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13 October 2014

Ms Carolyn Griffiths
Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Carolyn,

RAIB Report Dangerous occurrence involving track workers, near Roydon station, Essex, 16 July 2012

I write to provide an update¹ on the action being taken in respect of recommendation 1 addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 27 June 2013.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action being taken:

- The status of recommendation 1 is 'Implementation on-going'. ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 31 October 2014.

Yours Sincerely,

Chris O'Doherty

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

Recommendation 1

The intent of this recommendation is to improve the means by which controllers of site safety assess both the required and available sighting distance at sites of work.

Network Rail should review, and then improve as appropriate, the methods by which controllers of site safety [COSS] assess both the required and the available sighting distance when at sites of work. The review should include:

- The accuracy, availability and presentation of information concerning the available sighting distances at sites of work (particularly in those areas where sighting is limited, or too short to permit a sufficient warning from one or more lookouts);
- Identification of recommended methods of assessing sighting distance when on site (including the use of special equipment); and
- The adequacy of existing training and assessments of competence related to the assessment of sighting.

Brief Summary on what was previously reported to RAIB on 31 October 2013

1. Network Rail stated that It had made progress on how work on track is planned, briefed and delivered through the Control of Work project and the strategic direction away from 'red zone' [trains running] working with unassisted lookouts.

- Points 1 and 3: These were being delivered through the extension of Network Rail's non-technical skills training to the Lookout role. COSS, development material has been developed for those with the lookout competence but had been delayed to allow for the validation of the approach.
- Point 2: The work had been completed with extra material delivered in the COSS technical training.

Network Rail expected to complete the review by June 2014.

Update

2. On 18 July 2014 Network Rail provided an update stating:

The actions already being undertaken to improve the adequacy of lookout warning include training the lookout to be able to calculate warning times in order to challenge the COSS. This will also include information on using assisted lookout protection (LOWs [Lookout Warning Systems]) to encourage its use.

The track training review group discussed the different options available to the COSS for assessing sighting distances. The conclusion of the exercise pointed to training and awareness on distance perception as most people exaggerate distances and cannot accurately guess a distance over about 100m.

Mile posts were perceived as being one of the most effective ways of being able to judge distances, with the added benefit that they would also aid other duties, such as strapping out and placing worksite protection. The Group also considered exploring if fixed points can be mapped out for fixed worksite positions in a similar way to the mapping for LOWs [Lookout Operated Warning system] is being done, although the time cost of this may be prohibitive.

Reason for timescale extension: *Most of the intent of this recommendation has been implemented through the Lookout e-learning which went live on 7 July [2013]. However, there are options for reinstating line side milepost markers. To some extents, the intent is covered by the improved SSOW [Safe System of Work] planning provided in the 'Proscient' software. However, there remains a step to test feasibility of infrastructure changes with the Routes. This will be done through the DRAM [Director Route Asset Manager] community.*

Revised completion date: 30 September 2014.

ORR Decision

3. After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail;

- has taken the recommendation into consideration and
- is taking action to implement it by *30 September 2014*

Status: Implementation on-going. *ORR will advise RAIB when actions to address this recommendation have been completed.*