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22 July 2014

Ms Carolyn Griffiths
Chief Inspector of Rail Accidents
Cullen House
Berkshire Copse Rd
Aldershot
Hampshire GU11 2HP

Dear Carolyn,

RAIB Report: Derailment of a freight train at Shrewsbury station, 7 July 2012

I write to report¹ on the action taken in respect of the recommendations addressed to ORR in the above report, published on 22 July 2013.

The annex to this letter provides details of the action taken in respect of each recommendation where recommendations 1 and 2 are being implemented, and recommendations 3 and 4 have been implemented.

We do not propose to take any further action in respect of these recommendations unless we become aware that any of the information provided becomes inaccurate, in which case I will write to you again².

We will publish this response on the ORR website on 8 August 2014.

Yours Sincerely,

Chris O'Doherty

¹ In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(b) of the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005

² In accordance with Regulation 12(2)(c)

Initial Consideration by ORR

1. All 4 recommendations contained in the report were addressed to ORR when RAIB published its report on 22 July 2013.
2. After considering the report / recommendations, on 13 August 2013, ORR passed: Recommendations 1, 2 and 3 to Network Rail and Recommendation 4 to Freightliner Ltd asking them to consider the recommendations and where appropriate act upon them.
3. Details of consideration given and any action taken, in respect of these recommendations are provided below.
4. ORR also brought this report to the attention of: London Underground Limited, Docklands Light Railway, the Heritage Rail Association and tramway infrastructure managers as it was concluded that there are equally important lessons for them. ORR did not ask these organisations to provide a reply.

Recommendation 1

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to ensure that the risk-based approach to inspection of points to reduce the risk of derailment, as intended by TRK/053 and as mandated by TRK/001, is correctly implemented by all of its maintenance delivery units.

Network Rail should identify the maintenance delivery units which have not correctly adopted the risk-based approach to inspection of points intended by TRK/053 and mandated by TRK/001 [Inspection and Maintenance of Permanent Way: Management of Rail Defects]. It should then re-brief these maintenance delivery units on the requirement in TRK/001 and undertake follow up compliance monitoring activities to confirm that each maintenance delivery unit has adopted an appropriate regime, that all points have been the subject of a risk assessment and that all high-risk points are the subject of regular periodic TRK/053 [Inspection and Repair Procedures to Reduce the Risk of Derailment at Switches] detailed inspections.

Details of steps taken or being taken to implement the recommendation

5. Network Rail in its initial response on 7 October 2013 advised that:

The Maintenance Compliance & Assurance Team will undertake a specific review at Delivery Unit (DU) level of both the understanding, and the application of the mandated requirement of TRK/001. The DUs will also be requested to provide positive confirmation that they have a register of “at risk” sites. This review will be completed by 31 October 2013.


Following the review the actions to address identified deficiencies will be put into a time bound plan for delivery. Such actions will include the re-brief of TME [Track Maintenance Engineer] where a lack of understanding of the standard is identified and the production of a plan to risk assess each point end as required by standard where this has not taken place. Periodic

monitoring of the completion of any necessary risk assessments will be undertaken.

The recommendation will be considered closed when each DU has a list of high-risk point ends, agreed with the Track RAM [Route Asset Manager].

Timescale: 1 March 2014

6. On 29 October 2013 ORR wrote to Network Rail requesting a brief summary of the review including conclusions and any further action it may be taking (including timescales). On 18 December 2013 Network Rail provided ORR with a copy of its National Review of Risk Based SO53 Inspections.



Network Rail concluded that:

- *Ellipse is the company register for assets, the review has identified that the Delivery Units do have a register of all sites and “At Risk” sites, albeit, some do maintain “other” registers over and above the requirements. No further actions required.*
- *The competence review identified a few issues with profiles not being managed or updated; Delivery Units are now undertaking a data cleansing exercise to address the issues raised.*

Timescale – 31 March 2014

7. On 15 January 2014 Network Rail provided ORR with an update position stating that:

The review had been initiated on the basis that the switch at Shrewsbury did not have an enhanced inspection regime in place, and relied solely on the supervisor’s visual inspection. This had not triggered a full detailed inspection. The review investigated the approach that is taken nationwide and revealed that there are differences.

The requirements are currently specified in ‘TRK/001’ and ‘TRK/053’. ‘TRK/053’ describes the derailment hazards in section 6, and specifies (in section 9) the responsibilities of the person undertaking the supervisor’s inspection to assess the condition of the switch and trigger a detailed inspection when required. TRK/001/mod05 reinforces these requirements and the overarching TRK/001 standard gives more details about the principles of a risk based approach.

The position paper states that ‘the fundamental technical requirements are sound. It is the interpretation and implementation of those requirements that has to be clarified.

The workshops Network Rail has held with the routes confirm that there is inconsistency in understanding and approach. This has made our job more difficult, being particularly careful not to arrive in the same position again.

In summary our plans to change the situation are:

- *Briefing to RAMS to inform them of the current situation and remind them of the requirements of the current standard (Completed)*
- *Letter of instruction (LOI) to identify high, medium and low risk switches*
- *LOI to mandate DU's maintain a register of high risk switches, and undertake a detailed inspection every 13 weeks*
- *DU's to add medium risk switches to the register as appropriate through risk assessment and maintenance history*

These steps will provide better clarification and will mandate an enhanced inspection for the high risk switches.

ORR Decision

8. ORR is content that this recommendation will be addressed by actions being taken to address RAIB's Princes Street Gardens recommendation 1 due for completion by December 2014.

9. After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration and
- is taking action to implement it.

Status: *Implementation on-going.* Due for completion by December 2014

Recommendation 2

The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that Network Rail's update of TRK/053 in response to Recommendation 2 of the RAIB report (18/2012) regarding the Princes Street Gardens' derailment also includes the findings of this investigation that have not already been addressed by other actions.

Network Rail should rewrite TRK/053, its supporting Track Engineering Form and associated training and competence assessment material to:

- remove inconsistency between them (e.g. TRK/053 and TEF[Track Engineering Form]/3029);
- align the competence requirements for supervisors in TRK/053 and TRK/001 and define how supervisors must gain and retain this competence in areas where all detailed inspections are undertaken by others;
- make clear that a routine measurement (currently using a TGP8 gauge) to identify wear is mandatory; and
- mandate that the routine measurement should be repeated for points in both normal and reverse positions.

Details of steps taken or being taken to implement the recommendation

10. Network Rail in its initial response on 7 October 2013 stated that:

The intent of this recommendation is addressed by our response to RAIB Princes Street Gardens Recommendation 2:

Network Rail will undertake a thorough technical review of the 053 standard. This will be a cross-discipline review with the intent of challenging all aspects of its content and current understanding of the technique. With input from systems engineering and modelling specialists the review will take account of the wider non-technical factors that affect both how 053 is implemented and the overall effectiveness of risk controls.

Degradation modelling will be undertaken with the intent of providing qualitative and quantifiable data to enable an improvement of the risk management controls currently employed.

A full suite of technical documentation will be produced including an implementation strategy for training and competence development and the delivery of such in the field.

The action plan for this recommendation is inherently linked to, and informs, the Network Rail response for Recommendation 3.

Timescale: 31 March 2014

Further consideration will be given to extend this response with regard to:

- *Inconsistencies between the standard and associated TEF forms*
- *Clarification over the competency of staff undertaking supervisors inspections*
- *Will review the need for a mandatory measurement of switch wear on all switches or whether high risk switches can be identified for a more comprehensive inspection*
- *Will review the need for routine measure with the switches in both the normal and reverse positions*

The review is expected to be complete and instructions and guidance issued by the 31st March 2014, but a full re-write of TRK/053 would take a further 6 months to complete and issue. The new standard may take the form of the Business Critical Rules Programme. Network Rail cannot agree to mandate inspections on all switches until the technical review of the 053 standard (Princes Street Gardens Recommendation 2) is complete [Expected December 2014]. The work to date highlights that the risks are associated with a much smaller subset of switches.

Timescale: December 2014

ORR Decision

11. Network Rail is taking acceptable action to address the recommendation. ORR believes that the priority is to deliver the intent by ensuring that those currently carrying out '053 inspections are doing so to the required quality.

12. Implementation will be subject to the standard being updated and an effective training / competence management regime being in place. This may be reinforced by the Business Critical Rules (BCR) process.

13. ORR is content that this recommendation will be addressed by actions being taken to address RAIB's Princes Street Gardens recommendation 2 due for completion by December 2014

14. After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration and
- is taking action to implement it.

Status: *Implementation on-going.*

Recommendation 3

The purpose of this recommendation is for Network Rail to consider whether it needs to mandate the removal and re-application of the grease during supervisor's visual inspections of points.

Network Rail should determine if it is possible for supervisors to properly and reliably identify wear and damage and to use the TGP8 gauge without removing the grease and accumulated residue. Network Rail should also consider the risks associated with removing and re-applying the grease against the risks associated with a lack of detection of wear or damage. Depending on the outcome of this study, Network Rail should incorporate the findings into a future rewrite of TRK/053.

Details of steps taken or being taken to implement the recommendation

15. Network Rail in its initial response on 7 October 2013 stated that:

The intent of this recommendation is addressed by our response to RAIB Princes Street Gardens Recommendation 2. Further consideration will be given to extend this response with regard to the effects of grease being present.

Consideration will also be given to this issue in Network Rail's response to Recommendation 4 of the Princes Street Gardens Derailment:

As part of the technical review being undertaken to inform the Network Rail response to [Princes Street Gardens] Recommendation 2 the effects of lubrication will be considered.

Informed by this research the options for mitigating derailment risk in the circumstances described will be determined and appropriate guidance given. This may require revision to NR/L3/TRK/3510/A01 or indeed alternative technical standards developed.

Network Rail will then take appropriate steps to implement any documented revisions, or introduce alternative technical standards.

Training and briefing of staff will be fully considered and implemented as necessary.

Timescale: 30 September 2013

Any changes to requirements resulting from this review will be communicated in a Letter of Instruction pending standard change.

Timescale: 31 March 2014

16. On 8 May 2014, Network Rail advised a timescale extension: 30 June 2014.

Reason for extension: It has been identified that changes to the previous '053 standard had not been implemented consistently. Further time has been spent investigating the root cause of these issues. The meant the re-brief of '053 was delayed. Time also needs to be allowed for the issue and onward briefing of LOI-248 [Letter of Instruction]. Additional time has been allowed for the issue of and acceptance by ORR of the closure statement.

17. On 23 May 2014, Network Rail provided ORR with a copy of its Recommendation Owners' Form. Part D' Closure Statement' stated that:

Balance of Risk

Experience at Shrewsbury has shown that grease on switch, whilst reducing the risk of a flange climb derailment, can mask damage on the switch blade and can make it difficult to assess the level of switch wear and the switch contact angle with a TGP8 gauge.

Given this situation it was decided to re-enforce the requirements of the existing standard, and to mandate in LOI/284 that a build-up of lubrication is to be removed before undertaking a detailed, or supervisor's inspection.

Change of Requirements

Clauses 3.2 & 3.3, effective from 30th March 2014 mandate the requirements for removing a build-up of grease before undertaking inspections.

The need to re-lubricate the switch, when all grease is removed for a detailed inspection is also specified.

Although not a requirement of the existing standard, most routes have confirmed that this would have been a routine requirement before the LOI was issued.

Actions taken supporting closure of recommendation

- *Benefits of switch lubrication have been assessed*
- *Risks associated with wear and damage being masked by lubrication have been assessed*
- *Requirements of the exist '053 standard have been re-briefed in the clarification briefing (February 2014)*
- *LOI/284 mandates the removed of grease before switch inspections are undertaken*

Other activities supporting this work

Findings from PSG Recommendation 5

This recommendation focuses on lessons learned from previous derailments. The findings from this study, undertaken by the Network Rail Corporate Investigations team have influenced the work undertaken. The incidents identified in this recommendation have been considered in the analysis supporting the closure of Recommendation 2.

Shrewsbury Recommendation 2

The issues identified in this recommendation have been considered alongside the PSG recommendations. A plan has been developed to re-write the '053 standard, but the associated timescales are longer. The standard has been released from the standards moratorium allowing work to commence. The target for re-issue is January 2015.

Assurance of Route Activities


Once the letter of instruction has been issued, new equipment developed and the new '053 standard issued the success of this work is then dependent on the implementation in the Routes.

Further support has been offered to the Route teams to assist with briefing the requirements of the LOI. As the phased implementation progresses Route based briefing sessions will be organised by the Technical Services, S&C team. This will be a practical session at a Network Rail training centre when beneficial. A route based approach will be developed for briefing of the new standard.

A 'how to' App is being developed to support activities associated with switch inspection and switch repair. This will form part of the briefing process and will provide a resource that is available after the briefings have taken place.

LOI/284 will be issued as a Special Inspection Notice (SIN) to enforce the requirements of the LOI/284 and receive positive confirmation that they are being applied. The SIN provides tracking of compliance against the requirements, and includes a final sign off by the routes that all the required actions have been undertaken. This system has been used successfully on a number of stretcher bar issues.

The S&C team undertake Engineering Verification on behalf of S&SD and the Network Rail Board. The S&C team will monitor the introduction of the new procedures through the Engineering Verification process.



ORR Decision

After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Network Rail has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration and:
- has taken action to implement it.

Status: Implemented. ORR will write to RAIB again if it becomes aware that the information provided is inaccurate.

Recommendation 4

The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that Freightliner assesses the risks of continued operation when deficiencies in its maintenance practices have been identified.

Freightliner should confirm that, where disparities are identified between working practices and the requirements of the maintenance instructions, it has arrangements in place to ensure that risks are adequately managed in the interim until the discrepancy is resolved.

Details of steps taken or being taken to implement the recommendation

Freightliner in its initial response on 30 September 2013 advised that:

Freightliner has taken the following actions to implement the recommendation. These actions were identified during the investigation of the Shrewsbury derailment and have therefore been implemented already.

- 1. The Freightliner Traction and Rolling Stock engineering organisation has been strengthened with the creation and appointment of a new post: Professional Head of T&RS Engineering. This post has a key responsibility to set T&RS Engineering policy and ensure compliance with this policy. This additional resource will ensure that thorough review of any issues identified will be carried out.*
- 2. A review of the Freightliner policy for Management of Engineering Change has been undertaken. This has confirmed that the policy is fully fit for purpose and when applied will ensure that any risks posed by any deficiencies in maintenance practices identified are adequately assessed and managed. This policy has clear definition of the level of review and authority that is required to be obtained whenever engineering change is considered. Any change to maintenance policy that has potential risk to safety requires the approval of the Professional Head of T&RS Engineering hence ensuring that the requirements of the recommendation are fully met.*
- 3. All staff who are authorised to review maintenance procedures have been briefed on the requirements of Freightliner's policy for management of engineering change to re-enforce the need to fully assess the risks and develop suitable control measures when any deficiencies are identified.*

ORR Decision

18. After reviewing information received ORR has concluded that, in accordance with the Railways (Accident Investigation and Reporting) Regulations 2005, Freightliner has:

- taken the recommendation into consideration and
- has taken action to implement it.

Status: *Implemented.* *ORR will write to RAIB again if it becomes aware that the information provided is inaccurate.*

NATIONAL REVIEW OF RISK BASED SO53 INSSPECTIONS 2013

Introduction

As a result of the derailment at Shrewsbury Station on the 7th July 2012, a review was requested by the Head of Workforce Safety & Compliance to review whether all point ends have been assessed as required by standard. The reviews were led by the Maintenance Compliance & Assurance Advisors for their respective Routes.

1. Ellipse Standard Jobs

We currently have 5 standard jobs set-up in Ellipse, as follows:

- All Routes have MST standard job number 009033 for every set of S&C, this is part of the Supervisors Inspection as mentioned, and will encompass S&C in the 9033 inspection, we should be able to demonstrate this, for instance the 2nd line MST description makes reference to the S&C covered and includes around 20,000 assets.
- 9005 -Inspection of switches all types, this covers all point ends and has a 56 day frequency and a 21 day tolerance, looking at the asset registers, there are a some exceptions to the frequency and some Routes have them set at 60 days or 182 days, nevertheless, they all have a planned inspection. This is in line with supervisory inspection i.e. all switches will be visually examined on routine inspection. Where this cannot be achieved (limited access etc.) this standard job will be raised in addition to the supervisory inspection to ensure all points are visually inspected and the TGP8 gauge used.
- 9006 – detailed switch inspection, this is set as a result of the point end failing the above inspection, and we have 5853 detailed inspection planned within Ellipse at present, again this is over and above the 9005 inspections (TME). When required by the Supervisor’s visual inspection detailed inspections shall be carried out at a frequency commensurate with risk and documented wear rates (i.e. increase in side-wear – 7 to 9 will result in a monthly detailed inspection). The interval for these inspections will be a maximum of 13 weeks unless supported by a risk assessment signed off by the Supervisor and approved by the Track Maintenance Engineer.
- 9376 – detailed work arising 053 inspection, this will be generated if the Section Manager has carried out the 9005 inspection and he has detected an issue / fault, action to be carried out within 36 hours, after which they may decide to create a planned 9006 inspection to monitor the point end to establish what is causing the deterioration.
- I believe this standard job number is used following a detailed inspection (9006) rather than 9005. If a detailed inspection is required following a visual inspection (9005) a detailed inspection (9006) must take place within 36 hours, lubricant applied and results acted upon (9376) though this may be captured using a defect code in RDMS, a grinding std job number etc. Alternatively control measures may include, the points are to be banned to facing moves.

- 9009 - AMS and MHT - In addition to those inspections required for switches manufactured from pearlitic rail steel, switches manufactured from Austenitic Manganese (AMS) or Mill Heat Treated (350HT) (MHT) steels shall be subject to a special inspection of the switch rail gauge corner profile (Hazard 5).

2. Current Status within each Route

LNE Route

- The 9 TMEs located within the AD North and AD South all provided a response, the following 6 TMEs all used an excel spread-sheet to record the SO53s detailed inspections, TME York, Hitchin, Peterborough, Finsbury Park and Knottingley, all stated that they have undertaken risk assessments on the relevant points, the remaining 3 TMEs at Doncaster, Newcastle and Darlington all utilised Ellipse under standard job number 9006 to manage the detailed inspections and the high risk points are identified within Ellipse
- Sheffield DU had some major issues following a FAP audit, 'Some of the switches held on the detailed inspection register are inspected 6 monthly but are not supported by a risk assessment signed by the supervisor and approved by the TME.
- A risk assessment regime was put into place after the audit, checks are on-going with the ATME to ensure that was truly embedded.
- Derby DU had a good practice for their approach to risk-assessing 053 inspections:

The TME informed the auditor that he has assessed the need for further checks on switches and additional checks have been imposed where 053 failures have occurred in the past. This is seen as a good risk based process.
- Also, one of the key drivers for an enhanced detailed regime is the wear rate of the switches and even those switches that have been renewed (due to wear) remain on the enhanced regime as the wear-rate is a common factor in the deterioration of the switch.

Sussex Route

- All the TMEs within Sussex Route undertake the 9005 inspections and as and when they find anything amiss, they would trigger a 9006 detailed inspection during the Section Managers inspections, again all items are recorded within Ellipse, none made reference to a separate register, all were utilising Ellipse.

Scotland Route

• TME Perth

All points are given a visual examination as part of TSM's 8-13 wk walkout as per standard.

If a detailed inspection is required TSM informs B. Scott who tasks Ian Stewart to carry out same.

- Section Manager then mandates repair, increased frequency of inspection or ban to facing moves.
- The SM currently has circa 35-40pts on increased frequency of inspection.

- **TME Inverness**

All points are given a visual examination as part of TSM's 8-13 wk walkout as per standard.

In addition all points are given an Annual detailed inspection. This is not MST but worked from a spread sheet.

Section Manager then mandates repair, increased frequency of inspection or ban to facing moves.

Section Manager currently has 10pts on increased frequency of inspection.

- **Edinburgh position:**

Following the PSG derailment a Scotland wide review of at risk switches was completed by DUs on the basis of guidance from Glasgow DU IME, these switches were assessed and their inspection frequency amended in ELLIPSE.

Staff deemed competent to undertake O53 inspections have all been subject to on site mentorship from the Training & Development Team in their inspections and assessment of switch condition. Reviews of O53 inspection findings are used to drive any change in inspection frequency – this is typically a change to more frequent inspection when it does occur.

Western

- The Bristol and Plymouth Specialist, confirmed that in the main both Bristol and Plymouth have carried out risk assessments on all their switches, and that they have adopted a risk based approach, recording and reviewing on their individual At Risk Switch Lists.
- Where appropriate inspection frequencies have been changed and he suggested that as far as he was aware, all MSTs were now set up, and that he didn't feel there was an issue, bearing in mind there were no NCRs raised this year on the subject for either Bristol or Plymouth. Each DU has a list which is populated with "at risk" sites all within Ellipse under standard job.
- The Thames Valley Specialist, confirmed also that Swindon DU have previously applied a risk based approach/assessment to the switches on their area and have created MSTs in Ellipse accordingly. The DU does hold a list of "at risk" sites although the RAM Specialist did intend to review this list with the TMEs in the near future to ensure that all switches have now been fully considered. The Reading DU has also applied a risk based

approach/assessment to the switches and although they passed the recent NCAP audit without any NCRs being issued against the topic, he believes there is nevertheless still some room for improvement and plans to review their list of "at risk" sites for completeness very soon.

LNW

- Within the Route they have 2306 x detailed 053 inspections of switches MST's are held within Ellipse for LNW. Frequencies range from 28 (5) days to 364 (179). This demonstrates that differing frequencies are applied dependent upon risk.
- In the main most of the delivery units on LNW utilise Ellipse to generate their cyclical detailed inspections. There are in general three approaches to detailed 053 inspection on the route:
 - Some engineers use a 'capture-all' process whereby detailed inspections are carried out on all sets of points regardless of risk.
 - Others solely rely upon the supervisory 053 inspections to flag defective switches. A detailed inspection will be generated and a cyclical inspection subsequently raised as is necessary.
 - Others risk rank their switches and assign detailed inspections based upon factors of risk and incident tally. A number of engineers maintain 'at-risk' registers and / or S&C asset registers. These provide site detail and key risk factors, aiding the process of inspection risk ranking.

Anglia

- A number of the TMEs within the Anglia Route use a local register and Ellipse, the local register contains details on switch conditions, repairs and the inspection frequency. However, unlike Ellipse, not all switches have an entry against them, some have never had a detailed inspection, due to the good condition and are used very little, Ellipse is the main register.

Wessex

- All the TMEs within Route undertake the 9005 inspections and as per the standard, issues identified during the standard inspection, trigger a 9006 detailed inspection, again all items are recorded within Ellipse, none made reference to a separate register, all were utilising Ellipse.

Wales

- Currently two of the Cardiff TME's have identified points where they have reoccurring SO53 issues and a regime of full SO53 checks are in place. This is managed via Ellipse and the frequency is based on the deterioration rate of each location.
- The third TME undertakes visual supervisor checks which trigger full SO53 inspections as required, all utilise Ellipse as the register under standard job number 9006.

- Shrewsbury DU replicate the Cardiff process, again utilising Ellipse as the main register and the relevant standard job numbers applicable to the task.

Kent

- TSM / TME Ashford have risk assessed all their switches and undertake periodic inspections ranging from 13weeks to yearly based on facing or trailing, line speed, track Cat and previous history / failures, this builds up the MSTs that we undertake. This is above the requirement of TRK/001 and the 053 standard.
- All that is required is for the TSM to visually inspect the switches during his inspection and if he deems that he has a risk then he instigates an 053 inspection as per the standard.
- Most other DUs / TSMs in Kent don't have this back up inspection and rely solely on the TSM finding it, the volume of MSTs set-up in Ellipse is low, they have provided a spreadsheet, which details all the switches and associated risks and their frequencies, the risk assessment was a desk top exercise looking through the previous inspections and maps / line classifications and then agreeing a frequency based on risk for each point end. Once the frequency was determined then the next scheduled date was set from the previous date undertaken.

Summary

- All Routes do not set-up MSTs for every set of S&C, some Delivery Units do not have separate MSTs but encompass S&C in the 9033 inspection, a random download was undertaken to demonstrate this, for instance the 2nd line MST description makes reference to the S&C covered, it's not clear if I would be able to tot up the number of sets though from a 9033 download as the description would be generic and not name the actual point ends.
- All of Routes utilise Ellipse as the main register to track all inspections, and all switches on enhanced inspections, i.e.13 weekly due to high risk or high wear and or 8 weekly if heavy Side worn is evident, all have MSTs set up in Ellipse.
- The table below is a download from Ellipse on the number of detailed inspections under job numbers:

Count of Route	9006	9005
Route	Total	Total
Anglia	128	128
East Midlands	117	117
Kent	207	206
LNE	693	696
LNW North	1733	1746
LNW South	565	567
No Route Defined	---	151
Scotland	719	718
Sussex	50	50

Wales	458	462
Wessex	363	363
Western Thames Valley	441	441
Western West (blank)	379 ---	378 ---
Grand Total	5853	6023

- A number of TME have set up a local register to track switch conditions and heavy side-wear and are correctly utilising Ellipse as the register.

Competence Review

As a result of the review undertaken, this raised further questions with regards to the competence of the individuals involved, and the following questions were asked:

- Are all the Section Managers / Supervisors undertaking routine supervisors visual inspections trained and competent to determine whether a detailed inspection is required (The relevant competence is TR07.01)?

A full download of all the individuals holding the relevant competency was provided, 145 were under mentorship, 1595 were fully competent, 667 were deemed to no longer require the competency and were awaiting the records to be updated and TR07.01 removed.

- Are any Team Leaders within the Routes / Delivery Units also carrying out routine supervisors inspections, do they possess the relevant competence – TR07.01?

All the Routes confirmed that they have Team Leaders/Supervisors undertaking this inspection and all hold the correct competency.

- And do they have the required approval of this delegation from the RAM or TME?

Positive confirmation was provided by the majority of Routes, that the delegated authority is in place and for the few Routes who were not able to confirm, they have now addressed the issue with the RAM /TME.

Conclusions

- Ellipse is the company register for assets, the review has identified that the Delivery Units do have a register of all sites and “At Risk” sites, albeit, some do maintain “other” registers over and above the requirements. **No further actions required.**
- The competence review identified a few issues with profiles not being managed or updated; Delivery Units are now undertaking a data cleansing exercise to address the issues raised.

Timescale – 31 March 2014