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Mr Andrew Hall
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

RAIB Report: Person trapped in a train door and dragged at Jarrow station, Tyne and Wear Metro

I write to provide an update¹ on the action taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 3 December 2012.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken. The status of this recommendation is now '**Implemented**'. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of this recommendation unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 18 December 2015.

Yours sincerely,

Andrew Eyles

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The purpose of this recommendation is to reduce the number of deliberate door obstructions on the Tyne and Wear Metro network, by raising passenger awareness, thereby reducing the risk from future trap and drag incidents.

DB Regio Tyne and Wear should:

- a. develop its current actions, reported at paragraph 77 (included at Annex B), to reduce the frequency of door obstruction by passengers into an on-going long term strategy and implement this; and
- b. introduce a system of monitoring the frequency of door obstructions on its network, in order to check the efficacy of the measures implemented in (a) and to optimise the strategy where appropriate.

ORR decision

1. ORR is content that the Joint PTI action plan and strategy developed by Nexus and DB Regio Tyne and Wear (DBTW) has been delivered and work to mitigate the risk addressed by this recommendation is continuing through DBTW's routine operations. DBTW has also introduced an appropriate system to monitor and review instances of door obstruction.
2. ORR concludes that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, DBTW has:
 - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
 - has taken action to implement it.

Status: Implemented.

Previously reported to RAIB

2. On 3 December 2013 ORR reported to RAIB that DBTW had developed a long term strategy to develop the actions that it had reported it was undertaking at the time of publication of the RAIB report. The strategy also confirmed that monitoring was taking place to measure the efficacy of the actions being undertaken.

Update

3. On 12 November 2015 DBTW provided the following update:

In respect of part a of the recommendation, this action has been completed – and largely overtaken by more recent events. In August 2014, all extant Platform Train Interface (PTI) work-streams were coordinated into a Joint (Nexus and DBTW) PTI Strategy and Action Plan, which was formally endorsed by the ORR. The actions contained within this plan were successfully executed

and, in agreement with ORR, the Action Plan was formally closed at the DBTW End-of-Year Review on 18th May 2015. Any outstanding work from this Action Plan was taken into 'Business-as-Usual' work-streams.

In respect of part b of the recommendation, this action has been completed. When identified and reported, instances of Door Obstructions are logged within the DBTW Compass reporting system. The data is then trended as part of the DBTW Safety Period Report that is compiled, ratified, and formally agreed with Nexus on a monthly basis. A joint decision between Nexus and DBTW can then be taken as to what additional action (above and beyond the plethora of extant PTI work-streams) may need to be taken. Additionally, DBTW hold a monthly PTI CCTV review whereby any reported PTI incidents can be reviewed by Senior Leadership (Head of Operations, Current Operations Manager, Train-crew Manager, Head of Safety & Compliance, Safety & Business Risk Manager, and Operations Standards Manager) in order to ensure that the action of DBTW staff, and the performance of equipment, was appropriate and in accordance with extant Safe Systems of Work. The PTI CCTV monthly review also takes a random selection of station CCTV footage from across the network to ensure that a proactive measure is taken to the assessment of train dispatch (as opposed to only reviewing footage following a reported incident).