Oliver Stewart Senior Executive, RAIB Relationship and Recommendation Handling Telephone 020 7282 3864 E-mail oliver.stewart@orr.gsi.gov.uk



3 August 2017

Mr Andrew Hall Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents Cullen House Berkshire Copse Rd Aldershot Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

### **RAIB Report: Derailment at Knaresborough, 7 November 2015**

I write to report<sup>1</sup> on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the recommendation addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 4 August 2016.

The annex to this letter provides details in respect of the recommendation, the status of which is **'implementation on-going'**.

ORR will advise RAIB when further information is available regarding actions being taken to address these recommendations.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 3 August 2017.

Yours sincerely,

**Oliver Stewart** 

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

## Initial consideration by ORR

1. The recommendation was addressed to ORR when the report was published on 4 August 2016.

2. After considering the recommendation, ORR passed it to Network Rail asking them to consider and where appropriate act upon it and advise ORR of its conclusions. That consideration of the recommendation is included below.

#### **Recommendation 1**

The intent of this recommendation is that signal boxes should always be operated by members of staff who have the necessary knowledge and familiarity with the signal box and its operation.

This recommendation relates to the signaller competence action plan which was initiated by Network Rail in April 2016.

When carrying out its review of the effectiveness of the recently revised procedure 4-20 of the Operations Manual NR/L3/OPS/041, Network Rail should review whether the changes to the requirements on non- signallers have resulted in them maintaining the required level of knowledge and experience needed to operate the signalling locations for which they are authorised, including where it has not been practicable for them to operate those locations, and implement any further necessary changes.

#### **ORR** decision

3. Network Rail has carried out a review of the relevant procedure in the operations manual and has a time-bound plan in place to make the changes identified.

4. After reviewing the information provided ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- is taking action to implement it by 30 September 2017.

# *Status: Implementation ongoing.* ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.

#### Information in support of ORR decision

5. On 27 January 2017 Network Rail provided the following initial response:

Procedure 4-20 of the Operations Manual NR/L3/OPS/041 already contains the arrangements for the competence of non-signallers and how this shall be maintained.

An annual review of the 4-20 signaller competence procedure is covered within the signaller competence action plan and will take place during Spring 2017. The review will include feedback from the Operations Managers on how the process has managed the risk of non-signaller competence.

A two day review session will be held providing detail about how the relevant section is managing the risk. Following the review, the success measure for closure of the recommendation will be the output from the session and any actions resulting from the review will be addressed.

An update following the review will be provided.

6. On 1 February 2017 Network Rail issued a timescale extension for work associated with the recommendation from 31 May to 30 September 2017 for the following reason:

The two-day session has been held and the competence reviewed. Several changes to the standard have been identified and will be formally published in June 2017.

Timescale extension to 30 September 2017 to allow for any issues in publication and to allow for the closure state to align with the standards framework.