersbury and Richmond or Queens Park - Harrow & Wealdstone from being fitted with a TPS. Unclear if the regulation should say that trains should be fitted with LUL train stop equipment to operate over this part of the railway.	ATOC	See above.

	Reg 3(3)(b) should state for infrastructure that "London Underground is the Infrastructure Manager for".	Chiltern	See above.
	The precedence of the 'or' & 'and' terms in relation to the sub clauses of draft Regulation 3(3) is unclear. It is suggested renumbering these sub-clauses (a)(i), (a)(ii), and (b) respectively might aid understanding (if this is consistent with the intended precedence).	TfL	See above.
	Draft Regulation 3(3)(b); there are a small number of areas of the network owned by LU over which LU does not operate a train service, e.g. Amersham to Mantles Wood, where the traditional LU trainstop/tripcock system is in use rather than a full train protection system. Therefore that 3(3)(b) should read 'is used by London Underground Limited or forms part of the London Underground network'.		
Regulation 3(4)	the London Onderground network.		
Regulation 4(1)			
Regulation 4(2)	Contains redundant elements exempting Mark 1 rolling stock being operated on lines where it could not physically be operated, including Docklands Light Railway and the Glasgow Subway, as well as apparently allowing London Underground Limited to operate Mark 1 rolling stock wherever it may wish to do so. Better if mainline and non-mainline railways dealt with under separate legislation.	Southeastern	This provision has been removed.
	This reg appears to grant LUL the ability to operate Mk1 stock anywhere on the mainline railway, not clear why the reg has been drafted this way.	ATOC	See response to Southeastern above.

Regulation 5			
Regulation 6			
Schedule	Concerned about the proposed definition of "railway" in the Schedule to the draft Regulations since the exclusion of heritage railways hangs on the exemption in paragraph 1(e) (the system is not to operate at a speed of 40kph or more).	HRA	Not proposing to amend the definition of railway as we believe that some of the provisions should apply to heritage railways if they operate over 25mph.
	The definition of "tramway" refers to rails laid along a "road". Since road has no definition in the proposed Regulations suggest that the definition of "road" contained in regulation 2 of ROGS be adopted, since the definition of tramway itself is derived from that contained in ROGS.	HRA UKTram	We do not consider that a separate definition is required in the draft regulations given that 'road' is defined ROGS, the Road Traffic Regulation Act 1984 and the Road Traffic Act 1988.

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