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Mr Andrew Hall
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Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Uncontrolled evacuation of a London Underground train at Holland Park station

I write to report¹ on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the 6 recommendations addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 28 July 2014.

Annex A to this letter provides details of the consideration given/action taken in respect of these recommendations. The status of all recommendations is 'In Progress' and ORR will provide RAIB with a further update by 31 October 2015.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 31 July 2015.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Eyles

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Initial consideration by ORR

1. All 6 recommendations were addressed to ORR when the report was published on 28 July 2014
2. After considering the recommendations ORR passed all 6 recommendations to London Underground Ltd (LU) asking it to consider and where appropriate act upon them and advise ORR of its conclusions.
3. On 11 September 2014 LU provided an initial action delivery plan for each recommendation. Following consideration of this plan ORR notified LU on 3 November 2014 of its opinion that it did not adequately address the majority of recommendations and requested that LU provide more information on how they would be implemented.
4. In response to this LU provided a revised action delivery plan on 11 December 2014 (attached at Annex B).
5. A meeting was due to be held on 15 April 2015 to consider LUs response to their plan. However this meeting was cancelled by LU due to poor progress with implementing the delivery plan. A report was submitted to ORR following a meeting on the 8th May 2015 which demonstrated that progress was being made with the recommendations. ORR considered that further work was needed to ensure the evidence provided was sufficiently robust to provide a comprehensive response to the recommendations. A revised report was received by ORR on the 2 July 2015 setting out in greater detail the action LU was taking to deliver the requirements of each recommendation. This report was subsequently discussed at a meeting between LU and ORR on the 6th July 2015

ORR decision

6. Having reviewed the latest report and discussed it with LU ORR considers that LU has demonstrated that further progress has been made but has not provided a sufficient response to the RAIB recommendations. LU subsequently produced an updated document on Friday 17 July 2015 which ORR is reviewing.
7. ORR will provide an update to RAIB by 31 October 2015.

Status of all 6 recommendations: In progress

London Underground response to the RAIB Investigation Report into the Uncontrolled Evacuation of a London Underground Train at Holland Park Station on 25 August 2013

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><u><i>Recommendation 1</i></u></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to promote a design review of the passenger emergency alarm system on 1992 tube stock and the adoption of ergonomics best practice in an improved design.</i></p> <p><i>London Underground Limited should carry out an ergonomics assessment of the driver interface with the passenger emergency alarm system on 1992 tube stock. This assessment should include the functioning of the talkback system and the compatibility between the controls and the display. Taking account of guidelines on alarm handling and prioritisation (such as the, 'Good Practice Guide for the design of alarms and alerts' (T326), RSSB, 2008), London Underground Limited should then take appropriate action to present critical information to the train operator in a way that supports decisions and actions so that they can deal appropriately with the emergency situation (paragraph 129).</i></p> <p><i>Relevant outcomes of this ergonomic assessment should also be applied to other stock as appropriate.</i></p> <p>See report paragraph: 129: Train operators are not equipped to deal with multiple passenger emergency alarm activations.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will carry out an ergonomics assessment of the driver interface with the passenger emergency alarm system on 1992 tube stock.</p> <p>This assessment will:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Include the functioning of the talkback system • Include the compatibility between the controls and the display. • Take account of guidelines on alarm handling and prioritisation (such as the, 'Good Practice Guide for the design of alarms and alerts' (T326), RSSB, 2008) <p>London Underground Limited will then take appropriate action to present critical information to the Train Operator in a way that supports decisions and actions so that they can deal appropriately with the emergency situation.</p> <p>Relevant outcomes of this ergonomic assessment will also be applied to other stock as appropriate.</p>	28/02/2015	Martin Brown

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><u><i>Recommendation 2</i></u></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to improve the ability of train operators to handle multiple passenger emergency alarms and other 'out of course' events on 1992 tube stock.</i></p> <p>London Underground Limited should review the rules, procedures and training applying to the handling of emergency situations on 1992 tube stock where multiple passenger emergency alarms have been activated and/or where only part of the train is stopped in a station. This review should include an assessment of the ways in which train operators can best manage a situation and adequacy of existing training arrangements. Particular attention should be paid to helping operators make appropriate and timely announcements and the safe management of doors in such circumstances. Any necessary changes to existing arrangements should then be implemented and staff briefed and trained as appropriate (paragraph 126b).</p> <p>Relevant outcomes of this review should also be applied to other stock as appropriate.</p> <p>See report paragraph:</p> <p>126b: passengers became increasingly alarmed when there was little or no perceived response from the train operator to the activation of passenger emergency alarms and no passenger information announcements were made.</p> <p>Relevant outcomes of this review will also be applied to other stock as appropriate.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will review the rules, procedures and training applying to the handling of emergency situations on 1992 tube stock where multiple passenger emergency alarms have been activated and/or where only part of the train is stopped in a station.</p> <p>This review will include an assessment of:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The ways in which train operators can best manage a situation • The adequacy of existing training arrangements. <p>Particular attention will be paid to:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Helping Train Operators make appropriate and timely announcements • The safe management of doors in such circumstances. <p>Any necessary changes to existing arrangements will then be implemented and staff briefed and trained as appropriate.</p> <p>Relevant outcomes of this review will also be applied to other stock as appropriate.</p>	<p>30/04/15</p>	<p>Eileen O'Neill</p>

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><u>Recommendation 3</u></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that train operators remain in communication with line controllers when they are required to leave the cab to go back into the train.</i></p> <p>London Underground Limited should put procedures in place to require train operators to carry their hand-held radio when going back into the train, for example, to investigate the activation of a passenger emergency alarm, so that they can communicate with the line controller in a timely manner (paragraph 126c).</p> <p>See report paragraph: 126c: the doors to the platform did not open and passengers, both on the train and on the platform, were unable to open them.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will put procedures in place to require Train Operators to carry their hand-held radio when going back into the train, for example, to investigate the activation of a passenger emergency alarm, so that they can communicate with the Line Controller in a timely manner.</p>	<p>31/12/2014</p>	<p>Ian Gaskin (Procedures)</p> <p>Eileen O'Neill (Training)</p>

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><u>Recommendation 4</u></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to make sure that line controllers are enabled to take appropriate and timely action when dealing with potential safety critical faults and conditions on trains.</i></p> <p>London Underground Limited should:</p> <p>a. review the procedure applying to line controllers for dealing with reports of faults on trains, particularly reports relating to smoke or burning, and improve as necessary, in order that line controllers are provided with a clear process to assist timely decision-making and response; and</p> <p>b. establish a protocol to manage the shift changeover between controllers, so that there is no loss of time or continuity in dealing with an incident (paragraph 128).</p> <p>See report paragraph: 128: The train was not held in the platform at Holland Park station to allow the requested investigation of the burning smell to be carried out.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will:</p> <p>a. review the procedure applying to Line Controllers for dealing with reports of faults on trains, particularly reports relating to smoke or burning, and improve as necessary, in order that Line Controllers are provided with a clear process to assist timely decision- making and response; and</p> <p>b. establish a protocol to manage the shift changeover between Line Controllers, so that there is no loss of time or continuity in dealing with an incident.</p>	<p>31/03/2015</p>	<p>Eileen O’Neill</p>

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><u><i>Recommendation 5</i></u></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that London Underground Limited's staff are able to respond appropriately to incidents on trains in platforms.</i></p> <p>London Underground Limited should review the required competencies and training for dealing with out-of-course events on trains in platforms. This should include consideration of how best to prepare station staff, train operators and line controllers to respond to such events in a rapid, coordinated and coherent manner, to protect the safety of passengers and station users (paragraphs 126b, 126c, 126d and 128).</p> <p>See report paragraphs:</p> <p>126b: passengers became increasingly alarmed when there was little or no perceived response from the train operator to the activation of passenger emergency alarms and no passenger information announcements were made.</p> <p>126c: the doors to the platform did not open and passengers, both on the train and on the platform, were unable to open them.</p> <p>126d: passengers could not see any staff on the platform responding to the situation.</p> <p>128: The train was not held in the platform at Holland Park station to allow the requested investigation of the burning smell to be carried out.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will review the required competencies and training for dealing with out-of-course events on trains in platforms.</p> <p>The review will include consideration of how best to prepare station staff, Train Operators and Line Controllers to respond to such events in a rapid, coordinated and coherent manner, to protect the safety of passengers and station users.</p>	31/03/2015	Eileen O'Neill

RAIB Recommendation	London Underground Action	Due Date	Action Holder
<p><i>Recommendation 6</i></p> <p><i>The purpose of this recommendation is to draw attention to the need for the prompt and accurate reporting of incidents.</i></p> <p>London Underground Limited should devise a time bound programme to reinforce, by briefing and further training if necessary, its procedures on the reporting and investigation of incidents in which there are no reported injuries but which could have led to more serious consequences. This should include the need for the early debriefing of staff involved and, where appropriate, the withdrawal of any trains from service for inspection and testing, to permit such incidents to be properly investigated (paragraph 130).</p> <p>See report paragraph:</p> <p>130: Although not part of the cause of the incident the RAIB observes that the seriousness of the incident was not immediately appreciated by some senior staff involved which resulted in a loss of some evidence and a delay in initiating an internal formal investigation.</p>	<p>London Underground Limited will devise a time bound programme to reinforce, by briefing and further training if necessary, our procedures on the reporting and investigation of incidents in which there are no reported injuries but which could have led to more serious consequences.</p> <p>This programme will include the need for the early debriefing of staff involved and, where appropriate, the withdrawal of any trains from service for inspection and testing, to permit such incidents to be properly investigated.</p>	<p>31/03/2015</p>	<p>Eileen O'Neill</p>