

Oliver Stewart
Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and
Recommendation Handling

3 May 2018



Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

Near miss between a train and a level crossing user at Dock Lane, Melton, Suffolk, 14 June 2016

I write to report¹ on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the three recommendations addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 3 May 2017.

The annex to this letter provides details in respect of each recommendation. The status of all four recommendations is '**insufficient response**'.

ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address these recommendations.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 8 May 2018.

Yours sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read 'Oliver Stewart', written in a cursive style.

Oliver Stewart

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Initial consideration by ORR

1. All 4 recommendations were addressed to ORR when the report was published on 3 May 2017.
2. After considering the recommendations ORR passed all 4 recommendations to Network Rail asking them to consider and where appropriate act upon them and advise ORR of its conclusions.

Recommendation 1

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that all elements of human error by signallers are accounted for when assessing the risks to users at telephone equipped level crossings and when considering options to reduce the level crossing risk.

Network Rail should review, and revise as necessary, its risk management processes so that the risk of signallers making errors when controlling telephone operated level crossings is taken into account when identifying appropriate improvement options. This should include consideration of factors that affect:

- the probability of signallers making errors; and
- the number of crossing decisions that signallers are required to make.

Network Rail should also clearly identify who is responsible for assessing the risk associated with signallers making such errors

ORR decision

3. Network Rail has not provided a formal response to this recommendation.
4. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - has not provided a response setting out how the recommendation will be delivered.

Status: Insufficient response. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

5. No formal response to the recommendations has been provided.

Recommendation 2

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that Network Rail fully understands the demand rate and work complexity for the signaller at Saxmundham signal box in dealing with telephone calls from user worked crossings, as well as other signalling activities.

Network Rail should reassess the risks associated with the work demand on the signaller at Saxmundham signal box, using all the relevant assessment tools that it has available, to ensure that the number of permissions to cross given when it is not safe to cross is being managed to an acceptable level. This should include consideration of:

- the complexity of the tasks that the signaller needs to undertake;
- the number of user worked crossing calls that are dealt with by the signaller; and
- potential measures to reduce the number of user worked crossing calls that the signaller has to deal with.

It should produce a time-bound plan for implementation of any identified improvements

ORR decision

6. Network Rail has not provided a formal response to this recommendation.
7. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:
 - has not provided a response setting out how the recommendation will be delivered.

Status: Insufficient response. ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

8. No formal response to the recommendations has been provided.

Recommendation 3

The intent of this recommendation is to identify and assess any other signal boxes that manage high volumes of user worked crossing telephone calls, and reduce the associated risk, if necessary.

Network Rail should identify signal boxes, and other locations, where signallers, or similar, are responsible for giving permission to cross at multiple high usage telephone crossings. It should reassess the risks associated with the work demand on the signallers at each such location, using all the relevant assessment tools that it has available, to understand whether the signaller's workload is being managed effectively. Where this is not the case, it should develop prioritised, time-bound plans for implementing any necessary improvements

ORR decision

9. Network Rail has not provided a formal response to this recommendation.

10. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- has not provided a response setting out how the recommendation will be delivered.

Status: *Insufficient response.* ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

11. No formal response to the recommendations has been provided.

Recommendation 4

The intent of this recommendation is to ensure that signallers' workload is maintained at acceptable levels.

Network Rail should define criteria for when it is appropriate to either assess or re-assess the workload demands on signallers, and implement processes to ensure that the criteria are adhered to. Criteria for consideration could include, but not be restricted to:

- upgrades at the signal box;
- changes to the equipment controlled from the signal box;
- changes to usage;
- changes to the rates of incidents recorded;
- concerns identified during level crossing assessment;
- routine periodic assessment

ORR decision

12. Network Rail has not provided a formal response to this recommendation.

13. ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- has not provided a response setting out how the recommendation will be delivered.

Status: *Insufficient response.* ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address this recommendation.

Information in support of ORR decision

14. No formal response to the recommendations has been provided.

15.