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We attach great importance to the views of freight stakeholders, including freight customers, as we seek to understand the practical implications of policies under development and the regulatory approach that we take. To further inform our understanding of the freight sector, we carried out a survey of potential and existing freight customers during 2012. This covered the following areas: current

We carried out a research study in autumn 2009 into the application of The Railways and Other Guided Transport Systems (Safety) Regulations 2006 (ROGS) as part of the wider review of ROGS implementation conducted by independent consultants Noble Denton Associates for ORR. The scope of the study was to: assess whether the requirement to obtain safety authorisation or certification could be a

We carried out a public market study between September 2010 and February 2011 into access to rail freight sites in Great Britain. This resulted in a stakeholder consultation from May to July 2011, in which we described a number of potential issues affecting this sector, with a particular focus on the effectiveness of the various provisions that were put in place at privatisation to prevent the

We have commenced a review of the Association of Train Operating Companies' (ATOC) Code of Practice for the supply of Real Time Train Information. ATOC introduced its Code of Practice (the Code) through its subsidiary National Rail Enquiries (NRE) in April 2010 following ORR's Competition Act investigation into its supply of RTTI products. Although the investigation found that ATOC had not

The outcome of our investigation under the Competition Act 1998 in 2010 into the conduct of DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited (DBS) regarding the pricing of a contract for petroleum haulage by rail in Great Britain. DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited We found no evidence that DB Schenker Rail (UK) Limited (DBS) has infringed the prohibition imposed by section 18 of the Competition Act 1998 or Article 102

The outcome of our investigation under the Competition Act 1998 in 2001 regarding a number of passenger complaints about the scale of increases of the unregulated fares on Virgin's West Coast Trains Ltd. We received a number of complaints from passengers and passenger representatives regarding the scale of increases of the unregulated fares on Virgin's West Coast Trains Ltd. We considered

The outcome of our investigation under the Competition Act 1998 in 2004-2005 into a complaint by NTM Sales and Marketing Ltd (NTM). We decided that there are no grounds for action under the Chapter I prohibition of the Competition Act 1998 and Article 81 of the EC Treaty against Portec Rail Products (UK) Ltd (Portec) and RS Clare and Company Ltd (Clare). We have also decided, in respect of Portec

On 17 November 2009 we concluded our investigation under the Competition Act 1998 into the conduct of the Association of Train Operating Companies (ATOC) and its subsidiary National Rail Enquiries (NRE) in the provision of Real Time Train Information (RTTI) through its ownership of the 'Darwin' database. We found that, on the basis of the available evidence, ATOC's conduct had not amounted to an

Details of our current casework regarding suspected breaches of competition law. Review of Freightliner commitments On 31 March 2019, the commitments provided by Freightliner in December 2015 expired. These commitments had the effect of discontinuing our investigation into deep sea container rail transport services. After they expired, we conducted a short review to determine whether we should

Independent reporters provide professional advice to the ORR on the quality of Network Rail's service provision, as specified in its licence.

Condition 1 of the network licence sets out Network Rail's core obligations to secure the operation, maintenance, renewal and enhancement of the network in order to satisfy the reasonable requirements of its customers and funders. This covers both the quality and capability of the network and the facilitation of railway service performance. The condition includes some specific obligations on

On 30 July 2007, we imposed a penalty of £2.4m for Network Rail's breach of its licence in failing adequately to evaluate and mitigate the risks associated with the Portsmouth resignalling project and to manage its contractor in line with best practice. The documents below provide more background to our decision. Portsmouth Resignalling - enforcement - letter to NR 6 Sep 2007 Portsmouth

On 2 March 2006, we imposed a fine of £250,000 on Network Rail for its failure to ensure the information it made available to the industry on the capability of its infrastructure was accurate. Infrastructure Capability - letter to NR regarding completion of final milestones in the recovery plan PDF icon PDF, 103 Kb 10 Jan 2008 Infrastructure Capability - Breach of Network Licence - Letter from

On 13 May 2008, we imposed a penalty of £14m on Network Rail because of systemic weaknesses in Network Rail's planning and execution of engineering work which represented a serious and continuing breach of its licence. These problems were exposed in our investigation into the overruns into the New Year. Improving project delivery - 2010 Audits - ORR letter to Network Rail 15 Jul 2010 Improving

A programme of international fact-finding visits was conducted during the summer and autumn of 2007 to a number of railway administrations in Europe, North America and Australia. This study tour was part of our work on the 2008 Periodic Review, which will determine the regulated outputs and access charges for the five year control period (CP4) between 1 April 2009 and 31 March 2014. To be able to

The 2008 Periodic Review (PR08) set the outputs that Network Rail must deliver, and the level of access charges paid by train operators for use of the infrastructure from 1 April 2009 to 31 March 2014, or control period 4 (CP4).

How we'll monitor Network Rail 2014-2019

The decisions we've made will help the railway to grow in a sustainable way which minimises the costs to taxpayers, passengers and freight customers.

The assessment of the scope for Network Rail to improve on its cost efficiency is central to our work, since it enables us to establish efficient levels of track access charges when we periodically review Network Rail's outputs as part of a balanced package.