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Mr Andrew Hall  
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents  
Cullen House  
Berkshire Copse Rd  
Aldershot  
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

**RAIB Report: Serious irregularity at Cardiff East Junction on 29 December 2016**

I write to provide an update<sup>1</sup> on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 31 October 2017.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken regarding the recommendation. The status of recommendation 1 is '**Implemented**'.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of the recommendation, unless we become aware that any of the information provided has become inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 16 April 2020.

Yours sincerely,

Oliver Stewart

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

## Recommendation 1

*The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that projects, particularly those with a long duration, are appropriately held to account by the assurance process external to the project, and continue to follow good practice throughout so reducing the risk of safety critical errors and omissions, ensuring that a safe railway is handed back for operational service.*

Network Rail should review its project assurance process as applied to the CASR scheme, and identify the deficiencies which resulted in the management shortcomings described in this report. Network Rail should then use the findings of this review to establish suitable and sufficient management processes to assure itself that major projects deliver a safe railway on each occasion that it is handed over for service. These should cover as a minimum, all aspects of project governance, including quality assurance throughout all stages of the project lifecycle, organisational structure, record keeping and administrative systems

## ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed its assurance processes and identified a number of changes to standards and processes, as identified in our initial response, which have now been completed.
2. The actions taken included an update to the Signal Works Testing Handbook to reinstate the TIC responsibility to confirm unworked points are properly secured at entry into service. This update was published on 7 December 2019 and prompted Network Rail to issue a closure statement.
3. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
  - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
  - has taken action to implement it.

***Status: Implemented.***

## Previously reported to RAIB

4. On 29 October 2018 ORR reported the following:

*Network Rail has reviewed its project assurance procedures and have revised a number of standards and procedures, including the standard for entry into operational service of railway infrastructure. ORR is considering options for carrying out a more detailed review of Network Rail's project assurance procedures following the Cardiff East and Waterloo incidents.*

## Update

5. On 29 January 2020 Network Rail provided the following closure statement and supporting evidence:



6. Network Rail state the following:

*Following several discussions after the publication of the report the following action plan was put into place. The original target dates for the actions are shown.*

*A. Complete review of project assurance process and issues pertinent to Cardiff Resignalling project. Produce record of meeting(s) and actions. **May 2018***

*B. Update NR/L2/INI/CP0075 "Procedure for the Entry into Operational Service of Railway Infrastructure" to be updated to include a check that the commissioning scheme plan correctly reflects the layout being commissioned **Dec 2018***

*C. Emergency update to NR/L2/SIG/11704 (Signalling Requirements for the Application Design and Management of Points) to widen the scope for risk assessment of all instances of all unworked and undetected points on operational lines. Previously this was only required when this situation was expected to last for more than 2 months. Now it will be required in all instances. **Jan 2018***

*D. Develop IP Signalling Southern West local instruction, which sets out the process for the management of undetected points, which explicitly requires checked and controlled documents plus independent verification into national note of best practice. **Sept 2018***

*Action A was completed during February and March 2018. A copy of the summary of the discussions and conclusions is attached. This review was led by the IP Technical Head of Discipline Signalling. The discussion led to some additional actions being included in the action plan. These were a result of concerns that the RAIB report had not considered some key underlying factors in the course of their investigation. The key additional actions added were to clarify the requirement that a signalling scheme plan is required for each entry in service event. This action is particularly relevant as the unsecured points at Cardiff on 29 December 2016 were not shown to be extant on the commissioning stage plan being used. The work to remove the points had been deferred for several months yet the project still considered this to be a single stage, but this included several "entry into service" events. This clarification has been included in the revised issue of NR/L2/SIG/30035 which was published on 7 September 2019. The second action undertaken was to update the Signal Works Testing Handbook to reinstate the TIC responsibility to confirm unworked points are properly secured at entry into service. This update was published on 7 December 2019.*

## Previously reported to RAIB

### Recommendation 1

*The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that projects, particularly those with a long duration, are appropriately held to account by the assurance process external to the project, and continue to follow good practice throughout so reducing the risk of safety critical errors and omissions, ensuring that a safe railway is handed back for operational service.*

Network Rail should review its project assurance process as applied to the CASR scheme, and identify the deficiencies which resulted in the management shortcomings described in this report. Network Rail should then use the findings of this review to establish suitable and sufficient management processes to assure itself that major projects deliver a safe railway on each occasion that it is handed over for service. These should cover as a minimum, all aspects of project governance, including quality assurance throughout all stages of the project lifecycle, organisational structure, record keeping and administrative systems

### ORR decision

1. Network Rail has reviewed its project assurance procedures and have revised a number of standards and procedures, including the standard for entry into operational service of railway infrastructure. ORR is considering options for carrying out a more detailed review of Network Rail's project assurance procedures following the Cardiff East and Waterloo incidents.
2. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
  - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
  - is taking action to improve its project assurance, but ORR is not yet assured that processes are suitably robust.

**Status: Progressing. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.**

### Information in support of ORR decision

3. On 12 September 2018 Network Rail provided the following initial response:
  - A. *Complete review of project assurance process and issues pertinent to Cardiff Resignalling project. Produce record of meeting(s) and actions. **May 2018 (Complete)***
  - B. *Update NR/L2/INI/CP0075 "Procedure for the Entry into Operational Service of Railway Infrastructure" to be updated to include a check that the commissioning scheme plan correctly reflects the layout being commissioned **Dec 2018***

C. *Emergency update to NR/L2/SIG/11704 (Signalling Requirements for the Application Design and Management of Points) to widen the scope for risk assessment of all instances of all unworked and undetected points on operational lines. Previously this was only required when this situation was expected to last for more than 2 months. Now it will be required in all instances. **Jan 2018** (Complete)*

D. *Develop IP Signalling Southern West local instruction, which sets out the process for the management of undetected points, which explicitly requires checked and controlled documents plus independent verification into national note of best practice. **Sept 2018** (Complete)*