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9 May 2016



Mr Andrew Hall  
Deputy Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents  
Cullen House  
Berkshire Copse Rd  
Aldershot  
Hampshire  
GU11 2HP

Dear Andrew,

**RAIB Report: Collision on the approach to Loughborough Central station, Great Central Railway**

I write to report<sup>1</sup> on the consideration given and action taken in respect of the recommendations addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 21 May 2015.

The annex to this letter provides details of the consideration given/action taken in respect of these recommendations. The status of all four is '**Implemented**'. We do not propose to take any further action in respect of these recommendations unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 12 May 2016.

Yours sincerely,

**Andrew Eyles**

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<sup>1</sup> In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

### Initial consideration by ORR

1. All 4 recommendations were addressed to ORR when the report was published on 21 May 2015.
2. After considering the recommendations ORR passed them to Great Central Railway (GCR) asking it to consider and where appropriate act upon them and advise ORR of its conclusions. The consideration given to each recommendation is included below.

#### Recommendation 1

*The intent of this recommendation is for the Great Central Railway to ensure that activities which result in trains or vehicles being left unattended are subject to consistent and effective risk controls.*

The Great Central Railway should review those parts of the Great Central Railway Rule Book, General Appendix and any other instructions which relate to leaving trains or vehicles unattended.

This review should consider whether the rules and instructions contained within these documents are clear and consistent and if they adequately address all of the risks involved in trains and vehicles being left unattended. The review should specifically examine the use of handbrakes and wheel scotches and the stabling of vehicles within locations which offer runaway protection.

The Great Central Railway should implement any changes identified as being necessary as a result of this review. The Great Central Railway should ensure that suitable briefing and training accompanies any changes which are implemented.

#### ORR decision

3. ORR has reviewed the information provided by Great Central Railway (GCR) and discussed the proposed approach with the duty holder and is satisfied that it has conducted an appropriate review of its rule book and implemented changes to its operations that will meet the intent of the recommendation.
4. ORR, having reviewed the responses from GCR, has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, it has:
  - taken the recommendation into consideration; and
  - has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

## Information in support of ORR decision

5. On 29 March 2016 GCR wrote to ORR providing the following information:

*GCR has reviewed its Rule Book, General Appendix and other instructions applicable to leaving trains or vehicles unattended. The review considered whether the rules and instructions contained within the documents are clear and consistent and if they adequately address all of the risks involved in trains and vehicles being left unattended, as well as, the use of handbrakes and wheel scotches and the stabling of vehicles within locations which offer runaway protection. The following is a summary of actions carried out in response to the review:*

- *Immediate instruction to staff who carry out Fitness To Run (FTR) examinations for inclusion of handbrake check within FTR for diesel locomotives together with detailed maintenance instructions (see Appendices 1 and 1a);*
- *Immediate instruction to staff engaged in traction duties for no trains or vehicles to be left unattended on running lines unless it is an emergency situation. Further instructions given concerning the brakes and use of secure chocks (see Appendix 2);*
- *Further instructions followed concerning the need for all train movements to be with the authority of the Duty Traffic Manager. Suitable control forms have been introduced (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5);*
- *Clarification has been issued via the PON system concerning the conditions necessary before stabling on a running lane is allowed (see Appendix 6);*
- *Additional clauses to the General Appendix have been issued via the PON system concerning locomotives being left unattended (see Appendix 7);*
- *A reminder has been issued via the PON system to make everybody aware that the Rule Book takes precedence over any supportive documentation and that instructions in the General Appendix are additional to those in the Rule Book (see Appendix 8); and*
- *A reminder was issued to staff of the content of clause 3.22 in the Rule Book concerning the leaving of locomotives unattended (see Appendix 9).*

*GCR has briefed all relevant staff of the changes implemented as well as providing additional training where required.*

## Recommendation 2

*The intent of this recommendation is for the Great Central Railway to ensure that the requirement within its safety management system for regular checks to be undertaken on the correct operation of internal processes is implemented so that non-compliances to rules and instructions are detected in the future.*

The Great Central Railway should review the arrangements currently in place which are intended to ensure that the safety management system, rules and procedures are functioning as intended.

This review should ensure that these arrangements are suitable and able to identify any future non-compliances to policy, rules and instructions similar to those identified by this investigation. The review should specifically ensure that arrangements remain effective during periods when train services are not being run for the public and that the results of all inspections and audits are recorded.

The Great Central Railway should implement any changes identified as being necessary as a result of this review.

### **ORR decision**

6. ORR, having reviewed the information provided by GCR in conjunction with inspecting the operator's revised safety management system and associated policy documentation, and following further discussions with GCR, is satisfied that sufficient action has been taken, and adequate procedures are in place, to address this recommendation. ORR will also be carrying out separate assurance activity this year to satisfy itself that the GCR systems are still working as described.

7. ORR, having reviewed the responses from GCR, has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, it has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

### **Information in support of ORR decision**

8. On 29 March 2016 GCR wrote to ORR providing the following information:

*GCR has reviewed the requirements of the Safety Management System to ensure that rules and procedures are being adhered to. The results of this review has identified one aspect that had already been recognised as being deficient concerning the control of unauthorised traffic movement (see Appendices 3, 4 and 5). The situation which had given rise to the runaway incident has therefore now been removed. This change of procedure is particularly associated with periods when train services are not being run for the public and other stock shunting or maintenance movements are necessary. The reference to the inspections of procedure and audits within the Recommendation is therefore covered by control forms requiring signature of the Duty Traffic Manager.*

*The presence of functional committees ensures that the operation of the Railway is continually monitored by relevant departmental management who are responsible for the adherence of their staff to procedure. The Operations Advisory Group (OAG) meets regularly and brings together representation from all operational areas of safety criticality. Whilst all clandestine deviations from procedure are reported and changes introduced retrospectively to prevent reoccurrence, the committee does act as a controller of the content of relevant Policy Documents which back up the Rule Book. Thus, the OAG is the recorder of all incidents with actions taken but also acts pre-emptively through its committee members bringing items forward for consideration. The committee*

*also responds to the contents of relevant RAIB reports which are in the public domain to ensure recommendations which are applicable are discussed and appropriate action taken if necessary.*

*The Safety Management Group (SMG) also meets regularly and is the successor to the Safety Committee of the H&S at Work Act 1974. This committee is responsible for managing the general safety of the Railway other than that covered by the OAG. It also acts to minimise the risks associated with the operation but is particularly responsible for the investigation of accidents, their causes and their minimisation. Again, it does act retrospectively but also committee members are encouraged to bring issues to the table to pre-empt situations.*

*It is submitted that the two functional committees provide the means by which non-compliance to policy, rules and instructions is monitored and necessary changes made.*

9. On 11 April 2016 ORR sought further clarification from GCR about how it is managing ongoing active monitoring and inspection to assure itself that these new processes are working, and how it is ensuring that all deviations from procedure are reported and addressed retrospectively. On 23 April 2016 GCR provided the following update:

*The Chairs for the functional committees are held by the Director of Health and Safety Management (DHSM) who has an ongoing remit to check and audit continually the operational processes are being adhered to. The DHSM is in regular contact with the operational functions to ensure that the formal procedure for the control of unauthorised traffic movement is being followed. The system is self-controlling via the pro-forma system which requires the Duty Traffic Manager (DTM) to know before signature the requisite checks have been applied so that he can give approval for the movement to take place. This information will include for:*

*Certification of Permanent Way*

*Certification of FTR for vehicles*

*Signal and Telegraph clearance*

*Signalling system in readiness*

*The DHSM as part of his responsibility ensures the system is working according to plan and is in regular contact with the key members of staff who operate it. Deviations to procedure are immediately brought to the notice of the DTM through a number of channels. Signalling errors can be passed to the DTM by footplate crew or station staff using the Lineside Telephone (LST) system or station telephone whereas vice versa, footplate errors can be spotted by Signaller, station staff or Guard and immediately passed to DTM who will decide on the action to be taken, for instance, suspension and relief of duty. All deviations are recorded in reports and dependant on the severity of the incident, technical investigations will be organised. These are usually chaired by the next most senior manager. Disciplinary measures may be referred up to the*

*General Manager. Once again, the DHSM is continually watching to ensure conformity and very often takes an advisory part in disciplinary processes. Thus, whilst individual departments follow procedures to ensure deviations are acted upon and steps taken locally to correct malpractice, where it is a multi-discipline fault or interdepartmental confusion, the issue will be brought to the functional committee and collective correction introduced by new procedure or even policy document. If necessary, an addendum to the Rule Book will be issued. This may be retrospective but in a way, these deliberations help to prepare for proactive changes as well.*

*Presently, auditing of individual departments is carried out by the DHSM who acts independently of line management. By this means departments are checked for their controls to ensure competence certification and training. This procedure is discussed in the functional committee.*

*A copy of the Terms of Reference for the OAG (previously OMG), is attached for information. The change of title of this committee reflects a change in emphasis and ensures the committee acts independently of the direct management structure with the chair (DHSM) responsible solely to the Board of the Company.*



GCR New Terms of  
Reference for OMG..doc

*The function of the SMG is slightly different and concentrates on the control and minimisation of general safety management risks other than operational (which is covered by the OAG). As such, it is still regarded as having a management function under the auspices of the H & S at Work Act 1974 and thereby is a development of the old style Safety Committee referred to in that statutory document.*

10. ORR carried out an inspection of GCR's safety arrangements in response to the RAIB recommendations on 25<sup>th</sup> February 2016. In relation to recommendation 2 i.e. active monitoring/inspection, GCR's Head of Safety satisfactorily demonstrated how it actively monitors its arrangements during a site inspection, which included, a demonstration of how it manages procedures, starting from an issue being reported by a member of staff through to completion and feedback. ORR also discussed GCR's safety management system arrangements, documentation and recording of information.

### **Recommendation 3**

*The intent of this recommendation is for the Great Central Railway to ensure that the requirements within its safety management system and policy documents which relate to the training and assessment of staff are effectively implemented.*

The Great Central Railway should review the arrangements currently in place which relate to the training and assessment of staff in order to ensure that they are effective at ensuring employees (including volunteers) are fully competent to

undertake their duties. This should specifically include roles relating to the shunting of trains and the management of possessions.

The Great Central Railway should implement any changes identified as being necessary as a result of this review.

### **ORR decision**

11. ORR has reviewed the information provided by GCR and discussed the proposed approach with the duty holder and is satisfied that an appropriate review has been undertaken and actions implemented to ensure that areas of weakness have been addressed.

12. ORR, having reviewed the responses from GCR, has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, it has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

### **Information in support of ORR decision**

13. On 29 March 2016 GCR wrote to ORR providing the following information:

*GCR has reviewed the content of the Safety Management System in relation to the training and assessment of staff and has introduced a number of improvements. The Recommendation calls for the review to relate specifically to the shunting of trains and the management of possessions. Not all of the changes made are associated with the incident in question but are covered here for completeness:*

- *GCR has recognised there were some deficiencies in the way new volunteers were received and introduced to the operation. A team of trainers has been set up who are able to take new volunteers through the initial parts of the Rule Book concerning conduct, attitude, signing on and all the aspects expected of an employee. This is referred to as the Extracts of the Rule Book. They are also taken through the requirements of Personal Track Safety (PTS) which prepares them for any work they may be required to do trackside and gives them a good grounding into the operation of a railway. This process is also being applied retrospectively to existing staff who have never been introduced to this training;*
- *GCR has recognised that whilst the management of possessions has been taken away from the Permanent Way team, there is still a need for some of these people to be confirmed in positions associated with this kind of work. The requisite authorisation for these positions is being covered;*
- *GCR has recognised the importance of the position of Shunter and has introduced a system of training for all new people wishing to aspire eventually to driving locomotives or to becoming Guards. Anybody being*

*authorised as a Shunter will be classed as Safety Critical with its attendant physical checks and this qualification is now a prerequisite to commencement of training for the positions of Guard or Footplate/Cab Crew. The Shunter training now takes place after such people have been given a grounding as Cleaner (see Appendix 10) which summarises the syllabus associated with the Shunter training); and*

- *GCR has recognised the need for certain people to be trained as Slingers/Banksmen and a suitable course has been organised for a few staff in the maintenance sheds to be trained accordingly.*

#### **Recommendation 4**

*The intent of this recommendation is for the Great Central Railway to ensure that it has effective control and oversight of the maintenance undertaken on diesel locomotives operating on its infrastructure.*

The Great Central Railway should review the arrangements currently in place by which it ensures that diesel locomotives operating on its infrastructure are being maintained in a way which adequately addresses the risks posed by the potential failure or reduced reliability of components and systems. This review should specifically consider the maintenance of braking systems.

The Great Central Railway should implement any changes identified as being necessary as a result of this review.

#### **ORR decision**

14. ORR has reviewed the information provided by GCR and discussed the proposed approach with the duty holder and is satisfied that an appropriate review has been undertaken and actions implemented to ensure that areas of weakness have been addressed.

15. ORR, having reviewed the responses from GCR, has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, it has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration; and
- has taken action to implement it.

**Status: Implemented.**

#### **Information in support of ORR decision**

16. On 29 March 2016 Great Central Railway (GCR) wrote to ORR providing the following information:

*GCR has reviewed the way it managed the maintenance of diesel locomotives and has identified a number of deficiencies:*

- *Please see earlier references to the maintenance and FTR checks of handbrakes;*

- *A Diesel Maintenance Co-ordinator has been appointed to supervise the maintenance function of the diverse groups of diesel locomotives and classes;*
- *All diesel groups have appointed a single point of contact responsible for providing the Diesel Maintenance Co-ordinator with maintenance records as they are completed; and*
- *Policy Document 204 has been completed and lodged to describe the maintenance regime.*

*Each locomotive has a maintenance record which can be accessed in the office of the Chief Engineer.*





**DIESEL LOCOMOTIVE INITIAL HANDBRAKE EXAMINATION**

Issue 003 05/14

<b>Locomotive number</b>		<b>Date</b>	
<b>Examiner</b>			
	<b>Item</b>	<b>Tick</b>	
<b>No 1 end</b>			
	Handbrake linkages check for play in pins and bushes		
	Oil or grease hand brake linkages		
	Number of turns on handbrake when fully applied		
	Check brake blocks are touching the wheels		
<b>No 2 end</b>			
	Handbrake linkages check for play in pins and bushes		
	Oil or grease handbrake linkages		
	Number of turns on hand brake when fully applied		
	Check brake blocks are touching the wheels		
When both handbrakes are applied, and with engine running take power in notch 1 and record if locomotive moves. If no driver available use class 08/10 shunter			
<b>Handbrake</b>	<b>Pass/Fail</b>	<b>Signature</b>	

Appendix 2

**Great Central Railway**

**Vehicles left on Running Lines**

All crews are reminded that trains must not be left unattended on running lines unless absolutely necessary.  
*In other words when there is no alternative e.g. an emergency situation.*

If it is necessary for a train or vehicles to be left unattended on a running line, ALL handbrakes must be fully applied AND the wheels securely chocked in both directions to prevent movement.

Where available, chocks which require the wheel to be positioned on to the toe of the chock must be used to protect the vehicle from movement in the downhill direction. If there are additional stabling requirements for particular types of locomotives, these must also be carried out in addition to the above.


The permission of the DTM must be obtained before any locomotive, vehicle or train may be left in these circumstances.

Rulebook Clauses H3.22 and J 3.21 refer


John Pepper  
Senior Locomotive Inspector (Diesel)



Dr. Eric Smith  
Operations Advisory Group (Chairman)



Steven Chapple  
Operations Manager



17<sup>th</sup> May 2014

10/20/2015

Gmail - Additional Traffic and Possession Request forms



Eric Smith &lt;drehsmith101@gmail.com&gt;

## Additional Traffic and Possession Request forms

1 message

**Steven Chapple - Operations Manager** <steven.chapple@gcrailway.co.uk> Tue, Jul 8, 2014 at 8:24 AM  
 To: Steve Saunders <steve.saunders@gcrailway.co.uk>, "alan.pakes@royalmail.com" <alan.pakes@royalmail.com>, Craig Stinchcombe <craig.stinchcombe@gcrailway.co.uk>, Tom Tighe <tom.tighe@gcrailway.co.uk>, Chris Lang <chris.lang@gcrailway.co.uk>, Steve Cramp <smcavalon@yahoo.co.uk>, Graham Bannister <graham.bannister@gcrailway.co.uk>, Alan Brassey <alan.brassey@gcrailway.co.uk>, Bill Devitt <bill.devitt@gcrailway.co.uk>, Kate Tilley <kate.tilley@gcrailway.co.uk>, Michael Stokes <michael.stokes@gcrailway.co.uk>, Edwina Bannister <edwina@bannister1959.freeserve.co.uk>, "wrighteous4@hotmail.com" <wrighteous4@hotmail.com>  
 Cc: Richard Patching <richard.patching@gcrailway.co.uk>, "Eric Smith (drehsmith101@gmail.com)" <drehsmith101@gmail.com>, Andrew Morley <andrew.morley@gcrailway.co.uk>

Dear all,

The GCR is becoming forever busier but that means we all need to understand the various traffic requirements on any particular day – otherwise conflicts and double bookings can (and do) arise.

While charter trains are a specific area (which we'll liaise with Debbie separately) there are many other "extras" which all require planning: notably, Datex, P Way and infrastructure works, C&W needs for vehicles to be tripped, vehicles arriving/ leaving at Quorn on low loaders, photo charters, special projects & testing, filming work, S&T, special events with special timetables. There are probably other examples.

In order to manage everyone's needs, we are introducing, a form setting out any requests you have – a copy is attached. Amongst other things, this will enable the various departments to ensure that appropriate staff (including volunteer guards, footplate crew and signalmen) can be made available in a timely manner and to try and do things cost effectively across the board.

The second stage of the plan, to follow shortly, is for the key information from a request sheet to be added onto a "GCR calendar" which is readily accessible to everyone at GCR – then it will be far easier for everyone to see at a quick glance when we are most likely to have an issue. Unlike the current 3-monthly notices, the calendar will be updated continuously. Andrew Morley hopes to have this calendar available shortly.

Please see attached GCATR1 – Additional Traffic Request form and GCPRF1 – Possession Request Form. When submitting either of these forms please save the file as the form reference and then date requested (e.g. GCATR1-070714) and then email to myself. If you have any questions please do not hesitate to ask.

Many thanks,

Steven Chapple

Operations Manager

<https://mail.google.com/mail/u/0/?ui=2&ik=392a46adb2&view=pt&q=stew%20chapple&qs=true&search=query&th=14714dbbc2acee12&siml=14714dbbc2a> 1/2



**GCATR1**

## Additional Traffic Request

For the request of additional traffic including:  
**Charters, loco and rolling stock movements, DATEX.**

Please complete the details below giving details of the vehicles, origin, destination, and desired date and timings.

Reference No:  
 For office use only:

The request should then be submitted to the Operations Manager not less than 72 hours before the desired date of additional traffic.

Requested by:

Date of request:

**Details of request:**

Charter:  Locomotive movement:  Rolling stock movement:  DATEX:  Other:

Vehicles:

<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>

Desired date:

Desired time:

Origin:

Destination:

Additional information:

**Conclusion:** For office use only:

**Approved / Declined**

by:

on:

Remarks:



**GCPRF1**

# Possession Request Form

Please complete the details below giving details of the request and justification for a possession being required.

The request should then be submitted to the Operations Manager, **not less than 72 hours** before the desired date of the possession.

Reference No:  
For office use only:

Requested by:

Date of request:

**Details of possession request:**

Name of PICOP:

Contact number:

Commencement date:

Commencement time:

Termination date:

Termination time:

Line:

From:

To:

Line:

From:

To:

Justification for possession:

**Conclusion:** For office use only:

Approved / Declined

by:

on:

Remarks:

GCR PD104

PON No 07\_15

SECTION D

GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND  
NOTICESSECTION D  
Cont'd**INSTRUCTIONS TO ALL STAFF****STABLING OF TRAINS ON RUNNING LINES**

With immediate effect, the following instruction will apply until further notice :-

Trains must NOT be stabled or left unattended on running lines at any time unless :-

- No alternative arrangements can be made **AND**
- The permission of the Duty Traffic Manager is obtained **AND**
- The vehicles concerned are secured by all available handbrakes and by scotches. Wherever possible, the metal "German" type of scotch must be used, and the vehicle at the downhill end of the train must be pulled onto the scotch.

"Running Lines" are defined as the main lines and loops south of the Up Starting/Down Inner Home signals at Loughborough Central.

This instruction is in addition to the provisions of the Rule Book Clauses H3.22 and J3.21.

Any traction or vehicle specific instructions must also be fully carried out.

**SWITHLAND SOUTH VIADUCT – BRIDGE 350/5**

With immediate effect, the following instruction will apply until further notice :-

Under normal circumstances, trains must NOT allowed to stand or come to a stand with any part of the train on Bridge 350 – Swithland South Viaduct.

GCR PD104

PON No 07\_15

SECTION D  
Cont'dGENERAL INSTRUCTIONS AND  
NOTICES

APPENDIX 8A

TOP AND T

To be read by

**GENERAL APPENDIX  
ADDITIONS and AMENDMENTS**

With immediate effect, the following additions will be made to the General Appendix and will apply until further notice :-

**Appendix 12. Page 43, last clause, first paragraph amended to read :-**

**“LOCOMOTIVES LEFT UNATTENDED**

In addition to the provisions of the Rule Book Section H Clause 3.22, Steam Locomotives must not be left without a competent member of staff in charge unless :-”

**Appendix 12. Page 44, last clause amended to read :-**

**LOCOMOTIVES LEFT UNATTENDED**

In addition to the provisions of the Rule Book Section H Clause 3.22, Diesel Locomotives must not be left without a competent member of staff in charge unless :-

- The automatic train brake is fully applied
- The master controller is in the "Off" position with the master key removed
- The locomotive is secured by the hand brake AND scotches

**Appendix 8. Page 27 is superseded by Appendix 8A which is published as page 9 to this document :-**

***Members of Staff are reminded that the instructions contained in the General Appendix are to be read in conjunction with the relevant clauses of the Rule Book and are ADDITIONAL instructions to those in the Rule Book.***

GCR PD104

PON No 07\_15

# GREAT CENTRAL RAILWAY

# PO N

## LOUGHBOROUGH

### **General Appendix**

**All Train Crew to note**

This PON contains amendments (additions) to Appendix 12 of this document. All members of staff issued with the General Appendix must note these additions and act upon them.

All Members of Staff are reminded that the instructions contained in the General Appendix are additional to those contained in the Rule Book. The provisions of the Rule Book must ALWAYS be carried out!

### **Speed of Trains**

**All Footplate Crew to note**

The maximum permitted Line Speed under normal circumstances is 25mph.

Remember that checks can be carried out at any time!

THIS IS A MANDATORY NOTICE AS DEFINED IN THE RULE BOOK SECTION 5 CLASS 2.

SCHEDULED TRAIN SERVICES

**Section H. Working of Trains****3.22 Locomotive not to be left**

When in charge of a locomotive, the Driver must not leave it without a competent member of staff being left in charge of it unless :-

- (a) otherwise directed by the Rules or
- (b) it is absolutely necessary to do so, or
- (c) the locomotive is in a siding and has been secured by means of the hand brake or scotches and has carried out the other instructions appropriate to the type of locomotive concerned.

**3.23 Examination of the Line**

When it becomes necessary to carry out an examination of the line in accordance with the Block Regulations, the Driver must be advised of the specific circumstances by the Signalman.

The Driver must then proceed at reduced speed, so as to be able to stop short of any obstruction.

Where practicable the train must be accompanied by a member of staff competent to assess the condition for which the examination is being performed. After sunset, during fog or falling snow, and when definite information has been received that a passenger has fallen from a train, the train must always be so accompanied.

When the train leaves the section concerned, the Driver must report the circumstances to the Signalman.

**4. Duties of Guards****4.1 General**

4.1.1 Guards must obey the instructions of the Duty Traffic Manager.

4.1.2 Except as provided in Section M or the Sectional Appendix, each train is under the control of the Guard, who must give the Driver any instructions that may be necessary as to the working of it.

4.1.3 Each Guard must attend for duty at the time and place laid down for their rostered turn, or as instructed, and before leaving duty ascertain the time at which they are again required for duty.

4.1.4 Each Guard must, when commencing duty, ascertain from the notices posted for their guidance anything requiring their attention.

**Section J. Shunting****3. Duties of Shunters and others engaged in shunting operations (cont'd)****3.18 Attaching and detaching vehicles**

Where an Absolute Block System of working is in force and it is necessary for a locomotive to proceed to the rear of a train for the purpose of attaching or detaching vehicles, or for removing from the line vehicles which have been detached from a train which has gone forward, the Shunter must first obtain the permission of the Signalman unless a fixed signal has been cleared for the movement. The Shunter must give the Driver clear verbal instructions as to what is required before giving a signal to commence the movement. If necessary, the Signalman must instruct the Driver to pass a signal at Danger for this purpose.

**3.19 Not Used****3.20 Shunters passing between vehicles or between vehicles and stop blocks**

Shunters must not go between the buffers of vehicles or between stop blocks and the nearest vehicles when they are less than 60 feet (18 metres) apart without first satisfying themselves that:-

- no vehicles are about to be moved and
- no shunting is taking place on the lines which they are about to cross.

**3.21 Vehicles left on running lines**

If vehicles have to be left on a running line, the Shunter must immediately advise the Signalman. The Shunter must ensure that the vehicles are properly secured in order to prevent any movement and at night or during fog or falling snow, must place a red light on the rear of the vehicles until they have been moved from the running line. If necessary a red light must also be placed on the front.

**3.22 Placing vehicles outside home signals**

3.22.1 A Shunter must not place any vehicle outside the outermost home signal until the permission of the Signalman has been obtained.

3.22.2 When the line is on a falling gradient to the signal box in rear, no train or vehicle must be placed outside the home signal except as authorised in the Sectional Appendices.

**3.23 Shunting into sidings on a rising gradient**

When shunting into sidings on a rising gradient, the Shunter must limit the number of vehicles to be moved at one shunt to such a number as will enable the locomotive to propel without having to travel at an excessive speed.

Shunter

ALL trainees – irrespective of their final aspirations must complete and pass the Shunter course before progressing further in their chosen field (Footplate Vs Guard)

## Revision of Induction training:

- Personal Safety Awareness

- Employment and Discipline

- Rules – Phonetic alphabet (Section B)

- Rules - Hand signals - Day / Night (Section D)

- Rules - Fixed Signals – including passing Signals at Danger (Section C)

- Rules – Shunting (Section J)

- Rules – Communication standards (Section B)

- Rules – Stop / Not to be moved boards (Section B & J)

- Rules – Caution "Shore Line" boards (Section B & J)

- Rules – Trains detained on Running Lines (Section K - part)

- Communication Standards – Use of Radios (Section B and GA)

- Operation of hand points

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Locomotives to stock

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Diesel Locomotive to Diesel locomotive

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Vacuum Braked vehicles

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Air braked vehicles

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Buckeyes

- Coupling / Uncoupling - 3 link / Instanter couplings

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Steam Heating

- Coupling / Uncoupling - Shore lines

- Handbrakes

- Use of Chocks & Scotches

- Release of brakes on Vacuum / Air braked vehicles

- Point levers & Ground Frames

- Practical Assessment

Secondman

Any Shunter wishing to further develop as a Guard or Fireman must complete and pass the Secondman's course before progressing to specific Guard / Fireman training. This is important because both Guards and Firemen can also be called to work as Secondmen.

Obviously any Shunter wanting to train specifically as a Second man must also undertake this training.

## Revision of the Shunter elements plus:

- Rules – Working of Trains (Fireman's duties)

- Rules - Emergency protection (M1)

- Rules - Fire on trains (M1)

- Rules - Assistance protection (M2)

- Rules – Detentions of Trains on Running Lines (K)

- Rules - Use of Detonators (F)

- Absolute Block Signalling

- Observance of running signals

- Signal nomenclature

- Train despatch – Starting of trains (H)