

## Welcome to RIHSAC 100

Happy anniversary!

Dilip Sinha, RIHSAC Secretary
12 October 2015

Rail Industry Health & Safety Advisory
Committee

12 October 2015


John Cartledge

- 1974 Health & Safety at Work etc Act
- 1978 RIAC
- 1987 Kings X fire → Fennell inquiry
- 1989 Clapham Junction collision → Hidden inquiry
- 1990 HMRI → HSE
- 1993 Railways Act: privatisation

- 1997 Southall collision → Uff inquiry
- 1999 Railway Safety Regulations
- 1999 London Underground PPP
- 1999 Ladbroke Grove collision → Cullen inquiry
- 2000 Hatfield derailment → demise of Railtrack
- 2001 Strategic Rail Authority

- 2002 Alan Osborne
- 2003/5 RSSB, RAIB
- 2004 EU 2nd Railway Package
- 2005 Railways Act : SRA, HMRI → ORR
- 2010 London Underground PPP
- 2012 Red Tape Challenge
- 2013 Law Commissions' report on level crossings





#### RIAC composition in 1978

- 4 CBI members (3 BRB, 1 LUL)
- 4 TUC members (1 TUC, 1 NUR, 1 AUEW, 1 TSSA)
- Railway medical services
- HSE observers

• Chairman : Chief Inspector

#### RIHSAC composition in 2015

- 18 members (ASLEF, RMT, TSSA, Unite, Network Rail, LUL, ATOC, ISLG, RFOA, RSSB, ROSCOs, CPT, HRA, RIA, Transport Focus, London TravelWatch, +2 co-optees)
- 6 observers (BTP, PACTS, DfT, DRDNI, Transport Scotland, WAG)

Chair : ORR Board member

#### **RIAC** terms of reference 1978

 To consider and advise the HSC on the protection of people at work from hazards to health and safety arising from their occupation within the railway industry and the protection of the public from related hazards arising from such activities

#### **RIHSAC** terms of reference 2015

- To advise ORR on developing and implementing its strategy for improving standards of health and safety in the rail industry and protecting passengers, people at work and the public from related hazards
- To provide informed comment to ORR on its proposed advice and guidance to the rail industry arising from ORR's strategies and policies
- To encourage the participation of representative organisations in the protection of people from hazards to health and safety arising from the operation of railway services
- To involve all those with an interest in health and safety on Britain's railways in the work of RIHSAC.

**RIAC** documents 1978



RIHSAC documents 2015



#### **RIAC** sub-committees

#### **RIHSAC** working parties


- Occupational health
- Freight
- Human factors
- Safety critical work
- Trespass and vandalism
- Communications and research

#### Some evolving issues ...

- Trackside safety
- Driver stress
- Electrification
- Violence to staff
- Fire safety
- Train protection
- Rolling contact fatigue
- Infrastructure integrity

- Safety cases
- ROGS
- Dangerous goods
- Crowding
- Trespass and vandalism
- Suicide
- Road/rail interface
- SPADs

- Vehicle crashworthiness
- Road accident risks to staff
- Slips, trips, falls
- Platform-train interface
- Freight train derailments
- Managing passengers during disruption



#### **Areopagitica**

(John Milton 1644)

"where there is much desire to learn, here of necessity will be much arguing, much writing, many opinions; for opinion in good men is but knowledge in the making."









## RIHASAC Meeting #100 Trade unions – the past present and future!







# Happy Birthday!!







#### 1978 headlines:

- BRB/TU Productivity Steering Group "competition, productivity, efficiency."
- Rates of pay for female staff Board refused to discuss as it was "not considered an item of major importance".
- JSC items: stress factors in signal boxes, ear protection, authorised walking routes, asbestos, HSWA 74 – 1 safety rep for each LDC rep.
- Danger money 5p/8hr shift for working with high levels of dust "dirty allowance".
- 1976 18 track worker deaths.







#### 1978

- Interim report of the Track Safety Working Party established after calls by the TU's – Interim report recommendations:
- Consistent rules; Yodalarm issued to all maintenance gangs in a year; other warning systems rolled out over a longer period; human lookouts replaced in 5-10 years; headlights fitted to all trains as soon as possible; tidy days.
- Safety reps appointed in the machinery. Trained by the TUC. Use the machinery not HMRI.







#### What's wrong/what doesn't work?

- Return to risk based maintenance (BCR)
- Fragmentation of the railway/Network Rail
- Fragmentation leads to loss of opportunities for ill-health and accident reduction
- Profit and Production over safety
- Employers not listening







#### What's right?







#### What's good?

- "Can't think of one thing, not convinced by any future proposals by the Government or if there is a real commitment to rail"
- Growing recognition that rail employers must address health as main issue
- Continuing tripartite approach including working with health and safety representatives – 3<sup>rd</sup>
   November is 5<sup>th</sup> annual ORR/TU Conference







#### What could be better?

- Publically owned railway with a real long term strategy based on growth and integrated transport
- Continuing improvements on worker health and with worker involvement
- Greater commitment to support and encourage the work of health and safety reps







#### What could be better?

- Meaningful consultation
- Full time release for a Safety Rep in every company – acting as a fulcrum between employers and those they put at risk
- Better understanding and improvements in managing fatigue – again, with worker involvement









# Finally – someone who will listen to what we have been advocating for years!







- All rail franchises would be brought back into public ownership as they expire under a Labour government.
- "We know there is overwhelming support from the British people for a People's Railway, better and more efficient services, proper integration and fairer fares"
- A TUC report said that if the 11 franchises due to be renewed by 2020 nationalised £520m would be saved on shareholder dividends and £240m on dividends to Network Rail subcontractors.





## Looking forward to a better safer railway

George Bearfield

**Gary Cooper** 

Lisbeth Fromling

**26 February 2016** 




#### Overview

- How we've performed
- What we've learned
- ■The key challenges
- Where do we go from here:
  - -Activity
  - -Leadership
  - -Behaviour




#### Train accidents with passenger and workforce fatalities



Source: ORR for historical data; SMIS for recent statistics.



#### Train accident precursors





#### Key accidents of the modern era

1978: Taunton sleeper fire – demonstrated value of sharing lessons learnt

**1984: Polmont** – changes to rules, rolling stock, cab-to-shore comms

**1988: Clapham Junction** – brought out issues of change management, risk management, and initiated thinking about personal fatigue, organisational fatigue and the concept of control of accidental loss.

**1988/9: Clapham Junction, Purley (SPAD), Bellgrove (SPAD)** – sped the introduction of ATP/improved train protection, also contributed to withdrawal of Mark I rolling stock

**1997/1999:** Ladbroke Grove, Southall – sped the introduction of TPWS, raised issues of containment

**2000: Hatfield** – end of Railtrack, increased research into wheel-rail interface, improvements to track maintenance

**2002: Potters Bar** – Network Rail brings maintenance in-house

2007: Grayrigg - more focus on point maintenance, track inspection and organisational culture



#### Key challenges and opportunities


- Busier network, more people travelling aging infrastructure
- Risks to assets including terrorism, cyber security
- Platform Train Interface, signals passed at danger
- Work-related road driving
- Trespass and suicide
- Digital Railway
- Innovation, investment and technology







#### A common approach to risk management





#### Behaviours and leadership

We need to visibly embed a common approach to risk management

- To be effective
- To be consistent
- To be compliant

We all need to behave consistently – develop shared priorities, and work together visibly to deliver them.

We need to continuously improve and develop our maturity

As safety leaders, we need to be clear about the importance of safety and behave as we would expect others to.



#### What do we need from the regulator?

Act with consistent and joined-up behaviours



Evidence based interventions

Support the industry



Promote leadership and maturity





We have achieved progress to be proud of.

However, we need to continue showing leadership, and pursuing excellence in safety.

This means being mature enough to work together with long term strategy, focus and perseverance, and supporting each other in this journey even as challenges arise.





# Thank you

#### Looking forward to a safer, better railway



**Director for Health Safety Environment London Underground and London Rail** 

# Investment & Renewal

# C.6bn YEAR

Largest investment programme in the Tube's history. Along with Crossrail & Network Rail, it is the largest in the country and one of the largest in Europe.


- Our reputation for a strong investment record means we are trusted to deliver
- Investment in us means we can deliver more and get even better at doing so




# **Engagement & Collaboration**







# Barriers/Challenges







# Looking forward to a better, safer railway

GREATEST WENTURE SWHA LIES AHEAD

J.R.R.TOLKIEN



# Why review the Enforcement Policy Statement?

- It is 2.5 years since the last review;
- Results of review by the Attorney General's Office;
- A wish to:
  - make it more accessible less "legal speak";
  - be more representative of all our regulatory tools too much focus on formal enforcement;
  - highlight our priority areas;
  - include reference to the Growth Duty from the Enterprise Bill;
  - lay out our processes for meeting the Victims Code and Killick judgement
- BUT the principles of enforcement have not changed;



# **Progress to date**

- Mostly presentational changes.
- Consultation draft undergone targetted consultation e.g. HSE, BIS, Whitehall Prosecutors Group, Govt National Investigators Group;
- Public consultation via the website;
- Feedback:
  - very positive, welcoming the changes;
  - some advice re clearer drafting



# RIHSAC

# Any further comments?





# Europe update: Focus on Fourth Railway Package Implications for safety regulation

Martin Jones, Head of Railway Safety Policy, October 2015

# What is the state of play?

- Legal text agreed by Member States
- Formal adoption by Parliament before end 2015?
- Three year transposition deadline from adoption date
- Option for additional year if individual states wish
- Cion and ERA working to January 2019
- Three phases:
  - Phase 1 (to October 2017): Development of secondary legislation and collaboration to get shared understanding on assessment processes, criteria and national rules
  - Phase 2 (2018): "Shadow running": informal ERA involvement in NSA-led consideration of applications; conclusion of co-op agreements
  - Phase 3 (from 1 January 2019): ERA "one stop shop" for safety certificates and vehicle / type authorisations is live



# What is the "Technical Pillar"?

- Revised safety Directive (2004/49/EC)
  - Safety certification of train operators
  - Safety authorisation of infrastructure managers
  - Certification of entities in charge of maintenance
  - Common safety methods, indicators and targets
  - Roles and responsibilities of national safety authorities and investigation bodies
- Revised interoperability Directive (2008/57/EC)
  - Authorisation of rail vehicles, infrastructure and signalling
  - Technical specifications for interoperability / national rules
  - Conformity assessment bodies (NoBos and DeBos)
- Revised ERA Regulation (2004/881/EU)
  - Tasks and working methods of the Agency
  - Structure and resourcing of ERA and its working groups



# Why change the Directives?

- Good question many stakeholders prefer continuity supported by clearer enforcement of current EU legislation
- According to the European Commission:
  - Growth in EU rail is moribund (except UK) compared to other modes
  - New entrants and competition is the answer
  - Certification and authorisation processes are a barrier to market entry
  - Multiplicity and lack of harmonisation of process is inefficient compared to other modes
  - Divergent levels of safety performance a concern in own right...
  - ...and are a pretext / justification for blocking mutual recognition
  - Industry examples of new equipment / services being blocked / delayed
- Safety certification and vehicle authorisation focus of change



# What is changing?

- Single EU Safety Certificate (no more Part As and Bs)
- ERA decision-making role in safety certification and vehicle authorisation
  - For all cross-border applications
  - For domestic-only applications by choice of applicant
- Supported by mandatory ERA-NSA co-operation agreements
- EU "One Stop Shop" for <u>all</u> applications
- ERA "system authority" for ERTMS = approval of tenders
- Probable extension of ECM certification to all vehicles
- Possible extension of driver licensing to other crew
- European Vehicle Register



# What will stay the same?

- An awful lot not a radical change as per ROGS
- RU and IM share system safety responsibility (with some new "actors" identified)
- Safety permissioning based on high-level assessment of SMS
- General structure and content of TSIs and CSMs
- Assessment process and timescales broadly same (except international);
   tweaks to assessment criteria
- IM safety authorisation done by ORR
- All supervision carried out by NSAs; must be risk-based
- Interop authorisation of infrastructure projects (including CCS) by ORR
- National rules: progressive elimination; retention in limited circumstances; scrutiny by ERA
- Accident investigation bodies: no substantive changes



# Priority open issues

- Linking "supervision" (by ORR) and "assessment" (by ERA)
- Reaching multiple NSA consensus on assessment outcomes
- Transitional arrangements for current auth / cert holders
- Development of ERA competence, resources and IT systems
- ERA fees for applications (and NSA recharging for advice)
- Assessing how many applications will be made to ERA vs NSAs
  - Number of genuine cross-border proposals?
  - How many domestic applicants will choose ERA assessment?
- Impact on RISC, NSA network and ERA working groups of reduced role for MS in voting TSIs, CSMs and CSTs
- Many other points in the detail



# ORR approach / next steps

#### International

- ORR chairing ERA / NSA group developing co-operation mechanisms
- Influencing development of secondary regulations (e.g. new CSMs)
- Providing advice / expertise to help ERA prepare (e.g. learning cases)

#### Domestic

- More in-depth legal and policy analysis of new legislation
- Review of UK national rules notifications (with RSSB) well progressed
- Developing understanding internally (Board in November) and across industry
- Collaboration with DfT on revised regulations on safety (ROGS) and interop (RIR)
- Working with industry on practical transition (possible steering group)
- Channel Tunnel



# How you can help

- Influencing secondary legislation: Input to our consideration of EU proposals
- Preparing ERA: Ideas for "learning cases" / "shadow running"
- Guiding implementation: Participation in any UK steering / consultation groups we might set up
- Early engagement: Flagging areas of concern / challenge / ambiguity







# Leading Health and Safety on Britain's Railway –

A strategy for working together



### Why create a Rail Industry Health and Safety Strategy?

- We had a Rail Industry Safety Plan before....
- It now 'feels' like a gap
- The challenge was raised, the question was asked of industry, the answer 'yes' was broadly unanimous
- Leaders recognise that a focus on promotion of leadership and commitment to a cross-industry collaborative approach to health and safety has potential for benefit
- Industry recognises it needs to work better together to deliver improved health and safety performance
- ORR supportive and potentially demanding of the strategy
- Trilogy of Industry strategies: Rail Technical Strategy, H&S Strategy, People skills and capability Strategy



#### Industry agreed the following:

#### The strategy will be:

- Developed for the long term
- Focussed on areas where collaboration can deliver benefits
- Use ambition driven goals, not quantitative targets
- Designed to clarify and signpost, not to replace existing strategies
- A signpost document clarifying safety management in the railway
- Cover the entirety of the GB railway, including depots and sidings

#### The strategy will not be:

- An all encompassing risk reduction strategy or plan
- Written to replace individual SMS holders responsibilities for their own risk management
- A wrapper for all health and safety activities
- A set of targets



### Industry agreed 3 primary goals:

- 1. To provide a focus for leadership in key areas where increased collaboration will deliver benefits
- To suggest/identify collaborative strategies where crossindustry actions will deliver improved management of health and safety risk
- 3. To be a reference point for how health and safety is managed on the modern railway



## What have we done?

Dates	Activity
Oct 2014	NR Chief Exec proposed to RDG that GB mainline railway should have a H&S Strategy
Jan 2015	Industry leaders workshop – discussed the merits/purpose of a strategy. Outcome was positive with clear goals and scope
April 2015	Concept endorsed by ISM
May 2015	Engaged (very small) project team. RSSB funding secured
June - August 2015	Co-creation of content Extensive interviews, consultation and collaboration: with recognised experts, organisational representatives, industry groups Early drafts for consideration by the above/wider industry.
September 2015	Further consultation/editing and evolution Developed 'look' and 'feel' and final draft
October 2015	ISM – strategy 'endorsed'.






#### Structure of the strategy

- Forward
- Introduction
- Working together
- •How is health and safety managed on the modern railway
- Improving our management capability
- Governance, monitoring and review
- Priorities for working together



#### Forward – Leadership Commitments


- •Understand, endorse and champion the strategy, and communicate it within their own organisation
- Review and adjust company health and safety policy plans
- •Help establish recognised cross-industry arrangements to facilitate delivery
- Empower teams to engage with and support agreed crossindustry arrangements to address identified risks and improvement opportunities
- Lead specific workstreams or activities
- Set up and participate in arrangements to review the strategy



- AT Workface assault and trauma
- Fa Fatigue
- Hw Health and wellbeing
- RR Road risk
- ws Workforce safety
- то Train operations
- Fr Freight
- Station operations
- PB Public behaviour
- RS Rolling stock
- In Infrastructure
- LC Level crossings



#### Working Together – maturity of collaboration





#### How is health and safety is managed on the modern railway?






#### Improving our management capability





#### Priorities for working together





#### Vision

Further professionalising station management, by adopting more consistent management practices, will deliver demonstrable benefits, both operational and safety related.

The incidence of slips, trips, and falls; and PTI incidents will be reduced. Operational inconsistencies between and within companies will be eliminated, such as in ticket gate line operations or dispatch arrangements. Rail companies will work together to eliminate counter productive operational inconsistencies and develop approaches based on shared good practices for passenger management, and station design and management arrangements.

All affected parties will be involved at all stages of station redevelopment. They will work together to reduce disruption due to the construction works, and ensure that the final designs are capable of dealing with the increased passenger numbers expected over the next 10 years (and beyond).



## Next steps

Dates	Activity
Oct – Early Dec	Final consultation: wider industry leaders, subject matter experts, HSE professionals and industry groups
Early Dec	Final draft complete
Mid Dec	Individual company endorsement
Jan 2016	Final publication
On-going	Inform liP